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Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part II
Vern Countryman*
Originally, an assignee in bankruptcy taking title to the
bankrupt's property could elect to abandon that which was
worthless or onerous, including executory contracts. With the
amendment of the Bankruptcy Act in the 1930's, Congress codified this option with respect to executory contracts but nowhere undertook to define that elusive term. In Part I of this
Article, Professor Countryman defined "executory contract" in
the light of the purpose for which the bankruptcy trustee is
given the option to assume or reject. Finding the Willistonian
meaning of the term too expansive for the purposes of the
trustees option, Countryman concluded that within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act an executory contract is one under
which the obligations of both the bankrupt and the other party
to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other. With this definition as a
touchstone, Professor Countryman began to dredge the morass
of judicial analysis of the trustees option with respect to specific kinds of contracts: (1) land contracts and (2) contracts
for the sale of goods. Part II of this Article opens with a continuation of this discussion with respect to (3) employment contracts.

3. Employment Contracts
The bankruptcy trustee's option to assume or reject an
executory contract evolved from the judicial doctrine that
permitted abandonment of worthless or onerous property the ti2 20
tle to which had passed from the bankrupt to the trustee..
The trustee's exercise of the option to assume or reject an employment contract is thus limited in two respects: (1) the employment contract must be an executory contract; and (2) the
title to the contract must pass to the trustee under section 70a
22 1
of the Bankruptcy Act.
*Professor of Law, Harvard Law School. Part I of this article
appeared at 57 Mum. L. REv. 439 (1973).
220. For a discussion of the origins of the right of the trustee to
abandon executory contracts which he finds to be worthless or onerous,
see Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MIRNi.
. REv. 439, 440, 456 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Countryman, Part I].
221. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1970). Since U.S.C. section numbers do not
correspond to the section numbers of the Act as enacted, cross references
to U.S.C. Title 11 will be noted herein. Section 77B of the Act has
been superseded by the provisions of Chapter X, and thus no cross references will be provided.
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In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement, many
employment relationships involve no contract at all. When the
employee has been fully compensated for the services he has
rendered, there remains at most an outstanding offer by the
employer to pay for future services at an established rate.
Such an offer can be revoked by the employer at any time before additional services are performed by the employee.
When the employee has not been fully compensated for all
the services he has rendered, he retains a claim against the employer for those services. The contract upon which the employee's claim is based is unilateral because only the employer
has made a promise,222 and such a contract is not executory as
that term has been defined under the Act because no further
performance is owing from the employee. 223 In the event of the
employee's bankruptcy, he would have a claim for wages
22 4
which would pass to his bankruptcy trustee under section 70a
unless the claim was exempt. The bankruptcy trustee would
not, however, have an executory contract which he could assume or reject. Thus, the employer could gain neither a first
priority claim against the employee's estate as a result of the
trustee's assumption of the contract nor a provable claim for
damages against the estate as a result of the trustee's rejection
of the contract. In the event of the employer's bankruptcy, the
trustee would not assume the contract so as to elevate the employee's wage claim to a first priority expense of administration, and provability and possible second priority 22 5 of the em222.

1 A. Coiwni,

CoNTmAcTs §§ 21, 70, 96 (1963); 1 S.

WLSTON,

CONTRACTS § 39 (3d ed. 1957).
223. See Countryman, Part I, at 460.

224. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1970).
225. Section 64a(2) provides a second priority for "wages and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have been earned
within three months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding, due to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling, or city salesmen
...." 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1970). In view of the classes of claimants specified, the courts have attempted to limit the priority to those
in '"menial" or "subordinate" positions and to exclude executives. See,
e.g., Frasher v. Robinson, 458 F.2d 492 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972); In re Ko-Ed Tavern, 129 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1942);

Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 F. 35 (9th Cir. 1915). For those entitled
to claim the priority, however, the term "wages" has been found sufficiently broad to cover a variety of fringe benefits. The chief difficulty
with fringe benefits is the determination whether they were "earned"
within three months of bankruptcy. See, e.g., In re Ad Serv. Engraving
Co., 338 F.2d 41 (6th Cir. 1964) (vacation pay allocated in part to three
month period; severance pay found not to be wages because not
"earned"); United States v. Munro-Van Helms Co., 243 F.2d 10 (5th
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ployee's claim would not be affected by the trustee's rejection
of the contract.
The conclusion that a contract is unilateral and therefore not
executory within the meaning of the Act is often obviated in
actual decision
Courts frequently avoid the determination
that an employment contract is unilateral by finding evidence
that the employee and the employer intended to make mutual
Cir. 1957) (vacation pay allocated in part); Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Sampsel1, 172 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1949) (same); In re Public
Ledger, 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947) (vacation and severance pay allocated in part). See also Kavanas v. Mead, 171 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1948).
NLRB back pay awards are entitled to a second priority to the extent
allocable to the three-month period. Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25
(1952). However, the employer contributions to a union welfare fund
under a collective bargaining contract which were made to a trustee
at a flat rate of $8 per month per employee and in which no employee
"had any right whatsoever" have been held to be neither "wages" nor
"due to workmen." United States v. Embassy Restaurant, 359 U.S. 29
(1959). See also Joint Indus. Bd. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1928).
But Sulmeyer v. Southern Calif Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d 768
(9th Cir. 1962), gives second priority to an allocable part of employer
contributions to trustees under a union vacation fund where the contributions were calculated at a percentage of each employee's gross pay
and where the employees had a right to draw against the fund for holidays and annual vacations.
The priorities prescribed by § 64a, including the wage priority, are
expressly made inapplicable in Chapter X cases by § 102, 11 U.S.C.
§ 502 (1970); and § 77b provides that "unsecured claims, which would
have been entitled to priority if a receiver in equity of the property
of the debtor had been appointed by a Federal court on the day of
the approval of the petition, shall be entitled to such priority." 11
U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
The latter provision has been held to incorporate
the "six-month rule" formerly employed in equity receiverships of railroads and public utilities. Under this rule current debts for wages, supplies, traffic balances and repairs incurred by the debtor within a reasonable period prior to the receivership, usually but not invariably six
months, were given priority of payment from operating income. Southern Ry. v. Flournoy, 301 F.2d 847 (4th Cir. 1962); In 7e Chicago &
N.W.R.R, 110 F.2d 425 (7th Cir. 1940). On the theory that the justification for this rule was that the particular claimants favored by it had
"relied in. extending credit on the availability of current income" for
payment, the rule was held inapplicable in the pending reorganization
of the New Haven because that road had no net operating income during
the six months preceding approval of the petition nor thereafter. In
re New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 405 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969).
Under § 197 a Chapter X judge is authorized to classify claims,
and there has been some limited and selective invocation of the sLmonth rule in Chapter X cases where the debtor is not a public utility.
11 U.S.C. § 597 (1970). See In re Hallmark Medical Servs., Inc, 475
F.2d 801 (5th Cir., cert. denied, Martin v. Mizrahi 94 S. Ct. 359 (1973); In
re Yale Express Sys., Inc., 342 F. Supp. 972 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); 6A W. COLimn, BANwRUPTcY 9.13[5] (14th ed. 1972).
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promises of service and payment for a fixed or for a reasonable
period of time.

226

Even where there is an executory employment contract,
however, it may not pass to the trustee of the bankrupt employee or employer 22 7 so as to allow the trustee to assume or
reject the contract. The trustee will be denied this option
with respect to a "personal contract," a label which may be unfortunate and misleading 228 but one which nonetheless springs
from the sound doctrine that the performance called for by the
contract may be so "personal" to the bankrupt that it cannot
226. 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 70 (1950); 1 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 39 (3d ed. 1957). See, e.g., Whightsel v. Felton, 95 F. 923, 924-25
(S.D. Ohio 1899), where an injured railroad employee had settled his
claim against the road in return for $630 and the promise of the road
to employ him as a conductor for so long as he was able to serve or
until he was given a written statement of cause for dismissal. The
court found that the employee "promised to serve the railroad company"
so that "there was complete mutuality of obligation" and that the employee had an unsecured claim for damages against the estate when
the road went into receivership and the receiver dismissed him without
written statement of cause. But the court also held that the employee's
damage claim was not of a first priority status because the receiver
had not assumed the employment contract merely by employing the
conductor for almost a year before discharging him. The money paid
to the employee for his services to the receiver was said to be "a part
of the operating expenses of the road," but to elevate his damage claim
to that level "would be inconsistent with, and in frustration of, the purposes for which the receiver was appointed."
227. E.g., the employer of a personal secretary.
228. Not all employment contracts are "personal contracts" nor are
all "personal contracts" employment contracts. For example, it has
been assumed that the trustee does not take title to the bankrupt's executory contract to purchase real estate on credit, Texas & N.O.R.R.
v. Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1952), and it has been held that the
trustee of a bankrupt brewer cannot assume and sell to another the
bankrupt's executory contract to supply its beer to a customer, Jetter
v. Scollan, 48 Misc. 546, 96 N.Y.S. 274 (Sup. Ct. 1905), aff'd 114 App.
Div. 902, 100 N.Y.S. 1112 (1906).
For cases where the court was misled by the label "personal contract" into overlooking the fact that the bankrupt had performed all
of his nondelegable services before or after bankruptcy, see Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases (Part I), 47 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 407, 464 (1972). Of course, any money earned by an individual
bankrupt for his "personal" efforts after the petition is filed does not
pass to his bankruptcy trustee. Id. at 449-62. Hence, where a corporation discharges its manager after his bankruptcy and in breach of his
employment contract, the damage claim represents a loss of postbankruptcy earnings and does not pass to his bankruptcy trustee. Villar & Co. v. Conde, 30 F.2d 588, 590 (1st Cir. 1929). Although the
court decided that "neither the contract nor the right of action passed
to the trustee," it would doubtless have awarded the trustee non-exempt
salary accrued and unpaid at bankruptcy had there been any.

19741

CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY

be 'delegated to his trustee or to one to whom the trustee may
sell the contract. The doctrine would doubtless apply so that the
trustee could not perform the employment contract of an actress, a musician, a professional football player or even a law
professor.229 Conversely it is unlikely that the doctrine would
prevent the trustee's performance of the employment contract
of a ditch digger, a street cleaner or a dishwasher. This comes
very close to saying that the trustee of the employee only takes
title to an executory contract of employment in cases where he
would not want to assume it and where the employer would not
be damaged by its rejection. It is not surprising, therefore, that
most cases dealing with executory employment contracts have
arisen in the bankruptcy proceedings of the employer..2 30 In the
229. Although the trustee would thus not be able to reject the "per-

sonal" employment contract of the bankrupt employee, the employer
would nonetheless have a provable claim for damages if such an employee ceased performance before or after his bankruptcy. It should
be enough for provability under § 63a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (4) (1970),
that the employment contract was in existence at bankruptcy, even
though the breach may have come later. The only problem with such
a claim might arise under § 57d, 11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970), which requires
that the damages be "capable of liquidation or of reasonable estimation" without unduly delaying the administration of the estate. Only
if this requirement were not met would the claim be deemed not provable under § 63d, 11 U.S.C. § 103(d) (1970), and hence not dischargeable
under § 17a, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1970). See notes 46, 56, and 57, Countryman, Part I. Thus the court in Savoy Record Co. v. Mercury Record
Corp., 108 F. Supp. 957, 958-59 (D.N.J. 1952), a modern version of Lumley v. Gye, 2 EL & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853), arguably reached
a correct result despite its incorrect analysis of the discharge issue. In
Savoy, a singer under a recording contract with Savoy filed a voluntary
petition in bankruptcy listing Savoy as his only creditor. After obtaining a discharge of his "debt" to Savoy, he signed a new contract with
Mercury Records. Savoy then sued Mercury to enjoin Mercury's manufacture and sale of the singer's records on the theory that Mercury
had induced a breach of his contract with Savoy. Mercury defended
on the ground that Savoy's contract with the singer had been discharged
in bankruptcy. Because "no monies were due to flow from [the singer]
to plaintiff under that executory contract for services," the court concluded that the "petition in bankruptcy was filed for the sole purpose
of evading" the singer's contract with Savoy. As the singer was thus
not "an honest but unfortunate debtor" for whom the bankruptcy discharge was intended, a preliminary injunction issued pending trial. The
Savoy court could have reached the same result by sounder reasoning
had it recognized that damages are frequently awarded against parties
from whom "no monies were due to flow" under their contracts and
that Savoy's contract claim against the singer may well have been discharged. The court could then have held that this discharge did not
cover any tort claim Savoy had against Mercury.
230. The one exception seems to be Villar & Co. v. Conde, 30 F.2d
588 (1st Cir. 1929), discussed supra note 228.
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treatment of these cases it will be useful to distinguish between
individual employment contracts and collective bargaining contracts.
a.

Individual Contracts

In the straight bankruptcy liquidation of an employer, the
trustee will not often assume an executory individual employment contract. Such a contract would be assumed only where
the trustee continues the business with the intent to sell it as a
going concern or where the trustee intends to sell the contract
of a particularly valuable employee. 231 If the trustee does assume the contract, any compensation earned but not paid to the
employee at the time of bankruptcy is a nonpriority claim unless some part of it qualifies for a second priority under section
64a (2) .232 Any compensation earned by and payable to the
employee under the contract after the bankruptcy and prior
to sale of the contract is a first priority expense of administration. If the trustee does not assume the contract within the
time fixed by section 70b, 23 3 he will be deemed under that section to have rejected it. Such a rejection is treated by section
63c as a breach of the contract as of the date of the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. 23

4

In the event of such a breach the

employee has both a nonpriority provable claim for loss of future earnings and a provable claim for compensation earned and
unpaid at the time of bankruptcy. Again, some part of this
latter claim may qualify for second priority treatment.
But even this much must be deduced from the face of the
Act. The only straight bankruptcy case which is relevant to
the above analysis of the trustee's option was decided before
the Bankruptcy Act made express provision for the treatment of
executory contracts. In this case a corporate vice-president attempted to prove a claim for his future salary for the unexpired balance of a five-year contract. 235

Judge Learned Hand

231. In the latter case the bankrupt employer's obligations under
the individual contract must be delegable to the intended purchaser.

232. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2) (1970). See note 225 supra.
233. Id. § 110(b). See text accompanying note 48, Countryman,
Part. I.
234. 11 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1970). See text accompanying note 47,
Countryman, Part I, where § 63c is miscited as § 63a.
235. In re Montague & Gillet, Inc., 212 F. 452 (S.D.N.Y. 1914). See
also Erie Malleable Co. v. Standard Parts Co., 299 F. 82 (6th Cir. 1924),
rejecting the claim of a corporate vice-president with a two-year em-
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dismissed the claim as not provable without discussion of the
issue of assumption or rejection of the contract. Hand reasoned
that if the claim were treated as a claim for future installments
of salary at the contractual rate it would be contingent and
therefore not provable because dependent on performance of
future services. If the claim were treated as one for damages
arising from the anticipatory breach of contract caused by the
employer's bankruptcy, 23 it would also be contingent and therefore not provable. The employee would have the option either
to terminate his employment and sue for damages or to tender
his services and sue for payment as his salary came due. Under
the latter alternative the employee would subject "himself to
.the risk of having taken by way of set-off the estimated value of
237
his services, rather than his actual earnings ....

Hand's decision, questionable even in 1914,238 would likely
be different today. Because the trustee took no action within
the time prescribed by section 70b,2 39 the employment contract
would be deemed rejected by the trustee, and the rejection
would be treated as a breach as of the time the bankruptcy petition was filed. Section 63a(8) 2 40 now expressly provides that
contingent claims are provable, and section 57d 24 I provides that
both contingent and unliquidated claims shall be allowed if
their amount can be "liquidated or estimated" without undue
delay in the administration of the estate. Thus only if the
employee's claim could not have been liquidated or estimated
without such delay would it have been not provable under secployment contract. The claimant had been allowed by a receiver for
his employer to serve out the balance of his term at the salary specified
in the contract, but the court refused to conclude that the receiver had
thereby renewed his contract for an additional year. A variety of reasons was advanced: (1) the receiver had no authority to renew the
contract without court approval; (2) the receiver did not know of the
existence of the contract and the vice-president did not advise the receiver of it although he knew it was the receiver's policy to have continuing contracts approved by the court; and (3) the vice-president
knew before his-contract expired that the receiver planned to recommend to the court that the business be liquidated and that there would
thus be no need for the vice-president's services.
236. Hand regarded such a theory as questionable. See text accompanying notes 375-76 in.fra.
237. In Te Montague & Gillet, Inc., 212 F. 452, 454 (SD.N.Y. 1914).
238. Not only is the meaning of Hand's discussion of the employee's
alternatives problematical, but his assumption that contingent claims
were unprovable is questionable. See note 56, Countryman, Part L
239. 11U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
240. Id. § 103 (a) (8).
241. Id. §93 (d).
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tion 63d 242 and therefore not dischargeable under section 17a. 218

Where the issue of the executory individual employment
contract arises in chapter cases of the employer, the governing statutory provisions are somewhat different from those in
a straight bankruptcy. Inapplicable is the provision of section
70b, 24 4 which fixes a time within which the trustee may assume

or reject a contract and which provides that a contract not explicitly assumed within that time shall be deemed rejected. 24"
As a result, contracts may be assumed or rejected by the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession 240 prior to the confirmation
of a plan if the court approves, or the contract may be assumed or
rejected by a confirmed plan. Only if a contract has been explicitly rejected in one of these ways is the other contracting
party treated as a creditor with a claim in the proceeding.2' 7
In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co. 248 is illustrative of the

fact that a claimant cannot rely on a statutorily imposed rejection of his contract in a chapter case. In the Chapter XI case
of the employer, the -debtor in possession had done two things
which might have indicated a rejection of the individual employment contract of the employee. It had refused to allow the
employee to work while the case was pending and had notified the employee prior to confirmation that the contract was
terminated because of an alleged but nonexistent breach by
the employee.
Moreover, prior to confirmation the employee had asked the referee to determine the status of his contract and the referee had erroneously failed to order the contract rejected. 249 Nonetheless the court refused to recognize the
employee as a creditor with a claim in the case because the case
had culminated in an unappealed confirmation order. The employee had not obtained a court-approved rejection of his employment contract either prior to confirmation or as a part of
the plan of arrangement. Although the employee was therefore not a creditor, "he [was] not helpless, for he [could have
242.

Id. § 103(d).

243. Id. § 35(a).
244. Id.

§ 110(b).

245. See text accompanying note 546 infra.
246. Under most of the chapter proceedings, if a trustee or receiver
is not appointed, the debtor may be continued in possession with all
of the powers of a trustee. Bankruptcy Act §§ 188, 342, 444, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 588, 742, 844 (1970).
247. See text accompanying notes 540-41 infra.
248. 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940).

249. The employee's appeal from this treatment by the referee provided the occasion for the Second Circuit ruling.
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insisted] that his contract be either rejected or assumed under
the plan and [could have applied] to the bankruptcy court to
2- 0
protect his interest at the confirmation hearing or before. "1
Having so decided, however, the court found a remedy for
the employee. The new corporation to which the debtor's assets were transferred pursuant to the plan had made a deposit
in excess of the amount required to pay secured and priority
creditors 100 percent of their claims and unsecured creditors
20 percent of their claims. Relenting from its own logic, the
court allowed the employee to prove damages as if his contract
had been rejected and to receive a 20 percent payment thereof
from the excess deposit. But for the fortuity of the excess deposit and the indulgence of the court, however, the employee
would have been left with no payment under the plan, -51 no
claim against the new corporation which had not assumed his
contract under the plan, 252 and a surviving claim against the
corporate shell of the debtor.
Another Chapter XI decision, In re Capital Service,2 53 disposed of the issue of individual employment contracts on
grounds more questionable than those in Greenpoint. There the
debtor, who had contracts with its employees providing for va250. 113 F.2d at 884.
251. Although the plan provided that the new corporation should
acquire from the debtor "all its assets," the court concluded that the
employee's executory contract was not thereby assumed because (1)
the debtor had not filed with the court a list of executory contracts
as required by § 324, 11 U.S.C. § 724 (1970); (2) no provision had been
made for payment of the employee during the case; and (3) no mention
of the employment contract had been contained in the plan. Rather,
the Court was prepared to conclude that the plan tacitly rejected the
contract, but concluded also that rejection of a contract in a plan must
be explicit.
252. Earlier the court had held that a landlord in a § 77B case who
failed to object to confirmation of a reorganization plan under which
the debtor assigned the lease to a successor corporation was not entitled,
after the case was closed, to have it reopened. The plan could not
be amended even though the court agreed with the landlord that the
assignment to the new corporation without its assumption of the lease
"created privity of estate between it and [the landland] but no privity
of contract," so that the new corporation "was bound to pay the stipulated rental so long as it remained in possession, but it could move
out at any time, free of liability to the landlord." The court reasoned
that the landlord was "entitled to insist that his lease be either rejected
or fully assumed under the plan, and he must appear in the reorganization court at the confirmation hearing or before, in order to assure
adequate protection for his interests." Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise
Shoe Stores, 111 F.2d 287, 288, 290 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
654 (1940).

253. 136 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
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cation pay, had been designated debtor in possession and had
been authorized to continue the business. The business continued without interruption of employment and with payment of
wages at the contract rate until the rehabilitation effort failed
and the debtor in possession was adjudicated a bankrupt. The
court held that the employees were entitled to a claim for vacation pay accruing during the Chapter XI case as a first priority
expense of administration. 254 Normally such first priority
status would arise only when the debtor assumed the contracts,
but the court avoided this difficulty on alternative grounds.
On the one hand, the court held that the contracts were not executory because, under applicable state law on the legal incapacity
to contract, they terminated when the debtor was designated
debtor in possession-a "new legal entity." Although the debtor
in possession therefore could not assume these nonexecutory contracts, it had, by continuing to employ its workers under its authority to continue the business, in effect entered into new contracts of employment which conformed to the terms of the old.
On the other hand, even if the original contracts of employment were viewed as executory, the debtor in possession had
rejected them as of the date the Chapter XI petition was filed
by failing to assume them within the time specified in section
70b. 255 Again, the debtor in possession had entered into new
250
contracts which conformed to the terms of the old.
While the result in Capital Service seems unexceptionable,
the first ground for the decision employs a rather rarified
conceptionalism, and the second ground applies the section
70b 257 statutorily imposed rejection of a contract which is inapplicable in a Chapter XI case. 258 The contracts were not assumed
and were therefore not binding on the estate, and there were
no damage claims against the estate. It would still follow, however, that the debtor in possession with authority to continue
the business had been authorized by the court to contract to
maintain the work force, just as it was authorized to contract
254. Under §§ 64a(1) and 378a(1) & (2), 11 U.S.C. §§ 104(a) (1)
and 778 (a) (1) & (2) (1970), the administration expenses of the Chapter
XI case would be postponed to the administration expenses of the subsequent bankruptcy case, but would come ahead of second priority
claims in the bankruptcy case for wages and vacation pay earned in
the three months preceding the filing of the Chapter XI petition. See
note 225 supra.
255. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b). (1970).
256. 136 F. Supp. at 437.
257. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
258. See text accompanying note 546, infra.

1974]

CONTRACTS

IN BANKRUPTCY

for supplies, and that the employment during the Chapter XI
case could reasonably be said to be under new contracts which
250
conformed to the terms of the old.
A court may properly treat wages or salaries and fringe
benefits which the receiver, trustee or debtor in possession pays
to obtain services needed to continue the business as a first
priority administration expense. It is improper, however, to so
treat such items if they represent compensation for services performed for the debtor prior to the filing of a petition under
the Bankruptcy Act by persons not employed by the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession. Yet some courts have elevated
to first priority status pension payments to retired officers which
could not possibly qualify, even in part, for a second priority.260

This mischief may be inspired by Bowen v. Hockley,201 a
case in which a federal receiver was continuing the business of
a corporation that had been a self insurer under a state work-

men's compensation law. The court required the receiver to
continue to make periodic payments under the state compensation commission's award to the widow of an employee killed
in the service of the corporation before the receiver was appointed. This decision was based in part, and could have been
based entirely, on a section of the Federal Judicial Code which

provides that a
trustee, receiver or manager appointed in any cause pending
in any court of the United States, including a debtor in possession, shall manage and operate the property in his possession
...according to the requirements of the valid laws of the State
259. An additional criticism of the first ground for the decision in
Capital Service is that its treatment of the contracts as nonexecutory
would deprive the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession of the option
to assume or reject them in a successful rehabilitation proceeding. The
trustee in In re Maryvale Community Hosp., Inc, 456 F.2d 414 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 879 (1972), exercised that option in a Chapter
X case by obtaining court approval for rejection of a five-year contract
between the debtor hospital and a pathologist. When the doctor then
sought to prove damages as a "person injured by such rejection" under
§ 202, 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1970), he failed because he had assigned his
contract to another doctor prior to the rejection. The fact that the assignment was inspired by economic necessity due to the earlier wrongful
acts of a receiver, who served until the trustee was appointed, in preventing the doctor from performing his duties was held to give him
no claim based on rejection of the contract although it might give him
a claim against the receiver for tortious interference with contractual
relationships.
260. See note 225 supra.
261. 71 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1934).
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in which such property is situated, in the same manner that
the owner or possessor
thereof would be bound to do if in pos2 2
session thereof.
But the court also justified the result by treating the compensation award as an obligation which "in equity and good conscience.. . should be held a charge on the income of the business, just as is the wage of the laborer or the pension of the
super-annuated employee." 263 The court reasoned that the compensation award was analogous to a claim preferred under the
"six-month rule '264 and supported this analogy by invoking a
number of unreported orders in federal receivership cases requiring operating receivers to continue to pay the pensions of
retired employees.
The compensation claim in Bowen may well have constituted a valid claim against the estate in receivership. In the absence of the federal statute, however, the claim should not have
been treated as a first priority expense of administration. The
court explained its elevation of the claim only by observing
that it had been met by the corporation prior to receivership
"as a continuing expense of the business" 20 5-a
rationale
which would probably elevate many prereceivership claims to
first priority status.
A similar elevation of priority occurred in the reorganization of the New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 200 but
there the court relied upon a rationale different from that in
Bowen. A vice-president of the road had retired before the section 77267 petition was filed, and the trustee thereafter rejected
the contract which provided for his pension rights.20 8 The court
held that the vice-president and other former officers, whose
contracts did not likewise provide pensions but who were receiving them from the trustees under a plan established by the
board of directors, were entitled to receive an amount which
"equitably should be considered a fair pension." This result was
262. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1970). At the time of the decision in
Bowen v. Hockley, this statute by its terms applied only to "a receiver
or manager in possession." 36 Stat. 1104 (1911).
263. 71 F.2d at 783.
264. See note 225 supra.
265. 71 F.2d at 784.
266. Tate v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 332 F.2d 449
(2d Cir. 1964) [hereinafter referred to as Tate].
267.

11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).

268. Under the analysis proposed above, the contract does not appear to be executory since the vice-president apparently owed no further performance. In any event, the trustees' attempted rejection of
it added nothing to their discontinuance of pension payments.
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justified because the priority treatment of the vice-president's

claim was related to the trustees' need to maintain a working
force. The court expressed this rationale by saying that "the
purpose of continuing pension payments to employees retired
prior to reorganization-maintaining the loyalty and incentive
of present employees and facilitating of the recruitment of new
employees-might well be undercut by discontinuance of"'2 6
the retired vice-president's pension. But this explanation will
hardly suffice as a reason for first priority treatment of pension payments to any employees who retired before the petition was filed. The avowed purpose of the priority treatment
could be served as well merely by treating the pension rights of
those still working for the trustees as administration expenses
and by providing in the plan or reorgranization that the reorganized debtor (if any) should assume the pension obligations
of those employees.
In a later decision in the same reorganization proceeding,2 70
the court denied first priority status to the claim of the New
Haven's chief executive officer. His five-year employment contract with the road had expired one month before the section
77 petition was filed and had provided 12 annual payments of
$25,000 by way of severance pay and as deferred compensation. Distinguishing its earlier decision in Tate, the court held
that the payments provided by this contract did not constitute
a pension, but merely a claim for deferred compensation---an ordinary contract claim entitled to no priority. The claim bore no
relation to the pension payments made under the established
pension plan because it was subject to no conditions respecting
age or length of service and because it called for payments far
in excess of those payable under the pension plan. Moreover,
the court reasoned, the denial of priority to this claim would
not impair the loyalty and incentive of present employees nor
hinder the recruitment of new employees. 27 ' The decision is
completely correct, and the circumvention of the Tate rationale
is laudable, if not completely successful.
In the current section

77272

proceeding of the Penn Central,

269. 332 F.2d at 452.
270. Alpert v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R, 348 F.2d
304 (2d Cir. 1965).
271. The court also declined to extend the six-month rule (see note
225 supra) to the contract payments, the first of which became due
almost a year after the § 77 petition was filed.
272. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
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the court has ordered continuation of pension payments. 2 78 To
the extent that the order relates to pensions funded in a manner not challenged by the trustees so that the court could conclude the funds were not the property of the debtor, there can
be no quarrel with it. But the order extends also to unfunded pensions to retired officers. On the authority of Bowen
and Tate, such unfunded pensions are to be paid "as cash permits" while the reorganization case is pending. Treated as "normal operating expenses," these payments are made so that "employee morale [is] maintained at a high level" and "capable employees [are] encouraged to continue in the employ of the railroad." One must wonder just how it will boost the morale of
those trying to salvage the road to know that those who presided
2 74
over its financial collapse will continue to siphon off large parts
of their whopping pensions.
b.

Collective Bargaining Contracts

In the straight bankruptcy proceeding of an employer there
is only one situation in which the trustee would apparently
want to assume an executory collective bargaining contract.
That is where the search for a buyer of the business as a going
concern extends beyond the time specified in section 70b 275 so
that the trustee must assume the contract to avoid that section's
statutorily imposed rejection. Not surprisingly then, the reports reveal only one straight bankruptcy case 270 involving assumption or rejection of a collective bargaining agreement. All
of the other cases involving such contracts have arisen from
the employer's chapter case where the trustee, receiver or debtor
in possession normally continues operations until a plan is
consummated or the proceeding aborts.
In the treatment of the collective bargaining contract in a
chapter case (and in a straight bankruptcy case where the
273. In re Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 354 F. Supp. 408 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd 484 F.2d 1300 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 219 (1973).
The court also found one compensation plan for officers and salaried
employees to be merely a deferred compensation plan, rather than a
pension plan. The plan was therefore found to support only a general,
nonpriority claim under the authority of Alpert v. New York, New
Haven & Hartford R.R., 348 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1965), discussed in text
accompanying note 270 supra.
274. Pursuant to the order, payments are not to be made on unfunded pensions beyond the point that any one retired officer would
receive, from funded and unfunded pensions collectively, an amount
greater than $50,000 per year.
275. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
276. See note 285 infra and accompanying text.
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business is continued), federal labor legislation applicable to
the employer applies also to the trustee, receiver or debtor in
possession..2 77 Hence, even if the collective bargaining agreement is not assumed, the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession is under an obligation to bargain with the union representatives of the employees and to refrain from forbidden unfair
278
labor practices.
Since its enactment in 1935 the National Labor Relations
Act has been applicable not only to private employers but also
to their "legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy
or receivers."2 9 As a result, the NLRA has been held applicable to a state court receiver 280 and to a straight bankruptcy
trustee continuing the business.2 81 The jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board 28 2 has been delineated in several
cases involving bankruptcy proceedings. After a section 77b
case is closed and the debtor reorganized, the Board has jurisdiction to entertain a complaint alleging the commission of unfair labor practices by the debtor in possession during the section 77b proceedings. 283 If the Board has initiated a representa277. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (1970), set out in text accompanying note
262 supra, apparently would also subject trustees, receivers and debtors
in possession to any state labor legislation which is applicable to the
debtor's business.
278. Thus it may be an unfair labor practice for persons who exercise control over more than one employer unit to seek bankruptcy liquidation of one unit for the purpose and with the likelihood of discouraging union activity in the other units. In a nonbankruptcy context, such
a liquidation was held to be an unfair labor practice in violation of
the National Labor Relations Act. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington
Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
279. 49 Stat. 450 (1935), 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1970)
[hereinafter referred to as the NLRA].
280. NLRB v. Bachelder, 120 F.2d 574 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 647 (1941); NLRB v. Bachelder, 125 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1942).
See also Walling v. Black Diamond Coal Mining Co., 59 F. Supp. 348
(W.D. Ky. 1943), holding the Fair Labor Standards Act applicable to
a state court receiver although that Act is not by its express terms
made applicable.
281. Durand v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Ark. 1969). In Durand the secured claims against the estate exceeded the value of its
assets. Thus, while the bankruptcy court would not enjoin the NLRB's
processing of unfair labor practice charges against the bankruptcy
trustee, it would not grant the Board's request to impound funds
for possible back pay orders nor would it authorize the trustee to
spend money in defense of the unfair labor practice charges without
the assent of the secured creditors.
282. The National Labor Relations Board is hereinafter referred to
as the Board.
283. NLRB v. Baldwin Locomotive Works, 128 F.2d 39 (3d Cir.
1942).
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tion proceeding after the filing of a Chapter X petition, the
284
Chapter X court has no jurisdiction to enjoin the proceeding.
However, nothing in the NLRA or the jurisdiction of the Board
prevents a straight bankruptcy trustee from rejecting an executory collective bargaining contract. But if the straight bankruptcy trustee who is continuing the business decides to reject
such a contract, he must continue to comply with the NLRA
after the rejection.

285

In the various chapter proceedings,

2 0

unlike the trustee in a

straight bankruptcy, the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession often has the need to maintain a working labor force.
Again, the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession has the option to assume or reject an executory collective bargaining contract. But the contract will not support a first priority claim
for administration expense unless assumed and will not give a
claim against the estate for damages unless rejected. There
have been many chapter cases, 287 however, in which the option
has not been exercised. The cases show that the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession may be faced with a first priority employees' claim without having assumed the collective bargaining contract. In a section 77B proceeding the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession had authority to enter a supplemental contract with the union for vacation pay so as to give
all employees a first priority claim for pay earned after the in284. In re American Buslines, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 877 (D. Neb. 1957).
285. Durand v. NLRB, 296 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Ark. 1969); Carpenters Local Union v. Turney Wood Prods., Inc., 289 F. Supp. 143 (W.D.
Ark. 1968). See Comment, Collective Bargaining and Bankruptcy, 42
S. CAL. L. REv. 477 (1969).

Where the court suspects that the bank-

ruptcy proceedings are a subterfuge, however, the contract cannot be
rejected. In the § 77B proceeding in In re Mamie Conti Gowns, Inc.,
12 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), the court disallowed the rejection by
the debtor in possession. There the employer had filed a § 77B petition
alleging assets of $63,000 and liabilities of only $31,000. Thereafter the
employer, as debtor in possession, sought to reject a closed shop collective bargaining contract.
286. A Chapter XI court, mistakenly assuming that a Chapter X
provision was applicable in the case before it, has found no obstacle
to the rejection of an executory collective bargaining contract by the
debtor in possession. In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y.
1959). The Chapter X provision in issue was § 272, 11 U.S.C. § 672
(1970), which preserves the right of employees to join the union of
their choice. Section 15 of the NLRA provides that the NLRA shall
prevail in the event of conflict with § 272, 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as
amended 61 Stat. 151 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 165 (1970).
287. These cases have not treated the contracts as nonexecutory as
was done in Capital Services. See text accompanying notes 254-59 supra.
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ception of the contract and before a bankruptcy adjudication.2 88
In a Chapter X proceeding the trustee, receiver or debtor in possession may enter into a separate contract conforming to the
existing collective contract providing for vacation and severance pay so as to give a first priority claim for all such pay
earned before adjudication. 28 9 The Chapter X trustee, receiver
or debtor in possession may conform to wage rates specified
in the existing contract and thereby adopt pensions for employees who had retired before the trustee was appointed.
Such pensions as became payable while the trustee was operating
the business are entitled to first priority payment.2 90 Where the
Chapter X reorganization plan provides that the reorganized
debtor assume all executory contracts, the debtor is liable to
pay all pensions that become payable under an existing collective bargaining contract before and after the case is closed. 2 01
288. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 429 (2d Cir. 1940).
289. In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947); In re
Capital Foundry Corp., 61 F. Supp. 332 (E.D.N.Y. 1945). The court in
Public Ledger said that "it makes little difference ... whether the
trustees expressly assumed the contract or merely knowingly conformed
to its terms" (161 F.2d at 767) and thus ignored the possible requirement
in chapter cases of court approval for assumption of a contract (see
text accompanying notes 548-51 infra). The court found that:
There is nothing in the evidence to indicate that the trustees
sought to extend the contract beyond their own period of service, but the evidence is conclusive that they sought and obtained
the services ... with full knowledge that the services were

being given under the terms of the [existing) contract.
161 F.2d at 766. Cf. Ciriello v. Smith, 271 N.E.2d 359 (Mass. 1971).
290. In re Schenectady Ry., 93 F. Supp. 67, 70 (ND.N.Y. 1950). The
court's conclusion that the collective bargaining contract made the
monthly payments to retired employees "a part of the consideration for
the services presently performed" by other employees may be supported
by the language of the contract, but would be more compelling with
respect to employees who qualified for retirement during the period
of operation by the trustees.
The court in Schenectady also indicated that employees not covered
by the collective bargaining contract who had been receiving pensions
but who had no contractual commitment therefor were not to be paid
by the trustee. The same is true of pensions which had been paid by
the employer to employees covered by the collective contract if that
contract does not obligate the employer to pay them. In re Compania
De Los Ferrocarriles De Puerto Rico, 76 F. Supp. 521 (D.P.R. 1948).
291. In re American R.R. of Porto Rico, 110 F. Supp. 45 (D.P.R. 1952),
affd, 202 F.2d 149 (1st Cir. 1953). See also Vallejo v. Amerian RIR
of Porto Rico, 188 F.2d 513 (1st Cir. 1951). Cf. L.O. Koven & Brother,
Inc. v. Local Union No. 5767, 381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967). There the
court did not mention anything about assumption or rejection of a collective bargaining contract either by a Chapter XI receiver or in the
confirmed plan. The court found that prepetition claims for vacation
pay were excepted from the discharge of the order of confirmation under § 371, 11 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), because they were wage claims earned
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In the reorganization of a railroad, the Railway Labor Act
applies to "any receiver, trustee, or other individual or body,
judicial or otherwise, when in the possession of the business
of" a railroad. 292

Section 77n

29

3

of the Bankruptcy Act, more-

over, forbids any change in "the wages or working conditions
of railroad employees except in the manner prescribed in the
Railway Labor Act." Thus in a railroad reorganization the
RLA requires advance notice of proposed changes, negotiation
and mediation. If no settlement is reached and the parties do
not submit to arbitration, there must follow a 30-day "status
quo" period. Thereafter an emergency board reports to the
President, and that report is followed by another 30-day "status
294
quo" period.
In the pending reorganization of the Penn Central this statutory procedure consumed a period of 18 months, yet elicited
no settlement of a dispute between the trustees and the unions
over the size of train crews. 295 The court in July then ordered
the trustees to reduce the crews unilaterally but to continue newithin three months of the petition under § 17a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (5)
(1970). Both these prepetition claims and postconfirmation claims were
held to be subject to arbitration under the collective bargaining contract.
Vacation pay earned while the Chapter XI case was pending, however,
was held to be an administrative expense which should have been
claimed in the Chapter XI case and which was not subject to arbitration. The court in In re Muskegon Motor Specialities Co., 313 F.2d 841,
842 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 832 (1963), refused to order
arbitration of prepetition vacation pay claims where a division of the
debtor under Chapter X "[had gone] out of business and discharged
all its employees" more than ayear before the petition was filed. The
collective bargaining contract expired two days after the petition was
filed. The court in Johnson v. England, 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966), refused to direct arbitration of claims
for payments into a pension fund which had been required by the contract before the bankruptcy of the employer. These cases were distinguished in Koven as involving disputes between labor claimants and
other creditors who had not agreed to arbitration. In Koven the conflict
as to prepetition and postpetition vacation pay claims was "one between
the union and the employer, both of whom are bound by the contractual
obligation to arbitrate." 381 F.2d at 203.
292. 45 U.S.C. § 151, First (1970) [hereinafter referred to as RLA].
293. 11 U.S.C. § 205(n) (1970).
294. 45 U.S.C. §§ 152, Seventh, 155-56, 160.
295. Cf. Birmingham Trust & Savings Co. v. Atlanta, B. & A. Ry.,
271 F. 731 (N.D. Ga. 1921), where, before the enactment of the RLA,
the receiver of a railroad within three days of his appointment had
obtained an order reducing all wages of employees below those provided by union contracts. But the order was held invalid as to certain
employees covered by the old Newlands Act, which required that any
order reducing wages be made only after hearing on 20 days' notice.
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gotiations to resolve the issue. 29 The trustees then set and
postponed dates for reducing crews, and the unions set and postponed dates for calling strikes. Finally the trustees ordered
the crew reduction and the unions called a strike on February 8,
1973. On the following day Congress passed and the President signed a bill extending the last "status quo" period of the
BLA to May 9, 1973.297 As no settlement of the issue was
reached by that date, the trustees initially set June 9, 1973, as
the date for crew reduction but, before that date arrived, cancelled all plans for crew reduction to avoid a strike.20 8 Meanwhile, the court had advanced from April 1 to July 2, 1973, the
date by which the trustees were to file either a feasible plan of
reorganization or a proposal for the liquidation or other disposition of the road. The court also warned that
to the extent that... statutes and regulations, whether in the
area of abandonment, tariffs, or resolution of labor disputes,
preclude the exercise of self-help in achieving profitability, the
legislative and executive branches of government must be
looked to for solutions, if solutions are to be forthcoming.2090
The trustees on June 29, 1973, filed a plan of liquidation which
may be designed more to inspire governmental financial aid
than to gain court confirmation. 30 0
The pertinent provisions of the RLA apply also to air carriers,3 01 and one court entertaining the Chapter XI case of such
a carrier reversed a referee's order permitting the rejection of
collective bargaining contracts with pilots and stewardesses both
because the debtor in possession had not complied with the RLA
and because the court did not believe that a case for rejection had
302
been made on the merits.
296. In Te Penn Central Transp. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1356 (EfD. Pa.
1972).
297. 87 Stat. 5 (1973).
298. Wall Street Journal, May 29, 1973, p. 5, col 2.
299. In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (E.D.
Pa. 1973).
300. Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1973, at 9, col 1.
301. 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-85 (1970).
302. In Te Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 359, 361-62
(E.D.N.Y. 1965):
[Tlhe Bankruptcy Court, when it has the power to reject a
collective bargainng agreement, should do so only after
thorough scrutiny, and a careful balancing of the equities on
both sides, for, in relieving a debtor from its obligation under
a collective bargaining agreement, it may be depriving the em-

ployees affected of their seniority, welfare and pension rights,
as well as other valuable benefits which are incapable [sic]
of forming the basis of a provable claim for money damages.
That would leave the employees without compensation for their
losses, at the same time enabling the debtor, at the expense of
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It is doubtful that the Penn Central reorganization will
continue long enough to enable its trustees to resolve the train
crew dispute with the unions. It is even more doubtful that a
Chapter X or XI proceeding for an airline can remain viable for
the period required to exhaust the procedures of the RLA.
Hence, the operation of that Act seems effectively to preclude
the resolution of most labor relations disputes in a bankruptcy
rehabilitation proceeding for a railroad or an airline. Moreover, the RLA seems also to preclude any interim relief from
the onerous collective bargaining contract of a railroad or an
airline in bankruptcy proceedings. Where the trustee, receiver
or debtor in possession does not exercise the option to assume
or reject such a contract, the Act forestalls the negotiation of a
new and less onerous contract to apply while the proceedings
are pending.
4.

PublishingContracts

The contract between an author or composer and a publishing house commonly provides that the publisher will edit (if
a literary work is involved), publish and market the author's or
composer's work and will pay the author or composer a specified royalty. The copyright may be retained by the author or
composer or it may be assigned to the publisher.
If either party to such a contract goes into bankruptcy before
the author or composer has substantially completed his work,
the contract would be executory under the test here proposed
because neither party would have substantially performed.
Moreover, in the bankruptcy of the author or composer, his
rights under the contract would doubtless be held "personal"
and would not pass to the trustee because performance of
such artistic obligations would be nondelegable. 80 8 The few
bankruptcy cases dealing with such contracts suggest that the
same result would follow in the bankruptcy of the publisher.
These cases, however, did not involve executory contracts
and therefore did not involve the trustee's option of assumption or rejection. In each case the author or composer had
fully performed and the publisher had become a bankrupt
without completing performance. 0 4 Nonetheless, the judicial
the employees, to consummate what may be a more favorable
plan of arrangement with its other creditors.
303. See text accompanying notes 227-31 supra.
304. Cf. United Artists Corp. v. Strand Prods., 216 F.2d 305 (9th
Cir. 1954). Strand involved a contract for the distribution of motion pic-
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appraisal of the delegability of the performance of the publisher's obligation would doubtless have been the same even if the
contracts had been executory. In the early case of In re D. H.
McBride & Co.,30 5 the court held that the trustee of a bankrupt
corporate publisher could take no rights under a publishing
contract with an author because the publisher's obligation, involving "personal trust and confidence," was nondelegable.
Therefore, the trustee was compelled to reassign the copyright
to the author.80 6 The court recognized that the publisher was a
corporation but reasoned that its "management... may be such
as to command especial confidence. 3 0 7 Although the court emphasized that the contract was expressly made nonassignable
without the consent of the author, such a provision alone could
not have prevented the contract from passing to the publisher's trustee nor could it have prevented the trustee from transferring it to another.3 08
In a case more recent than McBride, the Oxford University
Press had entered a contract with an American publisher who
was to revise, publish and sell one of Oxford's encyclopedias in
this country. Oxford retained the copyright, and the contract
expressly forbade any assignment without the consent of Oxford. The publisher's bankruptcy trustee, appointed following
adjudication in an abortive Chapter XI proceeding, was held to
have no salable rights in the contract. Again, the publisher's
obligation was considered nondelegable.30 9
tures where the producer initiated a Chapter XI proceeding after having

completed the pictures. The only question involved was whether the
contract gave the distributor the right to contract for the television
broadcasting of pictures which were originally produced for theater
exhibition. It was assumed by all concerned that the debtor in possession took whatever rights it formerly had under the contract without
any assumption of the contract. The court further assumed (incorrectly
because the producer had fully performed) that the contract would be
executory if its provisions as to television broadcasts were separable
from its provisions as to theater exhibition, but concluded (correctly;
see Countryman, Part I, at 470) that they were not severable.
305. 132 F.285 (S.DMN.Y. 1904).
306. Under § 70a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (2) (1970), the bankruptcy
trustee takes the title of the bankrupt to all "interests in patents, patent
rights, copyrights, and trademarks."
307. 132 F. at 288. The exclusive market for the author's books
consisted of Catholic schools and convents, and the management of the
publisher was Catholic.
308. Countryman, Part I, at 445, and text accompanying notes 385400 infra.
309. In Te Little & Ives Co., 262 F. Supp. 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). Alternatively, Oxford was held entitled to exercise an option expressly
given it by the contract to terminate the contract if the publisher ini-
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Although these decisions relied on the "personal contract"
doctrine to find the obligations under a publishing contract nondelegable to a bankruptcy trustee, one court has reached a different conclusion. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed a decision directing the bankruptcy trustee of a music
publisher to reassign copyrights to composers. It held that the
trustee should instead be authorized to sell the copyrights subject to the royalty obligations imposed by the composers' contracts with the publisher. The court was influenced in part by
the fact that the form contracts purported to run to the publisher,
"its successors and assigns" and in part by the consideration that
the decision below "appears to give no weight to the labor, skill,
and capital which a publisher expends in putting a song on the
market."310 It was doubtless influenced also by the fact that
the composers had asked that the trustee be required, alternatively, to reassign the copyrights to them or to sell the copyrights subject to the contract royalty obligations.
To the extent that bankrupt publishers are involved, these
decisions seem to apply the "personal contract" doctrine too
mechanically. In this context the purpose of the doctrine is to
prevent an author or composer from being required to accept
the inadequate performance substituted by a bankruptcy trustee. However, if the trustee can locate a prospective purchaser
quickly enough to avoid a breach of the contract, 1 1 he should
be given an opportunity to show that the prospective purchaser
is as well qualified to publish and market the work as was the
bankrupt publisher. If the court then approves the sale of the
contract to the prospective purchaser, the creditors of the bankrupt publisher will get the value of the sale price of the contract. But the effort to preserve that value should not, without
the consent of the author or composer, carry so far as to require
him to continue the contract with any publisher without regard
to that publisher's qualifications.
This pragmatic approach to the proposed sale of the pubtiated any bankruptcy proceeding or was adjudicated a bankrupt. But
see text accompanying notes 384-400 infra.
310. In re Waterson, Berlin & Snyder Co., 48 F.2d 704, 706 (2d Cir.
1931). See also In re Law Book Co., 239 App. Div. 363, 267 N.Y.S.
169 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1933). There a publisher of law books made
an assignment for the benefit of creditors and the assignee sold a quantity of the author's books at public action for $298. The court required
the assignee to honor the author's claim for royalties at the contract rate
of $1,122 because the assignee, like a bankruptcy trustee, "received no
better rights than his assignor had." Id. at 365, 267 N.Y.S. at 171.
311. See text accompanying notes 471-72 infra.
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lishing contract should be adopted in both a straight bankruptcy and in a chapter case, and the same approach should be
taken in a chapter case where the rehabilitated debtor is to
continue performance rather than sell the contract. If this approach were taken in cases where the author or composer has
substantially performed, the "personal contract" doctrine would
not dictate termination of the contract whenever the publisher
entered a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act. By the same
token, where the author or composer has not substantially performed so that the contract remains executory, the pragmatic
approach would in some cases allow either the assumption
and sale of the contract by the trustee of the publisher, or the
assumption and performance of the contract by a rehabilitated
publisher.
In every case the inquiry should be whether the proposed
treatment of the contract would leave the author or composer
with a publisher inferior to the one with which he originally
contracted. And perhaps the inquiry into possible prejudice to
the author or composer should not stop with an examination of
the management of the purchaser or the rehabilitated debtor.
At least where literary works are involved, the most important
matter for many authors is probably the quality of the editor to
whom their work is to be assigned.3 12 If the author could retain
the same editor, or one equally acceptable, after the contract
was sold by the trustee or assumed by the rehabilitated
debtor, the relationship of "trust and confidence" on which the
author had relied would in most cases be preserved. True, the
author would also have an interest in the financial responsibiliity of the new or reorganized publisher, but that interest is
shared by the nonbankrupt party to a contract not classified
as a "personal contract." In the latter case, the concerns of the
nonbankrupt party are not allowed to interfere with the sale
of the contract or its assumption by a rehabilitated debtor.
5. PatentLicenses
The usual patent license, by which the patentee-licensor
authorizes the licensee to exercise some part of the patentee's
exclusive right to make, use and vend the patented item in
return for payment of royalties, ordinarily takes the form of an
executory contract. A license simply to use patented equip312. See Navaskey, In Cold Print: What is an Editor Worth,?, The

N. Y. Times Book Review, April 15, 1973, at 2.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:479

ment is typically a part of an agreement by which the equipment is leased to the licensee in return for royalty payments.
Such an agreement is clearly within the Bankruptcy Act's concept of an executory contract. A license merely to use a consumable patented product necessarily provides for the supplying of the product to the licensee. If the patentee-licensor is in
any way responsible for supplying the product, the contract is
executory. The same is true of a license to sell patented products manufactured by the patentee-licensor.
Where there is no express undertaking by the licensor, the
agreement with the licensee may not be executory because the
licensor may have fully performed merely by executing the license agreement. Thus a close question may be presented by a
license to make and sell a patented product where another licensee undertakes to apply the product. Even in these close
cases, however, there may be an implied undertaking by the licensor which brings all patent licenses within the ambit of an
executory contract. It has been held in a patentee-licensor's infringement action against a third party that a final judgment
adjudicating the patent invalid constitutes a "complete failure of
consideration" amounting to an "eviction" which releases the
the licensee from any further obligation to pay royalties. 18
Moreover, since the death of the doctrine of "licensee estoppel,"
the licensee can set up the invalidity of the patent as a defense
when sued by the licensor for royalties due under the license.3 14 Hence, all patentee-licensors are now substantially
in the position of having warranted to their licensees the validity of their patents. Although the sanction for the breach
of such a warranty is only forfeiture of royalties rather than
liability for damages, this continuing undertaking by the licensor is enough to justify the treatment of all unexpired patent
licenses as executory contracts. S 5
While this analysis would provide the bankruptcy trustee
of the licensor the option to assume or reject the license, another doctrine developed in nonbankruptcy cases could be ap313. Scherr v. Difco Labs., Inc., 401 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1968);
Drackett Chem. Co. v. Chamberlain Co., 63 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1933).
Some courts have confined the eviction doctrine to exclusive licenses.
Ross v. Fuller & Warren Co., 105 F. 510 (N.D.N.Y. 1900). Cf. Automatic
Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, 176 F.2d 799 (1st Cir. 1949), aff'd
on other grounds, 339 U.S. 827 (1950); Thomson Spot Welder Co. v.
Oldberg Mfg. Co., 256 Mich. 447, 240

N.W. 93 (1932).

314. Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
315. See Countryman, Part I, at 453.
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plied to deprive the bankruptcy trustee of the licensee of a similar option. In Oliver v. Rumford Chemical Works31 6 a flour
manufacturer obtained a license to use and sell a patented acid
supplied by the patentee-licensor, but the license obtained no
words indicating that it was assignable. Because the license
was "personal" to the licensee, the Supreme Court held that
on the death of the manufacturer-licensee it would not pass to
his personal representative. The Court thought it "apparent
that licenses of this character must have been granted to such
individuals as the grantor chose to select because of their personal ability or qualifications to make or furnish a market for
the self-raising flour, and thus for the acid . .
,,s17 Subsequent Supreme Court cases have accepted the rule that licensees' rights are not assignable unless expressly made so in the
license and have applied it without further explanation. 318
There is dictum in one of these cases, however, that a license
may pass from a licensee partnership to a corporation "formed
.. . to carry on the same business and in the same interests
...
."3 9 This dictum has been interpreted by some lower federal
courts to mean that a patent license may pass to a "successor"
of the licensee not only where a licensee partnership is incorporated3 20 but also where it is not so clear that the new business is conducted "in the same interests."3 2-1
Although none of these cases arose in a bankruptcy context,322 the notion that a patent license is not assignable unless
316. 109 U.S. 75 (1883).
317. Id. at 83.
318. Lane & Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193 (1893); Hapgood
v. Hewitt, 119 U.S. 226 (1886).
319. Lane &Bodley Co. v. Locke, 150 U.S. 193, 197 (1893).
320. Foster Hose Supporter Co. v. Thomas P. Taylor Co., 189 F. 407
(D.Conn. 1911), affd, 191 F. 1003 (2d Cir. 1912).
321. Mueller v. Mueller, 95 F. 155 (3d Cir. 1899) (interest of deceased partner in licensee partnership sold to third party); Papazia v.
American Steel & Wire Co., 155 F. Supp. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1957) (corporate licensee merged into other corporations); Gate-Way, Inc. v. Hillgren, 82 F. Supp. 546 (S.D. Cal. 1949), aff'd, 181 F.2d 1010 (9th Cir.
1950) (interest of one partner in licensee partnership sold to other partner); Neon Signal Devices, Inc. v. Alpha-Claude Neon Corp., 54 F.2d
793 (W.D. Pa. 1931) (assets of corporate licensee sold to another corporation); 'ilson v. J.G. Wilson Corp., 241 F. 494 (E.D. Va. 1917) (purchase of stock of corporate licensee). See also McKinnon Chain Co.
v. American Chain Co., 259 F. 873 (M.D. Pa. 1919), aff'd on other
grounds, 268 F.353 (3d Cir. 1920). Cf. Niagara Fire Extinguisher Co.
v. Hibbard, 179 F. 844 (7th Cir. 1910); American Pastry Prods. Corp.
v. United Prods. Corp., 44 F.2d 216 (D. Mass. 1930).
322. In Schmidt v. Central Foundry Co., 218 F. 466, 470 (D.N.J.
1914), affd on other grounds, 229 F. 157 (3d Cir. 1916), the court held
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expressly made so may carry over to bankruptcy proceedings
involving patent licenses. The uncertain "successors" exception
to the nonassignability rule may be applicable in some chapter
proceedings, but it will hardly be available in straight bankruptcy liquidation. Moreover here, as with publishing contracts,8 23 the application of the notion that all patent licenses
are "personal" and nonassignable because of the licensor's reliance on peculiar qualifications of the licensee seems too mechanical. Here again, it is conceivable that the licensee's bankruptcy trustee could locate a sufficiently qualified prospective
purchaser of the license, or that the license could be assumed
by a sufficiently rehabilitated debtor, so that no prejudice to
the licensor would result. As long as the court is convinced
that the licensor's interests are adequately protected, neither
the "nonassignability" rule nor the "personal contract" doctrine
should automatically prevent the trustee's assumption of a
patent license. Section 70a(2) 3 24 should be read to mean what
it says: The trustee of a licensee-debtor has title to all "interests in patents."
All of the bankruptcy cases dealing with patent licenses
have arisen in the bankruptcy proceedings of a patent licensee.
Only one of these cases 325 has expressly treated the patent license as an executory contract, but such a characterization
would apparently not have changed the result in any other
case.326 Thus, where the bankrupt had a license to sell at a
that where the licensee goes into bankruptcy and a receiver is appointed
to continue the business the license will protect the receiver against
liability for infringement since he did not take title to the licensee's
assets, including the license. The receiver's "acts in making use of the
device covered by the patent were the acts of" the bankrupt licensee.
Cf. Waterman v. Shipman, 55 F. 982, 986 (2d Cir. 1893). In Waterman
the court held that a patent licensee could maintain an action for violation of the license by the patentee-licensor even though a state court
had appointed a receiver for the licensee in supplemental proceedings
initiated by the patentee-licensor. The court's rationale was that the
license was "purely a personal license" and "the receiver could not acquire it."
323. See text accompanying notes 311-12 supra.
324. 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (2) (1970).
325. See text accompanying note 329 infra.
326. This is most obviously true of In re Wisconsin Engine Co., 234
F. 281 (7th Cir. 1916). There the licensee in consideration for the grant
of the license had given the licensor notes against which royalty payments might be credited but which were to be payable whether or not
royalties were earned. The court held that such notes gave the licensor
a provable unsecured claim when the licensee went into bankruptcy
before any royalties were earned. See also In re Diana Shoe Corp.,
80 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1936).
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fixed retail price the patented fountain pens supplied by the
licensor, the licensor was not entitled to reclaim any pens the
"title" to which had passed to the licensee before its bankruptcy. The licensee's bankruptcy trustee, however, was entitled to sell the pens only at the price specified in the license,
and any such sale was subject to the licensor's royalty rights
under the license.32 7 In a different case with a similar license
the licensee's bankruptcy trustee sold a great volume of electric shavers and parts in bulk. The trustee's activity was held
to have conferred on the licensor a first priority claim for damages for infringement.3 28 The result in both of these cases
would have been the same had the licenses been viewed as executory contracts so as to give the trustee the option of assumption or rejection. If the trustee had rejected the license, he
would have had no right to sell the patented articles; if the
trustee had assumed the license, he would have had only such
right to sell as the license conferred.
In the one case in which the license was held to be an executory contract, the licensor's "pre-existing right to terminate the
agreement" was held to survive a belated attempt by the debtor
in possession to assume the contract. 32 9 The license provided
that the licensor could terminate the license 60 days after notice
of default was given to the licensee, and the licensor had given
the licensee such notice three weeks prior to the licensee's Chapter XI filing. As the default remained uncured for the requisite
60-day period, the debtor in possession was not allowed to assume the executory contract. To the extent that they give
effect to provisions in licenses for automatic termination of the
license on the bankruptcy of the licensee, this and other cases 330
327. In -re S. Spitzel & Co., 168 F. 156 (E.D.N.Y. 1909). Cf. L.E.
Waterman Co. v. Kline, 234 F. 891 (4th Cir. 1916).
The court in In re Tidy House Prod. Co., 79 F. Supp. 674 (S.D.
Iowa 1948), where the bankrupt had bought a business, including trademarks, under a contract requiring the payment of royalties on all trademarked goods sold, held that the contract was executory and that the
trustee could not assume the contract and sell the trademarked goods
and the trademark free of the obligation to pay royalties.
328. InT e Progress Lektro Shave Corp., 35 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn.
1940).
329. In re Schokbeton Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 171, 175 (5th Cir. 1972).
330. The following cases involved a license to manufacture and sell:
Lichman v. Moore, 131 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.HL 1955); In re Michigan Motor Specialities Co, 288 F. 377 (EfD. Mich. 1923).
In -reDiana Shoe Corp., 80 F.2d 827 (2d Cir. 1936), involved a license to use equipment leased from the licensor. In this case the license
provided for termination "in case the licensee becomes bankrupt or has
a receiving order made against him," and the appointment of a trustee
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seem erroneous.83 1 But even if the courts had perceived the licenses as executory contracts, these cases would have reached
the same erroneous result.
III.

THE EFFECT OF MATERIAL BREACH

Most cases do not deal with all aspects of the effect of a
material breach on the bankruptcy trustee's option to assume or
reject an executory contract. 3 3 2 Moreover, those cases which do
deal with some aspects of the effect of such breach are almost
completely devoid of analysis. It seems desirable, therefore,
to set out the assumptions on which my analysis of the effect
of such breach is based.
A.

PREBANKRUPTCY BREACH

A material breach by a party to an executory contract before the bankruptcy of either party gives the other party a
unilateral option either to treat his own obligations under the
contract as discharged and claim damages for the breach or to
waive the breach and treat the contract as still in effect. 8 8
under § 77B was treated as a "receiving order." Cf. Simmons v. National Tool Co., 110 F.2d 850 (6th Cir. 1940), holding that reorganization
under § 77B did not involve "bankruptcy, insolvency or dissolution"
within the meaning of a termination provision in a patent license.
331. See text accompanying notes 384-400 infra.
332. A breach of an executory contract not sufficiently material to
excuse performance by the other party should not affect the trustee's
option to assume or reject the contract. Such a breach by the nonbankrupt party before or after bankruptcy merely creates a cause of action
for damages which the trustee can enforce if the contract passes to the
bankruptcy trustee under § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970).
Such a
breach by the bankrupt party before or after bankruptcy, but before
the trustee assumes or rejects the contract, merely gives the nonbankrupt party a provable claim. See Countryman, Part I, notes 46, 56 and
57, on the provability of claims under contracts existing at the time
of the bankruptcy petition where the breach occurs thereafter. Such
a breach after the trustee has assumed the contract and before he has
disposed of it creates a first priority claim against the estate. The estate
is expressly exonerated by the last sentence of § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (b)
(1970), from liability for breaches occurring after the trustee has disposed of the contract with the approval of the court.
333. 5A A. CoRSiN, CoNTRAcTs § 1244 (1964).
The presumption
seems to be that the nondefaulting party's waiver of the discharge of
his own obligation constitutes a waiver of any claim for damages. This
presumption may be a justifiable interpretation of most waivers that
induce the defaulting party to resume performance.
While the nondefaulting party's other alternative is sometimes described as a remedy of rescission, it is to be distinguished from a rescission by mutual agreement of both parties. Id. §§ 1131, 1236. Whether
a rescission by agreement discharges any existing right to damages be-
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This option of the nondefaulting party is qualified only to the
extent that some provision of the contract or some provision of
the applicable nonbankruptcy law gives to the defaulting party
a right to cure the default.334
If the bankrupt party is the party in default, his trustee takes
any right of the bankrupt to cure the default. This right to cure
the default passes to the trustee either under section 70a (5) 335 as
property which could have been transferred by the bankrupt or
under section 70a(3) 33 6 as a power which the bankrupt might
have exercised for his own benefit. Hence, if the trustee wishes
to assume an executory contract, he should be able to cure a default in the contract unless the bankrupt's time for curing the
default has expired. And a rather inscrutable provision in section
Ile might be interpreted to mean that, if the time for cure has
not expired at the filing of the bankruptcy petition, the trustee
may in some cases have at least 60 days thereafter to cure
the default.33
Although the Act S33 authorizes plans under
cause of a breach is a matter of interpretation of the rescission agreement. Id. § 1244. See Kenyon v. Mulert, 184 F. 825 (3d Cir. 1911),
discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 646 n.96. Under the Uniform Commercial Code the unilateral option to treat a contract for the sale of
goods as at an end is described as an option to "cancel." At least for
the buyer, however, cancellation does not preclude resort to other remedies. U.C.C. §§ 2-703(f), 2-711(1); R NoRsTRloz, SALES §§ 146, 165
(1970); Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article
Two, 73 YAIEILJ. 199, 216-23 (1963).
334. See U.C.C. § 2-508, which gives the seller of goods a right to
cure a defective tender or delivery. See IL NORDsTO m, supra note 333,
§ 105; Peters, supra note 333, at 209-16; cf. In re Burke, 76 F. Supp.
5 (S.D. Calif. 1948). In Burke a lessor had terminated a lease for the
lessee's default and failure to cure before the lessee filed a Chapter
X1 petition. The lessee as debtor in possession, however, was allowed
to reinstate the lease because a state statute provided relief from forfeiture.

335. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a) (5) (1970).

336. Id. § 110(a) (3) Section 70a(3) has not been confined to
technical powers at common law, but has been extended to reach, e.g.,
the bankrupt's statutory right to redeem property from a foreclosure
sale, Garber v. Bankers Mortgage Co., 27 F.2d 609 (D.C. Kan. 1928),
and his contractual right to change beneficiaries under a life insurance
contract, Cohen v. Samuels, 245 U.S. 50 (1917).
337. 11 U.S.C. § 29(e) (1970):
Where, by any agreement, a period of limitation is fixed for instituting a suit or proceeding upon any claim, or for presenting
or filing any claim, proof of claim, proof of loss, demand, notice,
or the like, or where in any proceeding, judicial or otherwise,
a period of limitation is fixed, either in such proceeding or by
applicable Federal or State law, for taking any action, filing
any claim or pleading, or doing any act, and where in any
such case such period had not expired at the date of the filing
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section 77 and Chapters X and XII to provide "for the curing
or waiver of defaults," it has not yet been established that these
provisions confer upon the trustee a separate right of cure without limit as to time.339 If the trustee of the defaulting party
does not wish to cure the default, he holds the contract subject
to the option of the non-bankrupt party to waive or assert the
consequences of the prebankruptcy breach and can assume the
contract only if the nonbankrupt party so waives.
If the bankrupt party is not the party in default, his trustee
takes the contract subject to any right of the nonbankrupt
party to cure the default. If the nonbankrupt party does not
cure the default, the trustee has the option either to assert the
consequences of breach (which would rid the estate of the contract without subjecting it to a damage claim for rejection) or
to waive the breach (which would enable him to assume the
contract).
Although not explicitly employed by the courts, these assumptions fairly well explain the cases dealing with executory
contracts with respect to which there has been a material breach
before bankruptcy. Not surprisingly, in all but two of these
cases 340 it was the defaulting party who later went into bankruptcy. In re Shokbetan Industries, Inc.341 involved an exclusive patent license to manufacture and sell which provided
that if a default in royalty payments continued for 60 days after
of the petition in bankruptcy, the receiver or trustee of the
bankrupt may, for the benefit of the estate, take any such action
or do any such act, required of or permitted to the bankrupt,
within a period of sixty days subsequent to the date of adjudication or within such further period as may be permitted by
the agreement, or in the proceeding or by applicable Federal
or State law, as the case may be. (emphasis added)
The suggestion that this provision might apply involves reading
"doing any act" to include the curing of a default. Even if so read,
however, the provision would cover only the time fixed for curing defaults "in any proceeding" or by other applicable law, and not the time
fixed by agreement. When both this provision and § 70b, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(b) (1970), were enacted in 1938, the 60-day time periods within
which the trustee could act under § lie or could assume an executory
contract under § 70b both ran from the date of adjudication. Since
the 1962 amendment to § 70b that is no longer true. See Countryman,
Part I, at 448.
338. §§ 77b(5), 216(10), 461(12), 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(b) (5), 616(10),
816(10) (1970).
339. But see Smith v. Hoboken R.R., 328 U.S. 123 (1946), discussed
in text accompanying notes 402 and 410 infra.
340. See notes 356-59 infra and accompanying text.
341. 466 F.2d 171 (5th Cir. 1972), discussed in text accompanying
note 329 supra.
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the licensee's receipt of notice thereof the licensor would have
the right to terminate the license. Three weeks after the licensor gave such notice the licensee filed a Chapter XI petition.
As debtor in possession,3 42 the licensee allowed the 60-day period to run without curing the default and thereby entitled the
licensor to terminate the licensee. The court reasoned that the
filing of the petition did not extend the time fixed by the
contract to cure defaults both because section lie 3 43 extends
only the time fixed by agreement within which a debtor must
prosecute a claim nd because the bankruptcy court had no
power to extend that time. While the debtor in possession
could have assumed the contract, it must take it cum onere,
subject to the licensor's right to terminate the license as soon
as the 60-day period expired. Hence, the court below had
properly refused to enjoin the licensor from terminating the license and had properly confirmed the plan of arrangement
"in all respects except as it provided for a perpetuation of the
exclusive licensing agreement." 44
Several other decisions recognize that where the trustee
fails to cure a prebankruptcy default of the bankrupt, waiver of
the breach by the nonbankrupt party will preserve the bankruptcy trustee's option to assume or reject the contract. In one
such case the vendor under a one-payment land contract had
342. As debtor in possession, the licensee had the powers of a
trustee. Section 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
343. 11 U.S.C. § 29 (e) (1970). See note 337 supra.
344. In re Shokbetan Indus. Inc, 466 F.2d 171, 178 (5th Cir. 1972).
This decision apparently did not foreclose the success of the confirmed
plan because the licensor was willing to allow another corporation
which was acquiring all of the debtor's stock to continue with a nonexelusive license and without use of the licensor's trade name. Apparently,
also, no attempt was made to provide for the belated curing of defaults
in the Chapter XI plan-something not expressly authorized by §§ 356
and 357, 11 U.S.C. §§ 756, 757 (1970). Cf. text accompanying note 338
supra.
Lindeke v. Associates Realty Co., 146 F. 630 (8th Cir. 1906), reaches
a similar conclusion with respect to a lease unnder which the landlord
had given prebankruptcy notice of default and the trustee of the lessee
allowed the time specified in the lease for curing defaults to expire
without curing them. Because the landlord was not entitled to terminate the lease until the time for curing defaults had expired, his acceptance of rent from the trustee during that time did not constitute
a waiver of the default. Cf. Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Phillips, 196 F.2d
692 (5th Cir. 1952). There the bankruptcy trustee was held entitled
to assume a lease despite a prebankruptcy default by the debtor. Although the lease required that the lessee receive a notice of default
and that the lessee thereafter be given 60 days within which to cure
the default, the lessor failed to serve such notice.
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reacted to the buyer's prebankruptcy failure to make payment
on the contract date by putting an executed deed in escrow
with instructions that it be delivered on payment of the purchase price. The court held that the vendor's action constituted
a waiver of the breach so as to entitle the buyer's trustee to assume the contract on payment of the purchase price and interest from the date of breach. 345 In a similar case the bankrupt
was in default on its contract with the government to manufacture and deliver goods at the time it filed a Chapter XI petition. The government was found to have waived the breach
during the pendency of the case so that, when the case was
closed without any assumption or rejection of the contract, the
debtor remained liable for damages when the contract was finally terminated by the government because of the default.8 40
Burns Mortgage Co. v. Bond Realty Corp.3 47 presents the
case of defaults by both parties to an executory contract and at
least suggests the possibility of waivers by each. The buyer in
possession under a land sale contract had defaulted on three of
four annual installment payments prior to her bankruptcy. Although the contract permitted the vendor to accelerate maturity in event of such a default, the vendor had not done so, perhaps because it had mortgaged the property and thus was not
prepared to convey the good title required by the contract. Instead of accelerating the maturity date, the vendor sold both
the land, subject to the mortgage, and buyer's installment notes
to a third party. After a post-bankruptcy default on the fourth
installment, the third party obtained a release of the mortgage,
345. Mound Mines Co. v. Hawthorne, 173 F. 882 (8th Cir. 1909),
discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 464. The court was undoubtedly
influenced by the fact that the buyer before its bankruptcy had taken
possession of the property and erected a $15,000 building on it. The
total purchase price for the land was $500. The bankrupt's possession
was held to give the court summary jurisdiction to order a third party
with knowledge of the bankruptcy, to whom the vendor had purported
to sell the property for $500, to convey the property to the trustee on
payment of $500 with interest. See also Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d
741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972), finding that a lessor under a real estate lease had waived the prebankruptcy default
of the tenant by accepting postdefault rental payments even though the
lessor had an eviction action pending when the Chapter X petition was
filed.

346. United States Metal Prods. Co. v. United States, 302 F. Supp.
1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1969). This consequence of the failure either to assume
or to reject a contract in a chapter case is discussed more fully in the
text accompanying notes 575-86 infra.
347. 47 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1931), discussed in Countryman, Part I,
at 463.
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tendered a deed to the original buyer's bankruptcy trustee, and
sought to prove a claim on the notes in the bankruptcy case.
Finding that neither the vendor nor its transferee was in a
position to transfer good title on the date of bankruptcy, the
court concluded that the transferee had no provable claim for
the purchase price because the buyer was entitled to treat her
performance as excused by the vendor's default. The buyer,
however, had contracted to sell part of the land to others and
the trustee had apparently occupied it for several years so that
the vendor of its tranferee had administrative claims for use
and occupancy. The court suggested, therefore, that it might
be desirable for the trustee to "waive the vendor's default and
accept for the estate the performance now offered, with compensation for the [vendor's] failure, if any, to make... prom48
ised improvements.3

Absent any waiver of the bankrupt's prebankruptcy breach,
the nondefaulting party can successfully assert the consequences of the breach. 49 Sometimes this has been done before
bankruptcy, as where the government officially terminated the
contract because of the breach,3 50 or where the vendor under a
land contract initiated a repossession action in a state court before bankruptcy and thereafter took a judgment under which
the statutory redemption period had expired before a trustee
was elected. 35 ' As often, however, the nonbankrupt party as348. Id. at 988.
349. An exception arises, of course, where the nondefaulting party
has contracted away its normal remedy. See text accompanying note
354 infra.
350. Crittenden v. Lines, 327 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1964). The Crittenden court held that termination of the contract after the debtor filed
a Chapter XI petition and before he was adjudicated a bankrupt rendered the contract nonexecutory. As the contract was nonexecutory,
the bankrupcy trustee did not reject it by failing to assume it within
the time allowed by § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970), and was entitled
to claim any payments due to the bankrupt from the government See
also United States v. Chichester, 312 F.2d 275 (9th Cir. 1963) (government has a provable claim for damages for a prebankruptcy breach).
Cf. Robertson v. Langdon, 72 F.2d 148 (7th Cir. 1934) (bankruptcy trustee
could not assume a lease where the landlord had, prior to bankruptcy,
terminated it by peaceable reentry because of default in an annual rental payment).
351. In re Winter, 17 F.2d 153 (E.D. Mich. 1927), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 463 n.94, held that the trustee could not recover the
land from the vendor. The further holding that the filing of the bankruptcy petition did not oust the state court of jurisdiction in the pending
repossession action is supported by the later decision in Straton v. New,
283 U.S. 318, (1931). Straton held that a bankruptcy court cannot stay
a pending action to foreclose an indefeasible judgment lien on the bank-
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serts his rights in the bankruptcy court to establish a provable
claim for damages without completing his performance.53 2 And
rupt's real estate. On the other hand, Isaacs v. Hobbs Tie & Timber
Co., 282 U.S. 734 (1931), held that a mortgage foreclosure action could
not be initiated in another court after bankruptcy of the mortgagor
without consent of the bankruptcy court. Isaacs apparently applies to
any postbankruptcy judicial action for the recovery of property because
of the bankrupt's defaults.
The Isaacs postbankruptcy initiation rule has been applied by a receivership court to a landlord seeking to recover the premises because
of bankruptcy default by the tenant. Odell v. H. Batterman Co., 223
F. 292 (2d Cir. 1915). In lease cases, moreover, the Isaacs rule has
been extended to give the bankruptcy court some say in a landlord's
repossession action initiated prior to bankruptcy. For example, a pending repossession action has been stayed to give the bankruptcy receiver
time to decide whether to intervene in and defend against it. In re
Lombardy Inn Co., 266 F. 394 (D. Mass. 1919). Even where the landlord
had obtained a final order for repossession and an eviction warrant had
issued before a Chapter XI petition was filed by the tenant, the execution of the warrant was stayed in order to give the debtor in possession
an opportunity to renegotiate the lease or to locate new premises without interrupting the operation of the business. In re Lane Foods, Inc.,
213 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). Lane Foods drew support from the
treatment of pledgees in Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935), discussed in Countryman,
Part I, at 485.
Similar treatment has been given a landlord seeking the consent
of the bankruptcy court to initiate a repossession action because of prebankruptcy default by the tenant. See In re Crawford Plummer Co.,
253 F. 76 (D. Mass. 1918), aff'd sub nora. Gardner v. Gleason, 259 F.
755 (1st Cir. 1919); In re Schwartzman, 167 F. 399 (D.S.C. 1909);
In re Kleinhans, 113 F. 107 (W.D.N.Y. 1902); In re Chambers, Calder
& Co., 98 F. 865 (D.R.I. 1900). Cf. Vincent v. Nat'l Drug Stores, Inc.,
3 F.2d 504 (E.D. Pa. 1925). The Case of Central Manhattan Properties,
Inc. v. D.A. Schulte, Inc., 91 F.2d 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302
U.S. 243 (1937), suggests, moreover, that a debtor in possession in a
§ 77B case may still have a reasonable time to decide whether to exercise the option to assume or reject a lease despite a prepetition breach
entitling the lessee to terminate the lease. See also American Brake
Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Ry., 282 F. 523 (2d Cir. 1922), where
a receiver was appointed for a lessee railroad after the lessee had defaulted in rental payments. Although the receiver took no action within
the 90-day period after which the lease gave the lessor the power to
terminate, the court refused to allow the lessor to repossess for six
months while the receiver decided whether to assume or reject the lease.
The decision on appeal did not rule on the propriety of the imposed
delay, and it appears that earlier the lessor itself had been unable to
operate the leased properties.
352. In re Marshall's Garage, 63 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1933), discussed
in Countryman, Part I, at 464. In Marshall's Garage the bankrupt vendee under a land contract had defaulted on the first four annual installments prior to bankruptcy. The court held that the vendor had a provable claim for the discounted value of the difference between the total
purchase price and the value of the land which the vendor retained.
See also In re Ross Dev. Co., 98 F. Supp. 872 (E.D.N.Y. 1951), discussed
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in one case, where the nonbankrupt party after bankruptcy
terminated the contract for the bankrupt's prebankruptcy default, the trustee negotiated a new contract with the nonbankrupt party and thus could perform free of a security interest
53
which a bank held in the proceeds of the old contract.
The nondefaulting party may, however, contract away any
right to assert the consequences of the bankrupt's prebankruptcy breach. In Application of Baby World Co., 35 4 the nonbankrupt party held one-half of the outstanding stock of the issuing corporation. He had agreed to sell the stock back to the
corporation at a purchase price of $250,000, of which $100,000
was paid at the time of the contract and the balance was to be
paid in monthly installments. The stock was placed in escrow,
and the contract provided that if the corporation defaulted in a
monthly payment the seller would have an option which he
could exercise within 100 days after such default, to return
one half of the payments recieved and take back all the stock
or to keep all the payments received and surrender all the stock
and any right to the unpaid balance of the purchase price. The
corporation defaulted on a monthly payment and less than a
month later filed a Chapter XI petition. The seller failed to exercise his option to retake the stock and return one-half of the
payments received within the time prescribed, and the court
held that he was bound by the contractual provision that relieved the corporation from liability for the unpaid balance
of the purchase price. Because the corporation was insolvent and the default was not deliberate, the court saw no unfairness in holding the seller to a contract under which he
would
very quickly get $100,000 and as much more as the Debtor could
pay up to $250,000, and, in the event of a default, have the
power then to make an informed judgment whether to keep
what he had received and cry quits, or to get back into the
business and effect a rescue, keeping half of what he had received as his "liquidated damages" and putting the rest back
into the business as--obviously-much needed working capital.
in Countryman, Part I, at 467 n.109; In re Elk Bank Coal Co., 261 F.
445 (M.D. Pa. 1919). Except for the fact that his damage claim is reduced by the saving resulting from the excuse of his performance, the
nonbankrupt party is in the same position as a nonbankrupt who has
fully performed before the bankrupt's prebankruptcy breach. See In
,re Beverlyridge Co., 35 F.2d 818 (9th Cir. 1929), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 463 n.94.
353. In re Luscombe Engineering Co., 268 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1959).
354. 236 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd sub nor. Baby World
Co. v. Daniels, 339 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1964).
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The latter alternative may be thought a species of rescission plus
damages for breach. 355

The two cases involving prebankruptcy breach by the nonbankruptcy party are consistent with, but add little to, the assumptions set forth above. In Tobin v. Plein"G a corporation
and its two stockholders had entered into an agreement for the
liquidation of the corporation. After the corporation's bankruptcy, its trustee charged one stockholder with a pre-bankruptcy breach of the agreement and sought to invoke an arbitration clause in the agreement. The defaulting stockholder
contended that the trustee had rejected the contract by failing
to assume it within the time specified in section 70b. 857 The
court denied this contention and permitted the arbitration on
two grounds: (1) Even if the trustee had rejected the contract
and his rejection constituted a breach, he would not lose any
claim he might have for prebankruptcy breaches by the stockholder. (2) If the prebankruptcy breaches by the stockholder
were material, the corporation would be relieved of any further
obligation to perform and the contract would therefore no
longer be an executory contract. 358
Archer-Daniels-MidlandCo. v. Paull33 0 involved a bankrupt
who had failed to schedule a claim for the prebankruptcy breach
of a contract with a third party to finance a business in which
he and another were engaged as joint venturers. Harkening
back to ancient learning, 3 60 the court held that the bankruptcy
trustee had not abandoned the cause of action for the third

party's breach. Although the joint venturer could similarly
maintain an action for damages for the breach, he would have
to account for the bankrupt's share of the recovery either to the
bankruptcy trustee if the bankruptcy case was reopened or to
the bankrupt as trustee for his creditors if it was not.
B.

POSTBANKRUPTCY BREACH

An analysis of the effect of a material postbankruptcy
breach on the bankruptcy trustee's option to assume or reject
an executory contract must proceed with little aid from the
355. Id. at 287.
356. 301 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1962).
357. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
358.
359.
F.2d 389
360.

Id.
188 F. Supp. 277 (W.D. Ark. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 293
(8th Cir. 1961).
See text accompanying note 14, Countryman, Part I, at 442.

1974]

CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY

cases. In re Dermere61 was decided before the Bankruptcy Act
provided expressly for the treatment of executory contracts.
There the vendee was not in default under his land purchase
contract at the time of his bankruptcy, but thereafter a default in the annual installment payment occurred despite the
vendors' notice to the bankruptcy trustee of the due date. When
the vendors asserted their rights under a contractual option to
terminate for such default, the referee ordered the trustee to
abandon the property, and the trustee sought no review of that
order. When the referee later ordered the trustee to pay to the
vendors any rents collected from the vendee's tenants after
the default, however, the trustee appealed that order and lost.
Inasmuch as the trustee's right to possession of the property
was no better than that of the vendee after the default, the
trustee's possession after that time was wrongful and required
surrendering the rents which he had collected while "holding
30 2
tortious possession in defiance of" the vendors' rights.
In the absence of any pertinent provision in the Bankruptcy
Act and of any assertion by the trustee of a right to cure the default, the decision in In re Dermer and its assumption about the
vendors' power to terminate the contract would be sound today.
The trustee of the vendee took only the vendee's interest in the
contract, and such interest was taken subject to any contractual
burdens. While the trustee could have assumed or rejected the
contract before the postbankruptcy default occurred, he had not
done so. Even in the absence of an express power in the vendors to terminate for default, a default in an annual installment
payment was doubtless sufficiently material to entitle the vendors to treat their own further performance as discharged. By
electing to treat it so, the vendors could prevent the trustee
from assuming the contract, had he wished to do so. Had they
elected instead to waive the breach, the vendors would then
have had to await the trustee's decision whether to assume or
reject the contract.
The analysis of the respective rights of vendor and trustee
in Deriner, however, follows only in the absence of some contrary provision in the Bankruptcy Act. Since 1938, section
70b 3 63 has given the trustee a fixed period, subject to reduction
or extension by the court, in which he must decide whether to
361. 56 F.2d 223 (S.D. Cal. 1931), discussed in Countryman, Part
I,at 464.
362. 56 F.2d at 224
363. 11 U.S.C. 110(b) (1970).
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assume or reject executory contracts. 6 4 In the factual context
of Dermer the question then arises how this provision is to be
applied where a material postbankruptcy breach in the bankrupt's obligation occurs before that time has expired and before
the trustee has either rejected or assumed the contract. When
the question does arise, the nonbankrupt party will doubtless
argue both that the right to terminate the contract is unaffected
by section 70b and that the contract is no longer executory if it
has been so terminated. If that argument prevails, future bankruptcy trustees can preserve their option to assume or reject an
executory contract only by making the expenditures necessary
to avoid a material postbankruptcy breach.
The acceptance of this argument raises another question.
If the trustee uses funds of the estate to avoid a post-bankruptcy breach and ultimately elects to reject the contract, are
the expenditures so made to be treated as a first priority expense of administration? After all, the nonbankrupt party's
claim for damages based on the rejection of the contract (which
claim will be reduced by the prior payments from estate funds)
is not entitled to such priority. If the expenditures are treated
as a first priority expense, the nonbankrupt party benefits from
the fortuity that some part of the bankrupt's performance came
due during the section 70b 3 65 period within which the trustee
must exercise his option to assume or reject."(0 This conundrum may persuade the courts that the effect of the section is to
deprive the nonbankrupt party of the usual right under state
contract law to treat a material breach which occurs during
the period prescribed by the section as an excuse of his performance under the contract. Such a conclusion may perhaps
compel the concomitant conclusion that where the trustee elects
to assume rather than to reject the contract he has not only
the right but also the obligation to cure the earlier default at
the expense of the estate.
The conundrum is even more pronounced where the postpetition breach of the debtor's obligation occurs after the initiation
364. See Countryman, Part I, at 448.
365. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
366. The question would not arise in those cases where the trustee
elects ultimately to assume the contract. The assumption is effective
as of the date of the petition. Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F.2d 161 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 590 (1939). Moreover, all postpetition expenses involved in performing the bankrupt's assumed obligations, until
the trustee disposes of the contract, are first priority administrative
claims.
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of a chapter'proceeding rather than a straight bankruptcy liquidation. The Act provides quite dearly that the chapter proceeding trustee, with court approval, may assume or reject an
executory contract at any time before confirmation of a plan and
that, if he does not reject, the contract may be assumed or rejected by the terms of a confirmed plan.30 7 The time during
which a material postbankruptcy breach may occur, that is between the filing of the petition and the exercise of the option
to assume or reject, thus may be more prolonged in a chapter
proceeding than in a straight bankruptcy case. The Act sheds
no additional light on the effect of this option upon the right
of the nonbankrupt party to treat a postpetition material breach
as an excuse of his performance except by the unconstrued provisions in section 77 and Chapters X and X11 that a plan may
provide for the curing of defaults.30 8 Although the only clear
statutory guidance is that rehabilitation plans are expressly authorized to alter contractual rights, the courts have been willing to impose restrictions on the contractual rights of individual
creditors where the exercise of those rights would jeopardize a
rehabilitation. The cases involving preplan restraint of the
nonbankrupt's exercise of contractual rights 0 9 have dealt with
secured creditors whose contracts were not executory within
the meaning of the Act, but the rights of unsecured creditors can
hardly rise higher than those of the secured. For example, in
the section 77370 reorganization of the Rock Island road the Supreme Court held that pledgees in possession of their collateral
could be restrained from foreclosing despite the debtor's postpetition default if such foreclosure would jeopardize the reorganization. The Court also suggested that the same result
might not follow in a straight bankruptcy liquidation case.3"
In re American National Trust37 2- sheds little light on the

problem of the nonbankrupt's right to terminate a contract for a
material breach which occurs after the filing of a Chapter X
petition. There the court held that a Chapter X court could
authorize the trustee to reject an executory contract to purchase
land despite the fact that the sellers had already terminated it
for postpetition breach under a provision in the contract which
367. See text accompanying notes 597-99 infra.
368. See text accompanying note 338 supra.
369. See Countryman, Part I, at 487-91.
370. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
371. Continental Ill. NaVl Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago Ry., 294 U.S.
648 (1935), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 485.
372. 426 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970).
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allowed the seller in event of termination to retain as liquidated
damages a money deposit and a deed to other land. The decision of the court below had also ordered the seller to return this
security to the debtor, but the reversal of this order as not
within the summary jurisdiction of the court left unresolved
what had been accomplished by the trustee's rejection of the
contract.
There are fewer problems where the trustee commits a material postbankruptcy breach after he has assumed an executory
contract and before he has disposed of it. If such a breach is not
cured, 373 there is no apparent reason why the nonbankrupt
party should not have the usual option to assert the consequences of the breach or to waive them. If the nonbankrupt
party elects the first alternative, any claim for damages would
be entitled to first priority as an administrative expense because the trustee has assumed the executory contract. If the
postbankruptcy breach occurs after the trustee has both assumed and disposed of the contract, with court approval, however, the last sentence of section 70b provides that the trust is
not liable for such breaches and the nonbankrupt
party must
87 4
pursue his options against the trustee's assignee.
The effect of a material postbankruptcy breach by the nonbankrupt party is similar to that of a prebankruptcy breach.
If the default occurs before the trustee has assumed or rejected
the contract and is not cured, the trustee either can assert the
consequences of the breach and thereby rid himself of the con373. In re Forgee Metal Prods., 229 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1956), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 489, did not speak of cure but perhaps
should have. Erroneously treating a conditional sale contract as an executory contract, Forgee held that where the Chapter X proceeding
aborts and the vendee is adjudicated a bankrupt the bankruptcy trustee
can assume the contract within the time allowed by § 70b despite a
default in payment after the vendee had originally filed the Chapter
X petition. Finding that the trustee had assumed the contract, the court
confined the vendor to a claim for the balance of the price and denied
his petition to reclaim machinery concededly worth more than that balance. Forgee may be explained by the fact that the contract was subject to § 19 of the old Uniform Conditional Sales Act which allowed
the vendee 10 days to redeem the machinery after the vendor repossessed it. Absent such redemption, moreover, the vendee was entitled
to insist that the vendor sell the machinery at public auction and account to him for any surplus because the vendee had paid more than
50% of the purchase price.
374. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). If the assignee had not assumed
the obligations of the contract, the option to assert the consequences
of the breach would not provide a damage claim against the assignee.
4 A. CoRBiN, CoN~mAcTs § 906 (1951).
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tract without a rejection and a resulting claim for damages
or can waive the breach and assume the contract. If the default occurs after the trustee has assumed the contract, he can
either assert the breach and pursue any damage claim or waive
it.

C. BAwKRUPTCY As BREAcH
There remains the possibility that in the absence of an
actual default by the bankrupt party to an executory contract
the mere fact of his bankruptcy may be treated as a breach of
the contract. The treatment of bankruptcy as a breach may
spring from the common law doctrine of anticipatory breach,
some other provision of nonbankruptcy law or an express provision in the contract.
1. Anticipatory Breach
In the early case of CentralTrust Co. v. Chicago Auditorium
Association375 the Supreme Court held that, at least where the
bankrupt's performance would require some capital, the mere
fact of the bankruptcy constituted an anticipatory breach which
gave the nonbankrupt party a provable claim for damages. Presumably the bankruptcy would also entitle the nonbankrupt
party to treat the breach as an excuse for nonperformance and
thus to prevent the trustee from assuming the contract, but in
most of the cases which might have turned on this particular issue the courts have been ingenious in avoiding it.370
375. 240 U.S. 581 (1916). Although the decision on this point was
unnecessary because the trustee had rejected the contract, other courts
have followed the Supreme Court's example by unnecssarily invoking
the doctrine of anticipatory breach in cases where there had been an
actual prebankruptcy default. In re Marshall's Garage, 63 F.2d 759 (2d
Cir. 1933), discussed in note 352 supra; In re Beverlyridge Co., 35 F.2d
818 (9th Cir. 1929), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 463 n.94.
376. See Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases
(Part I), 47 N.Y.U.L. Rzv. 407, 415-476 (1972). Cf. United States v.
Brunner, 282 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1960). See also United States Metal
Prods. Co. v. United States, 302 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), discussed
in text accompanying note 346 supra, and Application of Baby World
Co., 236 F. Supp. 283 (E.D.N.Y.), affd sub nom. Baby World Co. v.
Daniels, 339 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1964), discussed in text accompanying
note 354 supra, suggesting that, even if a straight bankruptcy petition
should be treated as an anticipatory breach, a petition for rehabilitation
under Chapter XI should not. See also Consolidated Gas Elec. Light
& Power Co. v. United Rys. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1936),
cert.denied, 300 U.S. 663 (1937).
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As argued at more length elsewhere, this court-created
doctrine of bankruptcy-as-anticipatory-breach (based, apparently, on state common law contract doctrine) was at its creation inconsistent with the earlier court-created doctrine giving
the bankruptcy trustee the option to assume or reject executory contracts. 8 "7 And in 1938 Congress expressly incorporated
the trustee's option to assume or reject an executory contract
and ignored the doctrine of bankruptcy-as-anticipatory-breach.
This congressionally authorized trustee's option should override any inconsistent option that state common law might give to
the nonbankrupt party solely because of the fact of bankruptcy.
2. Other Nonbankruptcy Law
The only other generally recognized provisions of nonbankruptcy law which might conceivably apply in the bankruptcy of
one party to an executory contract are certain provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code 37 8 applicable to contracts for the sale
of goods. Section 2-609 provides that either party to such a
contract may, when "reasonable grounds for insecurity arise"
with respect to the performance of the other party, make written demand for "adequate assurance of due performance." Failure of the other party to provide such assurance within a reasonable time not exceeding 30 days is treated as a repudiation of
the contract. And under section 2-610 a repudiation of performance the loss of which will substantially impair the value of
the contract to the other party may be treated as a breach of the
contract and an excuse for nonperformance.
Clearly, as a matter of fact, the bankruptcy of either the
buyer or the seller of goods under an executory contract might
provide the "reasonable grounds for insecurity" which would
entitle the nonbankrupt party under the provisions of the UCC
to demand "adequate assurance of due performance." If the
UCC applies, after such a demand the bankruptcy would have
only 30 days to provide such assurance-less time than the
Bankruptcy Act gives him to decide whether to assume or reject an executory contract in a straight bankruptcy case and
much less time than the Act gives him to decide in a chapter proceeding. This conflict between the UCC and the Act
poses the question whether the UCC can compel the bankruptcy
377. Countryman, supra note 376, at 418-20.

378. The Umnomv
as the UCC.

Co

MciAL CoDE

is hereinafter referred to in text
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trustee to incur the cost of posting adequate assurance"'9 as a
condition to taking the full time for decision allowed by the
Act. If the trustee posts such assurance but ultimately decides
to reject the contract, the bankruptcy court must again face
the question posed when the trustee uses funds of the estate to
avoid other postbankruptcy defaults, that is, whether the costs
incurred by the trustee are to be treated as first priority expenses of administration.3 80
If the trustee avoids this dilemma by accelerating his decision and assuming the contract, a whole series of questions arises.
Is the nonbankrupt party entitled to demand a greater assurance of performance than the trustee's assumption of the contract?38 1 Is the nonbankrupt party entitled to question the
adequacy of the estate to meet his and other first priority
claims against it? Is the nonbankrupt party entitled further to
speculate that the trustee may, with court approval, assign the
assumed contract to a financially irresponsible assignee or to an
82 assignee who does not assume its obligations?
Although interesting, these questions are obviated by a recognition of the primacy of the Bankruptcy Act. The provisions
of the UCC, like the common law doctrine of anticipatory
breach, should not be available to fetter the option, and the
time for exercising that option, that the Act gives to the trus38 3
tee.
3.

Express Provisionsof Contract

Before the Bankruptcy Act expressly dealt with executory
contracts, including leases, the draftsmen for real estate lessors
had met with some success in the use of clauses providing that
the bankruptcy of the tenant would ipso facto terminate the
lease or would give the lessor an option to terminate it.3 84
379. Comment 4 to § 2-609 specifies, as examples of "adequate assurance," the posting of a guaranty, replacement or repair of goods, and
a money allowance.
380. See text accompanying notes 365-66 supra.
381. See Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741, 743 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 957 (1972), discussed in note 345 supra. Weaver held
that a lessor under a real estate lease had waived prebankruptcy defaults in rent payments by accepting such payments after default and
that he had been relieved of any injury from the tenant's prebankruptcy
default under a trust deed to which the lessor's reversion was subordinated "through the [Chapter X] trustee's assurance."
382. See note 374 supra.
383. Countryman, supra note 376, at 420-23.
384. See Countryman, Part I, at 445-46.
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As enacted in 1938, section 70b provides in part:
A general covenant or condition in a lease that it shall not be assigned shall not be construed to prevent the trustee from assuming the same at his election and subsequently assigning the same;
but an express covenant that an assignment by operation of
law or bankruptcy of a specified party thereto or of either party
shall terminate the lease or give the
other party an election
to terminate the same is enforceable. 88 5
The draftsmen of this language explained that it was "perhaps
only declaratory of the existing law, and is here included for
the sake of comprehensiveness and clarity." 80 Certainly the
first clause seems to codify the Supreme Court decision in Gazlay v. Williams, s 7 holding ineffective against a bankruptcy trustee of the lessee a provision in a real estate lease forfeiting the
leasehold if the lessee "shall assign [his] lease . . . or if said
lessee's interest therein shall be sold under execution or other
legal process .... ,,388 The second clause, insofar as it gives effect to an ipso facto provision automatically terminating a lease
on the bankruptcy of the lessee, codifies the decision in Irving
Trust Co. v. A. W. Perry Co. 38 9 And that part of the second
clause which authorizes an option to terminate upon the bankruptcy of the lessee codifies the decisions of lower federal courts
involving real estate leases prior to the enactment of section
90

70b.3

In any event, the forfeiture provisions of section 70b are by
their terms confined to leases, and the "existing law" declared
by the section was confined to real estate leases39 1 wherein
385. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
386. HoUSE JUDIcIARY CommiTTEE, 74TH CONG., 2D SEss., ANALYSIS OF
H.R. 12889, at 227 (Comm. Print 1936).

387.

210 U.S. 41 (1908), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 445.

See Speare v. Consol. Assets Corp., 360 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1966).
388. 210 U.S. at 41.

389. 293 U.S. 307 (1934), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 445-46

but miscited in note 30. Cf. Jandrew v. Bouche, 29 F.2d 346 (5th Cir.
1928), treating as an ipso facto clause a recital in a lease that it was
"personal to the lessees and shall not inure to the benefit of any receiver or trustee in bankruptcy as an asset of the said lessees."
390. In re Lindy-Friedman Clothing Co., 285 F. 22 (5th Cir. 1922);
Empress Theatre Co. v. Horton, 266 F. 657 (8th Cir. 1920). See also
In re Walker, 93 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1937), holding that a provision giving
the lessor the option to terminate in the event of insolvency of the
lessee or the appointment of a receiver entitled the lessor to terminate,
both because of the filing of a petition under § 77B alleging inability
to meet debts as they matured and because the order continuing the
debtor in possession was tantamount to the appointment of a receiver.
Cf. In re Burke, 76 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1948); In re Larkey, 214 F.
867 (D.N.J. 1914).

391. Since the language of § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970), is con-
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draftsmen attempted to grapple with the unique judicial conceptions with respect to such leases.39 2 These forfeiture provisions should be confined to real estate leases,3 9 3 and a fair negative implication of the provisions is that neither ipso facto clauses
nor options to terminate for bankruptcy should be effective
against the bankruptcy trustee when they appear in executory
contracts other than leases. 94 Except where expressly permitted by the Bankruptcy Act, the parties should not be able by
contractual provision to deprive the bankruptcy trustee of the
option to assume or reject expressly provided by the Act.
In the event the Act's forfeiture provisions are not confined
to real estate leases so that ipso facto clauses and options to
terminate on bankruptcy are enforced in executory contracts
generally, 395 the treatment of such clauses in real estate leases
fined to leases, the "existing law" which it declares could not include
two decisions enforcing forfeiture provisions in patent licenses on the
bankruptcy of the licensee. See In re Diana Shoe Corp., 80 F.2d 827

(2d Cir. 1936), discussed in text accompanying note 330 supra; In re
Michigan Motor Specialties Co., 288 F. 377 (ED. Mich. 1923), discussed
in text accompanying note 330 supra.
392. See Countryman, Part I, at 439, 446.
393. In re Atlanta Times, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 820, 827 (N.D. Ga. 1966),
aff'd per curiam sub nom. Sanders v. National Acceptance Co. of
America, 383 F.2d 606 (5th Cir. 1967), assumes without discussion that
the forfeiture provisions of § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970), are applicable to an equipment lease. See also American A. & B. Coal Corp. v.
Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960).
394. See Countryman, supra note 376, at 423-26. In re Little & Ives
Co., 262 F. Supp. 719, 723 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), discussed in text accompanying note 309 supra, does treat the forfeiture provisions of § 70b, 11 U.S.C.
§ 110(b) (1970), as validating an option to terminate a publishing contract on the bankruptcy of the publisher. The principal basis for this
decision, however, is that the relationship between the parties "was
based on trust and confidence" so that the contract was one that did
not pass to the trustee under § 70a, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (a) (1970). Lichman
v. Moore, 131 F. Supp. 434 (D.N.H. 1955), discussed in note 330 supra,
concludes without reference to § 7Ob that a provision for forfeiture of
a patent license on the bankruptcy of the licensee is enforceable against
the bankruptcy trustee. It is also argued in 4A W. CoteS, BANKRuproy f 70.43[9]
(14th ed. 1971), that the forfeiture provisions of §
70b should apply to all executory contracts since they represent '"merely
an adoption of prior case law," but the prior case law cited is confined
to real estate leases. Id. 70.44[3].
395. A party with sufficient bargaining power or one willing to offer
sufficient inducement to obtain a power to terminate at will need not
worry about the problem. In Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S.
134 141 (1946), a trackage agreement between the Brownsville and TexMex railroads which gave the Brownsville the right to operate over
the track of the Tex-Mex also gave either party the power to terminate
on 12 months' notice. The Brownsville went into § 77 proceedings, 11
U.S.C. § 205 (1970), in 1933, and the court held the Tex-Mex entitled
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illustrates problems that may arise with such clauses in other
executory contracts.
In Finn v. Meighan39 the Supreme Court found that the
forfeiture provisions of section 70b were not inconsistent with
the provisions of Chapter X31 7 and were therefore applicable in

a Chapter X case, even though in some such cases a forfeiture
of a lease would frustrate reorganization. The lease in question had been drafted 12 years before Chapter X was enacted and
contained an ipso facto clause which was to apply "if the tenant
shall be adjudged bankrupt or insolvent by any Court, or if a
trustee in bankruptcy of the tenant shall be appointed .. ."811
The debtor in Chapter X had not been "adjudged" a bankrupt,
however, and the Court ignored the fact that a trustee had been
appointed who under sections 186 and 187 had the title, rights,
duties and powers of a trustee in straight bankruptcy. 80 D After
announcing that the "bankruptcy court does not look with favor upon forfeiture clauses in leases" and that such clauses "are
liberally construed in favor of the bankrupt lessee," the Court
concluded that the Chapter X case constituted an adjudication of
insolvency which would trigger the ipso facto clause. The
Chapter X petition alleged that the debtor was unable to pay
its debts as they matured, 40 0 and prior to the enactment of Chapter X corporations had been reorganized in federal courts by
equity receiverships initiated on general creditors' bills alleging
in 1940 to terminate the contract effective in 1941. The contract was

executory and the § 77 trustee took it subject to the power of the TexMex to terminate it-a power that "survives adoption of the contract
by the trustee." See also Cantor v. Cherry, 73 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1934),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 626 (1935). In Cantor the tenants 20 days before
their bankruptcy had exercised a power which the lease gave either party
to terminate on 30 days' notice and thus terminated the landlord's claim
for rent after expiration of the 30-day period.
396. 325 U.S. 300 (1945) (lease of one of a chain of restaurants).
397. Section 102, 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1970), provides, with exceptions
not including § 70b, that straight bankruptcy provisions of the Act "insofar as they are not inconsistent or in conflict with the provisions of"
Chapter X shall apply in Chapter X cases. There are similar provisions
in § 771, 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970), and in Chapter XI (§ 302, 11 U.S.C.
§ 702 (1970)), Chapter XII (§ 402, 11 U.S.C. § 802 (1970)) and Chapter
XIII (§ 602, 11 U.S.C. § 1002 (1970)).
398. 325 U.S. at 301.
399. 11 U.S.C. §§ 586, 587 (1970).
400. Under § 130(1), 11 U.S.C. § 530 (1970), every Chapter X petition must allege insolvency in either the bankruptcy or the equity sense.
The same requirement is imposed by § 77a, 11 U.S.C. § 205(a) (1970),
and by Chapter XI (§ 323, 11 U.S.C. § 723 (1970)), Chapter XII (§
423, 11 U.S.C. § 823 (1970)), and Chapter XIII (§ 623, 11 U.S.C. § 1023
(1970)).
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insolvency in the equity sense. The Court reasoned that the ipso
facto clause by its reference to an adjudication of insolvency
was aimed at that earlier practice and should therefore be con40 1
strued to reach its statutory equivalent.
Thereafter in the Hoboken Railroad case,4 0°2 the Court held

that the forfeiture provisions of section 70b were not on their
face inconsistent with section 77403 and that an option to terminate a railroad lease (drafted in 1906) was enforceable against
the section 77 trustee in the event of any transfer of the lease
"whether made by the Lessee or in any proceeding... whereby any of the rights, duties and obligations of the Lessee shall
4 04
°
be transferred ... without the consent of the Lessor.
...
The lessor had petitioned the court below to be allowed to terminate the lease, but the court ordered the trustee to adopt the
lease before it ruled on the lessor's petition. The Supreme
Court concluded that "[w]hen the trustee adopted the lease,
the lessee's interest was transferred to him ... in a 'proceeding

" within the meaning of the lease's option to terminate.
Although other courts have been similarly generous to the
lessor in construing lease forfeiture provisions not precisely ap405
plicable to the various proceedings under the Bankruptcy Act,
such provisions have caused enough litigation to inspire more
precision in their drafting.
The termination of leases in section 77 cases involves other
problems, however, and the Supreme Court's resolution of those
problems later produced new uncertainties about the application of the forfeiture provisions in other rehabilitation cases.
Section 77d 40 6 provides both that no reorganization plan for a
railroad can be confirmed until it has first been approved by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and that the Commission may
approve plans different from those proposed by the parties as
long as the plans are fair and equitable and compatible with the
401. Despite the termination of its lease after this decision the
debtor was-held entitled to remain in possession for a limited period
of time under a state emergency rent control law. Finn v. 415 Fifth
Ave. Co., 153 F.2d 501 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 328 U.S. 838 (1946). Cf.
In re Burke, 76 F. Supp. 5 (S.D. Cal. 1948), discussed in note 334 supra.
402. Smith v. Hoboken R.R. Co., 328 U.S. 123 (1946).
403. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
404. 328 U.S. at 126.
405. See 4A W. Comua BArxSrucy 1 70.44[3] (14th ed. 1971)
and notes 330 & 390 supra. Cf. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 429
F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1970).
406. 11 U.S.C. § 205(d) (1970).
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also requires ICC approval pur-

suant to section 1(18) of the Interstate Commerce Act

40 8

before

400

any lines can be abandoned in a section 77 case.
Consequently, the Supreme Court held in the Hoboken Railroad
case 410 that, while a lessor's option to terminate a lease was enforceable against the section 77 trustee of the lessee, the reorganization court could not declare the lease forfeited until the
ICC had performed its functions under sections 77d and o. With
respect to the Commission's authority over the reorganization
plan under section 77d, the Court noted that forfeiture of the
lease would deprive the debtor of all of its railroad properties
and might frustrate its reorganization. The Court further indicated that the Commission might conclude either that forfeiture
of the lease as provided by section 70b would be compatible with
the public interest or that the public interest required that the
lease be adopted by the terms of the reorganization plan. If
the public intererst required the adoption of the lease, any application of the forfeiture provisions of section 70b would not be
"consistent with the provisions of" section 77 within the meaning of section 77(1), and the plan which adopted the lease
could also provide for the curing of defaults as authorized by
section 77b(5).411
407.
408.
409.
a lease

Id. § 205(o).
49 U.S.C. §1(18) (1970).
Section 77c(6), 11 U.S.C. § 205(c)(6) (1970), provides that if
is rejected and the lessee elects no longer to operate the leased

line the lessor shall do so. If the judge finds that it would be impracticable and contrary to the public interest for the lessor to do so, however, the lessee shall continue operation for the account of the lessor
until the Commission authorizes abandonment. See Palmer v. Webster
& Atlas Nat'l Bank, 312 U.S. 156 (1941); Warren v. Palmer, 310 U.S.

132 (1940).
Chapter X excludes from those executory contracts which may be
rejected by the trustee or by the terms of the plan "contracts in the
public authority." §§ 116(1), 216(4), 11 U.S.C. §§ 516(1), 616(4) (1970).
This language has not been officially construed, but it seems to have
been inspired by the ultimately unavailing effort of Mayor LaGuardia
to preserve the five cent subway fare provided by contracts between
the City of New York and public utility corporations operating the subways. See 6 W. COLIER, BANKRUPTCY 3.23[7] & n. 83 (14th ed. 1971).
It has been suggested that the language is not applicable where the
trustee of a public utility in reorganization seeks to reject a lease with
another public utility. In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1,
8 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942).
410. Smith v. Hoboken R.R., 328 U.S. 123 (1946), discussed in text
accompanying note 402 supra.
411. 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (5) (1970).
See also Thompson v. Texas
Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 143 (1946), discussed in note 395 supra, dealing with the same problem where the bankrupt party sought to termi-
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In reliance on Hoboken Railroad, two federal courts of appeal have concluded that it would be inconsistent with Chapter
X to allow a section 70b forfeiture of the leases of publicly held
corporations where that forfeiture would deprive them of the
properties upon which they operated motels and thus frustrate
their prospects for reorganization under Chapter Y.412 When
the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the more recent of these
cases, only Justice White dissented on the ground that Finn v.
Meighan413 had rejected the argument that application of the
forfeiture provisions of section 70b might frustrate some Chapter X reorganizations. 414 The frustration of reorganization,
however, was not shown to be a likely result of the forfeiture
in Finn v. Meighan. Perhaps all that can be said of the test of
inconsistency of the forfeiture provisions of section 70b with
the provisions of section 77 and the chapters is that it will be
made on a case-by-case basis.
The doctrine of waiver has also been invoked to prevent a
lessor from employing ipso facto clauses and options to terminate which would otherwise be enforceable under section 70b.
Although waiver has not resulted merely from the fact that that
4 5
the lessor delayed in exercising his option to terminate,
nate a trackage agreement with a railroad in a § 77 reorganization. In
that case the Court noted that the problem was "kin to that involved"
in Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, RI. & Pac. Ry.,
294 U.S. 648 (1935), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 485, and in
text accompanying note 371 supra. Continental held that a § 77 court
could enjoin pledgees in possession from foreclosing on their collateral
for postbankruptcy default where the foreclosure would jeopardize the
reorganization of the debtor.
412. Weaver v. Hutson, 459 F.2d 741 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 957 (1972); In re Fleetwood Motel Corp., 335 F.2d 863 (3d Cir.
1964). Cf. In 7e Program Aids Co., 310 F. Supp. 198 (E.D.N.Y. 1969),
which did not deny the right of the landlord to forfeit a lease in a
Chapter XI case, but approved an eight-month delay in surrender of
the premises to him by the debtor in possession-that appearing to be
the maximum time a new tenant was willing to wait to receive possession. Cf. In re Lane Foods, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), discussed in note 351 supra.
413. 325 U.S. 300 (1945), discussed in text accompanying note 396
=pra.
414. Weaver v. Hutson, 409 U.S. 957 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
415. 415 Fifth Ave., Inc. v. Finn, 146 F.2d 592 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 325 U.S. 856 (1945) (ten months, during which lessor and trustee
negotiated unsuccessfully for a new lease). See also Model Dairy Co.
v. Foltis-Fischer, 67 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1933), finding no waiver of an
option to terminate the lease in a receivership case because of a sixmonth delay in its exercise, where the receiver had gotten an order
from the court giving him six months to determine whether to assume
or reject. The Model Dairy court also expressed doubts about Durand
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waiver has been found where the lessor accepted rental payments from the trustee for more than a year after the lessee's
bankruptcy 4 16 and where the lessor waited three months to
exercise her option while assuring both the referee and the
trustee that she would cooperate in the assignment of the
lease. 417 And both waiver and estoppel have been found where
the lessors, acting through a trustee who was also an indenture
trustee for creditors and who had filed the Chapter X petition,
had for two months assured the trustee that they would not ex418
ercise their option to terminate.

Several cases have involved a lessor who received payments,
not as rent under the lease but rather for use and occupancy
of the premises, from the debtor in possession under section 77B
or Chapter XI. The receipt of such payments has been held not
to constitute a waiver of the lessor's option to terminate because the lessor would have a valid claim for such payments
even if the lease were terminated. 419 The receipt of rental payments, however, has often been found to constitute such a
waiver. Thus a lessor had waived his option to terminate by
consenting to the trustee's assignment of the lease and by accepting rental payments accruing after the petition was filed
from the prospective assignee. 420 Similarly a lessor has waived
an ipso facto clause and an option to terminate merely by accepting payments of postpetition rents from the debtor in possession or the trustee with knowledge of the pendency of the
proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act. 421

A provision in the

& Co. v. Howard & Co., 216 F. 585 (2d Cir. 1914), which found a
waiver where the lessor obtained an order giving the receiver two
months to determine whether to assume or reject.
416. Ten-Six Olive, Inc. v. Curby, 208 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1953).
417. Larkins v. Sills, 377 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967). Cf. Speare v. Consolidated Assets Corp., 360 F.2d 882 (2d Cir. 1966).
418. Davidson v. Shivitz, 354 F.2d 946 (2d Cir. 1966).
419. B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 326 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1963);
In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, 95 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304
U.S. 567 (1938); In re Walker, 93 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1937). See also
Model Dairy Co. v. Foltis-Fischer, 67 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1933), applying
the same rule in an equity receivership. Inasmuch as the use and occupancy payments made to the lessor by the debtor in possession in the
B.J.M. Realty and Walker cases were in the precise amount of the
monthly rental payments specified in the lease, the courts' conclusions
that they were not paid as rent but rather for use and occupancy were
rather heroic ones. And, as the trial court had not yet fixed the reasonable value to the estate of the use and occupancy, the payments
so characterized would be subject to later adjustment. See also Sproul
v. Help Yourself Store Co., 16 F.2d 554 (3rd Cir. 1926).
420. Entin v. Stevens, 323 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1963).
421. In re Sound, Inc., 171 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied,

1974]

CONTRACTS IN BANKRUPTCY

lease that receipt of rent with knowledge of any breach shall
not be deemed to constitute a waiver, however, has been effective to forestall the waiver consequences of the lessor's acceptance of postpetition rent.422 But such a provision has not been
effective where the lease also required the lessor to exercise his
option within a reasonable time, and when he made a written
offer to accept rental payments from the Chapter XI receiver and
did in fact accept partial payments from the receiver before attempting to exercise his option seven months after the petition
423
was filed.
Double-barreled options to terminate have also been effective to forestall the waiver consequences of the lessor's acceptance of postpetition rent. One lessor, for example, waived his
option to terminate on the appointment of a receiver by thereafter accepting rent payments from the Chapter XI receiver,
but retained an option to terminate for bankruptcy adjudication where the Chapter XI case aborted and an adjudication followed.4 24 Another lessor had the option to terminate either if
bankruptcy proceedings were initiated or if the lease was transferred by operation of law. The lessor waived the first option
by accepting rent from the bankruptcy receiver but did not
waive the second because title would not pass to the bankruptcy
trustee until he assumed the lease--an event which the lessor
42 5
was allowed to preclude by exercising his option.
336 U.S. 962 (1949) (ipso facto clause); B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri,
338 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1964). At an earlier stage of the B.J.M. Realty
case, the court found no waiver in the lessor's mere acceptance of postpetition rental payments and required a showing that the lessor knew
of the pending Chapter XI proceeding-a showing that the court was
unwilling to find from the fact that the checks which the lessor accepted
were stamped "debtor in possession." B.JM Realty Co. v. Ruggieri,
326 F.2d 281 (2d Cir. 1963). No waiver results from the lessor's postpetition acceptance of payment of prepetition rent. In re Wise Shoe Co.,
26 F. Supp. 762 (SD.N.Y. 1938). Cf. Ten-Six Olive, Inc. v. Curby, 208
F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1953). In Curby the lessor did not exercise his option
to terminate during the pendency of an abortive Chapter X case, but
accepted rental payments from the Chapter X trustee and then accepted
possession of the premises from the bankruptcy trustee shortly after
the debtor was adjudicated. The court held that there had been a surrender and acceptance of the lease which terminated all liability for
further rent.
422. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 304 U.S. 567 (1938).
423. Geraghty v. Kiamie Fifth Ave. Corp., 210 F.2d 95 (2d Cir.
1954).
424. Robinson v. Hadley, 351 F.2d 385 (9th Cir. 1965).
425. In re Frazin, 183 F. 28 (2d Cir. 1910).
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IV. MANNER AND CONSEQUENCE OF
ASSUMPTION OR REJECTION
The questions remain as to how the trustee assumes or rejects an executory contract and the consequences of his action.
In the chapter cases there is the additional question of the consequences when the trustee neither assumes nor rejects. This
discussion will therefore deal separately with the problems in
straight bankruptcy liquidation and in rehabilitation cases.
A. STRAIGHT BANKRUPTCY
For the first 40 years of the administration of straight bankruptcy cases under the Act of 1898, the courts merely applied
doctrines which were created earlier and developed contemporaneously in equity receivership cases. Having created the option to assume or reject executory contracts in receivership
cases and having carried the option over to the bankruptcy
cases, the courts also created for themselves the obligation to
prescribe how the equity receiver, or the bankruptcy receiver
or trustee, must exercise his option and defined the consequences of his action.
In the earliest of its decisions involving the options of a
receiver, the Supreme Court dealt with a lease of rolling stock
to a railroad which was to be converted into a purchase and
which also gave the lessor the right to ship goods over the road
at specified rates. Two weeks after his appointment, the receiver had failed to purchase on the date specified in the lease
and successfully resisted the lessor's attempt to compel specific
performance. In what is apparently dictum, the Court said that
the receiver of the road "was entitled to a reasonable time to
elect whether he would adopt" the lease or would "return the
property . . . paying, of course, the stipulated rental for it so

long as he used it" and that the receiver had the right to set
off freight charges owed by the lessor. 426 In succeeding cases
the Court reiterated that railroad receivers had a "reasonable
time" to decide whether to assume or reject leases and held that
they had not assumed them so as to become liable for the stipulated rentals as first priority administration claims merely by

operating the leased lines without producing enough income to
426. Sunflower Oil Co. v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313, 322 (1892), discussed
in note 24, Countryman, Part I. Cf. Kneeland v. American Loan Co.,
136 U.S. 89 (1890).
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pay renf for periods of 14427 and 23428 months. In both cases
the receivership court had promptly granted the lessor's first
request to repossess. In a similar case where the receivers had
earned and paid rent for five months but operated for another

15 months without earning rent, the Court held that the lessor
was entitled to a priority claim for the receivers' "use and occupation" of its property at the stipulated rental rate only for
the last month, during which the bondholders unsuccessfully
42opposed the lessor's attempt to repossess.
Lower federal court decisions in receivership cases fleshed
out the skeleton somewhat. In an attempt to bring some precision to the "reasonable time" within which the receiver must exercise his option, some courts fixed a specific period within
which he was to act 430 and then in some instances extended

such time at the receiver's request.43 1 If the receiver took no action within a reasonable time, however, that inaction did not
alone constitute an assumption of the contract, and the receiver
could thereafter reject it.

43 2

"It

is not the rule that the con-

tract is binding on the receiver until renounced. In order for a
receiver to become bound by a contract, he must positively indicate his intention to adopt it. . .. ,"43 Indeed, some of the decisions allowed the receiver to perform under the contract for a
time to determine whether it was profitable and then reject it.

If the receiver later persuaded the court that his rejection was
proper, he could collect for his performance at the contract
rate without setoff by the other party of a prereceivership dam43 4
age claim against the debtor.
427. Quincy, Mo. & Pac. R.R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82 (1892),

discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 444.

428. St. Joseph & St. Louis R.R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 105 (1892),
discussed in note 24 Countryman, Part I.
429. United States Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry., 150 U.S. 287 (1893),
discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 445.
430. Peabody Coal Co. v. Nixon, 226 F. 20 (8th Cir. 1915).
431. See Pacific W. Oil Co. v. McDuffie, 69 F.2d 208 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 568 (1934); Irving Trust Co. v. Densmore, 66 F.2d
21 (9th Cir. 1933).
432. Menke v. Willcox, 275 F. 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1921). Cf. In re Mallow Hotel Corp., 17 F. Supp. 872 (M.D. Pa. 1937), finding that receivers
who had operated a leased hotel for five years had impliedly assumed
the lease. Cf. Thomas v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry., 77 F. 667 (S.D.
Ohio 1896).
433. Pacific W. Oil Co. v. McDuffie, 69 F.2d 208, 213 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 293 U.S. 568 (1934). See also Peabody Coal Co. v. Nixon,
226 F. 20, 22 (8th Cir. 1915).
434. Butterworth v. Degnon Contracting Co., 214 F. 772 (2d Cir.
1914).
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Not all receivers had the temerity to act unilaterally to reject contracts. Some sought court approval of the rejection and
obtained it;

435

43
others were directed to assume the contract.A

In other instances the application of the nonbankrupt party precipitated the court order to the receiver to reject 43 ' or assume 438 the contract.

Where the receiver assumed the contract, the cost of the receiver's performance was treated as a first priority administration expense. 439 While in most cases the receiver presumably
would not take better rights under the contract than those of
the debtor, one court concluded, where a debtor had before receivership assigned the proceeds of its electricity supply contract with a city to secure loans, that both the supply contract
and the security agreement covering the proceeds were executory. The receivers could therefore assume the supply contract
and reject the security agreement and thus could retain, free
from the security interest, any proceeds earned by the receiv440
ers' performance under the supply contract.
435. Irving Trust Co. v. Densmore, 66 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1933); Peabody Coal Co. v. Nixon, 226 F. 20 (8th Cir. 1915); Kansas City S.
Ry. v. Lusk, 224 F. 704 (8th Cir. 1915). See also Eames v. H.B. Claflin Co., 220 F. 190, 192 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), where the receivers petitioned
for instructions with respect to goods delivered after the receivership
by the other party under a contract of sale and were directed either
to assume the contract, retain the goods, and pay the contract price
or to reject the contract, "in which case the sellers will be allowed
to pursue such remedies ... for their recovery as they may be advised."
436. Mercantile Trust Co. v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 81 F. 254
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 168 U.S. 710 (1897).
437. United States Trust Co. v. Wabash W. Ry., 150 U.S. 287 (1893);
St. Joseph & St. Louis R.R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 105 (1892); Quincy,

Mo. & Pac. R.R. v. Humphreys, 145 U.S. 82 (1892); Sunflower Oil Co.
v. Wilson, 142 U.S. 313 (1892); American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co.
v. New York Rys., 282 F. 523 (2d Cir. 1922), appeal dismissed, 262 U.S.
736 (1923).
438. Gaston v. Rutland R.R., 35 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930); Central Trust Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 86
F. 517 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 171 U.S. 687 (1898).
Cf. Park v.
New York, L.E. & W.R., 57 F. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1893), which two months
after receivers were appointed denied the petition of a lessor for an
order directing them to assume a lease.
439. Gaston v. Rutland R.R., 35 F.2d 685 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied,
281 U.S. 728 (1930); Central Trust Co. v. Continental Trust Co., 86 F.
517 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 171 U.S. 687 (1898); Mercantile Trust
Co. v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 81 F. 254 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
168 U.S. 710 (1897).
440. General Elec. Co. v. Whitney, 74 F. 664 (5th Cir. 1896). It
did not appear whether the security agreement obligated the lenders
to continue making advances. As argued earlier, if it did not, it was
not an executory contract. See Countryman, Part I, at 453, 472.
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Where the receiver rejected the contract, the other contracting party was given a general claim for damages for breach
of contract.4 1 If the rejected contract was an unexpired lease,
the lessor was also given a first priority claim for the reasonable
value to the estate of the receiver's use and occupancy of the
leased premises from the time the receiver was appointed until
the time the property was surrendered to the lessor. This use
and occupancy value was usually,442 but not invariably, 44 3 taken
to be the rental rate stipulated in the lease.444 But the receiver
had to use the leased property in order to give the lessor such a
first priority claim. Where the receiver merely collected rents
from subtenants during the two months before he rejected the
lease and turned those rents over to the lessor, for example,
the lessor's claim for use and occupancy was denied. 45 There
are many ways to use leased property, however. Thus in one
case a debtor had purchased a competitor's papermill on leased
property, had taken an assignment of the lease, and had closed
the mill to eliminate the competition before receivership. Subsequently the receiver neither took physical possession of the
leased property nor did anything else with respect to the property for more than six years except to demand a release of rent
claims when the lessor sought to repossess. Nevertheless, the
lessor was allowed a priority claim for the receiver's use and occupancy of the property at the rental stipulated in the lease
441. Samuels v. E.F. Drew & Co., 292 F. 734 (2d Cir. 1923); Texas
Co. v. International & G.N. Ry., 250 F. 742 (5th Cir. 1918), cert. denied,
249 U.S. 613 (1918); Pennsylvania Steel Co. v. New York City Ry, 198
F. 721 (2d Cir. 1912). In the Samuels case, where receivers had rejected

contracts to purchase goods, the other party's damages were measured
by the difference between the contract price and the market price on
the delivery date. In the Texas Co. case, which involved a contract
to supply oil to the debtor railroad, the supplier also established a priority claim for oil supplied to the road prior to the receivership under
the "six-month rule." See note 225 supra.
442. Oscar Heineman Corp. v. Nat Levy & Co., 6 F.2d 970 (2d Cir.
1925); Fleming v. Noble, 250 F. 733 (1st Cir. 1918). Cf. Johnson v.
Emerson Phonograph Co., 296 F. 42 (2d Cir. 1924).
443. See North Kansas City Bridge & R.R. v. Leness, 82 F.2d 9 (8th
Cir. 1936), and Carswell v. Farmers Loan & Trust Co., 74 F. 88 (6th
Cir. 1896), where the value to the estate was found to be less than
the stipulated rental.
444. See also Mathews v. Butte Mach. Co., 286 F. 801 (9th Cir.
1923), discussed in note 50, Countryman, Part I, where a receiver who
allowed a lease of machinery to expire after his appointment without
either assuming or rejecting it was held liable to the lessor at the stipulated rental from the date of his appointment until he surrendered the
machinery.
445. Irving Trust Co. v. Densmore, 66 F.2d 21 (9th Cir. 1933).
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from the time five years earlier when the receiver had refused
to surrender possession unless the lessor's rent claims were released. From that time, the receiver had "appropriated the
premises to the use of" other operating mills in his charge "in
the way

. . .

which ...

was most useful" to the estate and thus

had continued for the receivership "the same
value" which the
440
closed mill previously held for the debtor.

The Second Circuit treated the lessor's use and occupancy
claims differently, however, in a series of cases involving street
railways. Where the lessor was obligated by the terms of its
franchise to keep the lines in operation but was equipped only
to collect rent and not to operate railways, the court indicated
that the lessor's priority claim should be calculated differently
if the receiver of the lessee operated for a period prior to rejection of the lease. Thus where the receiver in Pennsylvania
Steel Co. v. New York City Ry.4 47 paid the stipulated rental

during part of the period of his operation prior to rejection and
later discovered that the net earnings from his operation were
less than the amount paid, he could not recover the difference for the period for which he had paid. But for the period
between the cessation of rental payment and the surrender of
the properties, the receiver operated for the account of the lessor and was charged only for net earnings. Where the receiver
4 48
in American Brake Shoe & Foundry Co. v. New York Rys.
operated the lines and paid no rental prior to rejection (the
lessor was not itself able to take over operations earlier), the receiver was charged only for the net earnings of his operations.
Subsequently the court concluded that Pennsylvania Steel had
not established a "rigid rule" with respect to a receiver who for a
time paid the stipulated rental. Such a receiver who later discovered that net earnings were more than the rental paid had to
account to a lessor who was willing and able to operate for both
the difference for the period during which he had paid rent and
the full net earnings for operations between the cessation of
44
rental payment and the surrender of the properties. '
446. Dayton Hydraulic Co. v. Felsenthall, 116 F. 961, 967, 969 (6th
Cir. 1902).
447. 225 F. 734 (2d Cir.), rehearing denied, 227 F. 1021 (1915).
448.

282 F. 523 (2d Cir. 1922).

449. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co. v. Brooklyn Rapid Transit Co.,
6 F.2d 547, 551 (2d Cir. 1925). See also Meck, Railroad Leases and
Reorganization: II, 49 YALE L.J. 1401, 1405-1408 (1940); Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 318 U.S. 523, 553-55
(1943).
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The straight bankruptcy cases arising prior to the 1938
amendments to the Bankruptcy Act added little to what was
developed in the above receivership cases. One court dismissed
the lessor's contention that the bankruptcy trustee of the tenant who assumed and sold a lease had thereby discharged the
guarantors' of the tenant's obligation under the lease. The
trustee's assignment alone did not discharge the tenant of his
covenant to pay rent, and even assuming that a later bankruptcy
40
discharge would cover the tenant's liability, " section 16451 of

the Act provided (and still does) that the liability of a guarantor
is unaffected by the discharge of his principal.4" 2 Another court
concluded, where the bankruptcy receiver sold a lease, that a
security deposit posted by the bankrupt tenant remained avail4 3
able for rent unpaid before the receivership. 5
Other cases made it clear that where the trustee assumed
contracts for the sale of goods he took them cum onere, subject to the requirements of giving the buyer credit for prebankruptcy advances on the purchase price 45 4 and holding the proceeds of his own performance subject to the bankrupt's prebankruptcy assignments of the contract's proceeds to secure a
bank loan. 45 5 Uncertainties remained, however, as to whether

the trustee had assumed or rejected the lease. For example, one
trustee reported inability to sell "wild cat" oil leases and the
estate was closed without further action. A receiver later appointed for the corporate bankrupt by a state court sold one of
the leases, and the purchaser struck oil four years later. Notwithstanding the sale of the lease, the bankruptcy case was reopened, and a new trustee was allowed to recover the property
on a finding that his predecessor had not "abandoned" the
450. Under then prevailing law it probably did not. See Countryman, Part I, at 446.

451. 11 U.S.C. § 34 (1970).

452. In re Tidus, 4 F.2d 558 (D. Del. 1925).
453. In re Sherwoods, 210 F. 754 (2d Cir. 1913). Since this application exhausted the deposit, the court did not consider whether the
deposit might also be charged with the receiver's obligation to the lessor
for the period of his occupation of the premises, an obligation which
the court described as one for use and occupancy without considering
whether the receiver had assumed the lease by selling it with the approval of the bankruptcy court.
454. Greif Bros. Cooperage Co. v. Mullinix, 264 F. 391 (8th Cir.
1920); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Hurley, 153 F. 503 (8th Cir. 1907),
af-fd on other grounds, 213 U.S. 126 (1909).
455. In re Long Furniture Co., 188 F. 686 (ED. Pa. 1911). Cf. General Elec. Co. v. Whitney, 74 F. 664 (5th Cir. 1896), discussed in text
accompanying note 440 supra.
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456

lease.

A number of decisions established the consequences of a
rejection of a lease or contract. Thus it was assumed in a case
where the issue was not decided that after rejection of a lease
the "leasehold remained the bankrupt's." 4 577
Where the bankruptcy trustee rejected a contract to sell goods, the buyer was
left with a damage claim for breach of contract. 4 58 The trustee
who rejected a lease, however, was liable for the reasonable
value (usually 4 9 but not always 400 the rental price stipulated
in the lease) of the use of the premises prior to rejection and
surrender.4 11 And where an electricity supplier was enjoined
456. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Logan, 92 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1937),
cert. denied, 302 U.S. 763 (1938) and 303 U.S. 636 (1938). The lessor
apparently should have followed the practice adopted in Gate City Clay

Co. v. Dickey, 39 F.2d 581 (8th Cir. 1930), where the court, on petition
of the lessor, directed the trustee to reject the lease.
457. Green v. Finnigan Realty Co., 70 F.2d 465, 466 (5th Cir. 1934).
458. In re Lathrap, 61 F.2d 37 (9th Cir. 1932).
459. Jensen v. Sparkes, 53 F.2d 433 (9th Cir. 1931); In re Millard's,
Inc., 41 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1930); In re Colburn, 16 F.2d 780 (1st Cir.
1926); Gardner v. Gleason, 259 F. 755 (1st Cir. 1919); Wilson v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 114 F. 742 (3d Cir. 1902); In re Nathanson, 24 F.2d
760 (D. Mass. 1927); In re Adams Cloak, Suit & Fur House, 199 F.
337 (D. Mass. 1912); In re Winfield Mfg. Co., 137 F. 984 (E.D. Pa. 1905);
In re T.L. Kelly Dry-Goods Co., 102 F. 747 (E.D. Wis. 1900). See also
In re Benguiat, 20 F. Supp. 504 (S.D. Calif. 1937), where the lessor
exercised an option to terminate because of the tenant's bankruptcy.
Where the lessor held a security deposit exceeding his claim against
the bankrupt for prebankruptcy rent, he was held entitled in Jensen
v. Sparkes, supra, to satisfy his claim for use and occupancy out of
the balance of the deposit-a result which seems unobjectionable only
if there were enough assets to pay all other first priority administration
expenses in full. Cf. In re Sherwoods, discussed in text accompanying
note 453 supra.
460. The value was fixed at less than the stipulated rental in Crook
v. Zorn, 100 F.2d 792 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 630 (1939);
Green v. Finnigan Realty Co., 70 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1934); In re McNeice, 287 F. 706 (9th Cir. 1923). It was fixed at more than the stipulated rental in In re Grignard Lithographic Co., 155 F. 699 (E.D.N.Y.
1907). But see In re Grignard Lithographing Co., 158 F. 557 (E.D.N.Y.
1907).

In Crook v. Zorn, supra, the court fixed the value at less than the
stipulated rental because the trustee used only a part of the premises
leased for a retail business and then only for storage purposes.
In re Millard's, Inc., 41 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1930).

461.

In re Chakos, 24 F.2d 482 (7th Cir. 1928).

Cf.

Where the trustee

made no use of the leased premises prior to rejection, no allowance

for use and occupancy was made, but the lessor was held entitled to
subrents collected by the trustee. In re McCrory Stores Corp., 69 F.2d
517 (2d Cir. 1934); In re No Care Elec. Radiator Corp., 3 F. Supp. 331
(S.D.N.Y. 1933). In Meehan v. King, 54 F.2d 761 (1st Cir. 1932), where
the lease expired two months after the tenant's bankruptcy without affirmance or rejection and without any use of the premises by the receiver, a claim for use and occupancy was denied. But the court then
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from suspending service because of the bankrupt's prebankruptcy defaults while a bankruptcy composition was being effected, the supplier was allowed a priority claim at the prevailing retail rate rather than at the lower contract rate for all the
electricity supplied to the
receivers, who had neither rejected
46 2

nor assumed the contract.
The 1938 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, so far as here
relevant, were primarily concerned with making claims for future rent provable and dischargeable but were also directed
toward eliminating some of the uncertainty as to whether the
trustee had assumed or rejected any executory contract. New
section 63a(9) expressly made provable "claims for anticipatory breach of contracts, executory in whole or in part, including
unexpired leases of real or personal property." However, that
section limited the allowability of a landlord's claim under a
real estate lease to an amount not to exceed the rent reserved
by the lease for the year following the date of either surrender
of the premises to the landlord or his reentry, plus the rent unpaid and accrued up to that date.468 New section 63c provided
that "[n]otwithstanding any State law to the contrary, the rejection of an executory contract or unexpired lease . . . shall
concluded that its ruling on that point had "in effect held the lease
disaffirmed" so that any postpetition subrents collected by the receiver
belonged to the bankrupt as after-acquired property. Meehan v. King,
62 F.2d 435, 437 (1st Cir. 1932). Where the bankruptcy trustee leaves
property in storage on the property of another, the court will make
no allowance for use and occupancy if the original storage arrangement
with the bankrupt was a gratuitous bailment rather than a lease. In
re Seatrade Corp., 345 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1965).
Where the trustee used only a part of the leased premises, he was
held liable only for the value of that part. In re United Cigar Stores
Co., 69 F.2d 513 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 566 (1934); In re J.
Frank Stanton Co., 162 F. 169 (D. Conn. 1908).
A bankruptcy receiver who was dilatory in surrendering leased
premises to the lessor was personally charged for a part of the use
and occupancy claim in In re C.M. Piece Dyeing Co., 89 F.2d 37 (2d
Cir. 1937).
See also Wilson v. Pennsylvania Trust Co., 114 F. 742 (3d Cir. 1902);
In re Winfield Mfg. Co., 137 F. 984 (E.D. Pa., 1905), which held the
trustee liable only for the period of his use. This limitation of the
trustee's liability resulted despite a provision in the lease, effective under state law, that bankruptcy of the tenant should render the entire
rent for the balance of the term immediately due and payable. Cf.
Rosenblum v. Uber, 256 F. 584 (3d Cir. 1919).
462. Odell v. Bedford Co., 224 F. 996 (E.D.N.Y. 1915).
463. 11 U.S.C. § 103 (a) (9) (1970). The limitation on allowability
does not affect dischargeability of the full claim. Under § 17a, 11 U.S.C.
§ 35(a) (1970), provable claims, with exceptions not pertinent here, are
discharged "whether allowable in full or in part."
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constitute a breach of such contract or lease as of the date of the
filing" of a petition under the Bankruptcy Act. 4

4

New section

70b, as once later amended, 465 provided in part:
The trustee shall assume or reject an executory contract,
including an unexpired lease of real property, within sixty days
after the adjudication or within thirty days after the qualification of the trustee, whichever is later, but the court may for
cause shown extend or reduce the time. Any such contract or
lease not assumed or rejected within that time shall be deemed
to be rejected. If a trustee is not appointed, any such contract
or lease shall be deemed to be rejected within thirty days after
the date of the order directing that a trustee be not appointed. 466 A trustee shall file, within sixty days after adjudication or within thirty days after he has qualified, whichever is later, unless the court for cause shown extends or reduces the time, a statement under oath showing which, if any,
of the contracts of the bankrupt are executory in whole or in
part, including unexpired leases of real property, and which,
if any, have been rejected by the trustee.

. .

. A trustee who

elects to assume a contract or lease of the bankrupt and who
subsequently, with the approval of the court and upon such
terms and conditions as the court may fix after hearing upon
notice to the other party to the contract or lease, assigns the
contract or lease to a third person, is not liable for breaches
occurring after the'assignment.
The draftsmen of these provisions explained that the first
sentence of section 70b 467 was included because it was "con-

sidered advisable to impose upon the trustee the duty to act"
and "it requires the trustee to make a decision" within the time
specified unless the court altered that time. The requirement
of the last sentence that the trustee obtain court approval of the
assignment of an assumed contract was said to be imposed to
"relieve against the unfairness which may occur in a case where
or lease, asthe trustee, after adopting the executory contract
'4 8
signs it to an irresponsible or undesirable person.
Actually, the amendments did little to clarify the manner
of the trustee's assumption or rejection of a contract. Although
the trustee may either assume or reject the contract within the
time specified by section 70b, the Act neither prescribes any
form for the manifestation of his action nor indicates whether
court approval is required for assumption or rejection, as distin464.

11 U.S.C. § 103(c) (1970).

See Countryman, Part I, at 448,

where § 63c is erroneously cited as § 63a.
465. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). See Countryman, Part I, at 448.

466.
467.

See note 48, Countryman, Part I.
11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). In 1938, the first sentence of § 70b

read somewhat differently. See note 48, Countryman, Part I.
468. HOUSE JUDICIARY CoMrrEE, 74TH CONG., 2D SESS., ANALYSIS OF
RR. 12889, at 227 (Comm. Print 1936).
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guished from assignment, of a contract. Indeed, the fourth sentence of section 70b by requiring the trustee to file with the
court a statement indicating any contracts rejected within the
prescribed time may be taken to indicate that the trustee may
act on his own. 46 9 Only one point seems clear. If the trustee
does nothing within the time fixed by section 70b, 470 as that
time may be reduced or extended by the court, he is deemed to
have rejected the contract. This provision of section 70b has
been treated as establishing a rejection without more in several
cases 471 -including one where the trustee of a bankrupt lessor
had accepted rent from the lessee for "several months after
47 2
adjudication."
As matters have transpired, however, the nonbankrupt contracting party cannot with safety rely on the apparently firm
assurance of this provision. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that the bankruptcy court may, pursuant to
Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, extend the
time for the trustee to act without notice to the other contracting party.473 The Fifth and the Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have concluded, moreover, that the nonbankrupt contracting party has waived his right to insist on automatic rejection within the section 70b 474 time limits by assuring the ref47
eree and trustee that he would cooperate in the sale of a lease, 5
by consenting to assignment of a lease and accepting rental payments from the prospective assignee,476 and by accepting rental
payments first from a Chapter X trustee until adjudication
469. Since this sentence speaks only of rejection and since assumption of contracts involves the creation of first priority administration
expenses, it'is argued in 4A W. CoLLIE, BAmumupcy 1 70.43[5], at
529-31 (14th ed. 1972), that court approval should be required for assumption but not for rejection. But Nastromo, Inc. v. Fahrenkrog, 385
F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1968), finds an effective assumption by the trustee
without court approval.
470. 11 U.S.C. § 110 (b) (1970).
471. Aylward v. Broadway Valentine Center, Inc., 390 F.2d 556 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 964 (1968); In re Gravure Paper &
Board Corp., 234 F.2d 928 (3d Cir. 1953); Fletcher v. Surprise, 180 F.2d
669 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 824 (1950); Hill v. Larcon Co.,
131 F. Supp. 469 (W.D. Ark. 1955); Rosnick v. Aetna Sheet Metal Works,
Inc., 146 Conn. 565, 153 A.2d 435 (1959).
472. In re Northern Ind. Oil Co., 65 F. Supp. 167, 168 (N.D. Ind.
1946).
473. Texas &N.O.R.R. v. Phillips, 196 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1952).
474. 11 U.S.C. §110(b) (1970).
475. Larkins v. Sills, 377 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1967).
476. Entin v. Stevens, 323 F.2d 894 (8th Cir. 1963). The same conduct was held also to constitute a waiver of the option to terminate
the lease because of the filing of a Chapter X petition.
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more than a year later and thereafter from the bankruptcy trustee.477 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has said
that "the sense of [the section] is that rejection is to be inferred
unless assumption is satisfactorily proved.

'478

The court found

a rejection of a contract to manufacture and sell goods where the
trustee of the seller negotiated a new contract to sell to the buyer
certain tools and dies which, by the terms of the original contract,
were to have become the property of the buyer on completion
of the manufacture and delivery of the goods.
While one court has indorsed the suggestion 47 that court
approval is required where the trustee assumes a contract, 480
another has rejected the suggestion while conceding that it
would be better practice for the trustee to obtain such approval. 481

And another, erroneously treating a conditional sale con-

tract as an executory contract, found that the trustee of the
vendee assumed it by taking possession of the property covered
by the contract and selling

it.

4

8

2

New Bankruptcy Rule 607, which was approved by the Supreme Court and became effective October 1, 1973,483 provides
merely an exhortation that the trustee gain court approval of
an assumption of a contract:
Within 30 days after the qualification of the trustee, unless
the court for cause shown extends or reduces the time, the
trustee shall file a statement showing any executory contracts
of the bankrupt, including unexpired leases, which the trustee
has assumed. Whenever practicable, the trustee shall obtain
approval of the court before he assumes a contract. Any such
contract not assumed within 60 days after qualification of the
trustee, or within such further or reduced time as the court
477. Ten-Six Olive, Inc. v. Curby, 208 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1953). The
same conduct was held also to constitute a waiver of the option to terminate the lease because of the filing of a Chapter X petition. As indicated in text accompanying notes 545-46 infra this case and Entin
v. Stevens, note 476 supra, are in error in assuming that the time limits
of § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110 (b) (1970), are applicable in Chapter X cases.
478. In re Luscombe Eng'r Co., 268 F.2d 683, 687 (3d Cir. 1959).
479. See note 469 supra.
480. In re Northern Ind. Oil Co., 65 F. Supp. 167, 168 (N.D. Ind.
1946).
481. Texas &N.O.R.R. v. Phillips, 196 F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1952).
482. In re McCormick Lumber & Mfg. Corp., 144 F. Supp. 804 (D.
Ore. 1956), discussed in Countryman, Part I, at 489. Cf. In re Forgee

Metal Prods., Inc., 229 F.2d 799 (3d Cir. 1956), discussed in text at

note 208, Countryman, Part I, at 489, involving another conditional sale

contract, where the court ordered the contract "paid off."

483. The Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure were promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970) and were reported
to Congress on April 24, 1973. Congress did not object to the rules,
and they became effective October 1, 1973.
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may allow within such 60-day period, shall be deemed to be
rejected. If a trustee does not qualify, any such contract shall
be deemed to be rejected at the expiration of 60 days after
the date of an order directing that a trustee be not appointed,
or at such earlier or later time as the court may fix within
such 60-day period. On application by the trustee for authority
to assign any contract he has assumed pursuant to this rule,
after hearing on notice
the court shall determine the matter
48 4
to the other party to the contract.

The 1938 amendments to the Act have made no change in
the rule that a trustee who rejects or is deemed to have rejected
a lease is subject to a first priority claim for the value to the
estate of his use and occupancy of the premises until they are
surrendered to the lessor. But this rule does not apply where
the lessor has agreed to permit the trustee to occupy the premises
rent free while he sells the assets located therein because of the
lessor's interest in negotiating a new lease with the purchaser of
It continues to be true, moreover, that the
those assets.485
"contractual rental agreed on... is presumed to be an appropriate figure" for the use and occupancy allowance. And it has
been held that in determining whether this presumption has
been overcome the referee "should not consider that the trustee

has used only for storage purposes property that had been occupied by a going business" 488 and that the allowance should not
be limited to what the referee "feels the estate can 'afford to
pay'-to do so would be to confer on general creditors an advantage obtained after bankruptcy at the expense of" the lessor.487 Indeed, the presumption that the contractual rental is ap484. The Advisory Committee's Note to the rule indicates that the
additional 30 days after qualification of the trustee and his report of
contracts assumed is given "in order to afford creditors an additional
opportunity to evaluate the situation in respect to contracts not assumed
and to .apply to the court for an order approving assumption of any
additional contracts that appear to be advantageous to the estate." The
Note also points out that any extension of the 60-day period must be
sought before that period has expired and that under proposed Rule
906(b), which will replace Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) in
bankruptcy cases, extension after the time has expired is not permissible "for the purpose of rendering a contract amenable to assumption
after it has once been deemed rejected." Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, House Document No. 93-87, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 38, 185 (1973).
Under proposed Bankruptcy Rule 906(b), however, the time could
be extended before it had expired without notice to the other contracting
party. Id. at 54. Cf. text accompanying note 473 supra.
485. Aylward v. Broadway Valentine Center, 390 F.2d 556 (8th Cir.
1968).
486. Cf. note 460 supra.
487. Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Harralsen, 369 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir.
1966). See also Zoconick v. McKee, 310 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1962), allow-
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propriate may be overcome because the value to the estate exceeds the contractual rate.488 In addition to the lessor's claim for
use and occupancy of that portion of the premises used by the
trustee, the lessor is entitled to recover postbankruptcy rents
48 9
collected from subtenants by the trustee.

Where an ipso facto clause provided that on the filing of a
bankruptcy petition by the tenant the lease "shall expire ipso
facto ...

and come to an end," one court dismissed as entitled

to "scant consideration" the trustee's argument that such a termination of the lease defeated the landlord's provable claim for
loss of future rents under section 63a(9) .490 The lease in this
case specifically provided that the lessor would have such a
claim if the lease were "terminated.

' 49 1

Although recognizing

this claim by the lessor, the court held that the lessee's security
deposit must be applied against the limited amount of the claim
allowed under section 63a(9) rather than against the excess
of the claim proved but not allowed under the section. 4

2

An-

ing a claim for use and occupancy at the contract rate after the lessor
exercised an option to terminate because of the tenant's bankruptcy.
488. S. & W. Holding Co. v. Kuriansky, 317 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1963).
In Kuriansky the lessor had no claim for loss of future rents, and only
a small part of the security deposit held by the lessor was needed to
cover its claim for prebankruptcy rent. The court held it proper to
apply the balance of the deposit in satisfaction of the claim against
the trustee for use and occupancy. See also In re Pal-Playwell, Inc.,
334 F.2d 389 (2d Cir. 1964), where the lessor's right to apply the security
deposit to his claim against the trustee for use and occupancy was erroneously treated as a right to set off "mutual debts" under § 68, 11
U.S.C. § 108 (1970). See In re Plywood Co., 425 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1970).
On the other hand, In re Plywood Co., 304 F. Supp. 219 (E.D. Pa. 1959),
held it improper to apply the security deposit to the priority claim for
use and occupancy where the lessor's claims for prebankruptcy rent and
loss of future rent exceed the amount of the deposit. Cf. notes 453
and 459 supra.
489. Fort Lauderdale v. Freeman, 217 F.2d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 1954).
In this case the court found that the lessor had effectively cancelled
the lease for nonpayment of rent and that the trustee "did not attempt
to adopt it." Id.
490. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (9) (1970).
491. Oldden v. Tonto Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944). Cf.
In re Bonwit, Lennon & Co., 36 F. Supp. 97 (D. Md. 1940).
492. Under the formula prescribed in the lease, the difference between the present value of future rent reserved in the lease and the
present rental value of the balance of the term, the lessor proved damages of $40,000. But under the limitation of § 63a(9), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a)
(9) (1970), only one year's rent as reserved in the lease ($22,700) plus
the unpaid rent accrued on the date the trustee surrendered possession
($3,300) was allowable. See text accompanying note 463 supra. Thus
by requiring application of the $3,000 deposit after arriving at the statutory limitation rather than before, the allowable claim ($26,000) was
reduced to $23,000.
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other court, operating under a similar statutory limitation on allowance imposed by former section 63a(7), 493 held both that the
trustee's power to reject a mining lease was not subject to a provision in the lease allowing the lessor to terminate on six
months' notice and that the lessor's contractual lien on all property on the premises was limited to securing so much of his
claim as was allowable. 49 4 Without regard to the allowability
limitation of section 63a(9), however, several courts have concluded that if the money deposited by the tenant is characterized as advance payment of the last year's rent rather than as a
security deposit, the "title" to the money has passed to the lessor

and he may keep it as against the trustee. This "title passage"
has been upheld even where the tenant had become a bankrupt
two, three 495 and even 14 years 490 before expiration of the lease
term and subsequently the trustee rejected the lease or the
lessor exercised an option to terminate it.
The last sentence of section 70b exonerates the trustee
from liability for breaches occurring after he makes a court approved assignment of an assumed contract.4 7 Although this
Earlier the lessor's exercise of an option to terminate because of
the bankruptcy of the lessee gave the lessor no provable claim for loss
of future rent, but the lessee was liable for such damages (see Countryman, Part I, at 446) and the lessor was allowed to retain a security
deposit until the end of the term when damages could be calculated.
In re Homann, 45 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1930).
Such was the case unless
the lessor had taken action that by state law terminated further liability
of the lessee. In -re Barnett, 12 F.2d 73 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273
U.S. 699 (1926). In re Luria, 46 F. Supp. 305 (E.D.N.Y. 1942), applies
the same rule after the 1938 amendments. There a landlord was allowed a first priority claim for the trustee's use and occupancy before
the lessor exercised an option to terminate because of the bankruptcy
of the tenant and was allowed to retain a security deposit until the
end of the term. See also Ghoti Estates, Inc. v. Freda's Capri Restaurant, Inc., 332 Mass. 17, 123 N.E.2d 232 (1954).
493. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (7) (1970). See Countryman, PartTi, at 447.
494. Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. v. Whiteside, 110 F.2d 778 (10th Cir.
1940). At a time when the landlord's claim for loss of future rent occasioned by the trustee's rejection of a lease was not provable and hence
not dischargeable, his statutory lien for such rent was held enforceable
in bankruptcy. Britton v. Western Iowa Co., 9 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1925).
Cf. Rosenblum v. Uber, 256 F. 584 (3d Cir. 1919).
495. Zaconick v. McKee, 310 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1962); Sline Properties, Inc. v. Colvin, 190 F.2d 401 (4th Cir. 1951).
496. Aylward v. Broadway Valentine Center, Inc., 390 F.2d 556 (8th
Cir. 1968).
497. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). See text accompanying note 465
supra New Bankruptcy Rule 607 (see text accompanying note 483 supra)
deals only with the procedure for notice and hearing to the other party to
the contract. The Advisory Committee's Note explains that to the extent § 70b relieves the trustee from liability it "states a rule of substan-
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provision has not yet been dealt with in the straight bankruptcy
cases, an opportunity may have been missed. In In re Wil-Low
Cafeteria, Inc. 498 a debtor in possession under section 77B negotiated a new agreement with its lessor which reduced the
amount of rent payable under its lease. The reorganization
court approved both the agreement and the debtor's assumption
of the lease as modified. Thereafter, and shortly before the effective date of the 1938 amendments, 499 the reorganization effort
aborted and the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt. The bankruptcy trustee sold the lease, but the purchaser soon defaulted.
After expiration of the term, the lessor filed a priority claim
for the balance of the unpaid rent which was rejected by the
court without mention of section 70b. While the court viewed
the arrangement negotiated by the debtor in possession as a
modification of the original lease rather than as a new lease
and considered the bankruptcy trustee bound by the adoption
of that lease by the debtor in possession, it concluded that there
was only "privity of estate but not privity of contract"5 0 between the lessor and the trustee so that the trustee's liability
for rent ceased on transfer of the lease to the purchaser.
Further consequences of assumption or rejection of an executory contract include the following: The trustee who assumes
an executory contract to sell a bankrupt motor carrier's operating certificate takes the contract subject to the lien of a prebankruptcy federal tax levy on the buyer. 00
But where the
trustee rejects an executory contract and negotiates a new one
with the other contracting party, he takes the proceeds of the
new contract free of a security interest which encumbered the
proceeds of the old one. 502 If the trustee is deemed to have rejected a partially performed construction contract by doing
nothing for the time specified in section 70b 50 3 he may have a
tive law inappropriate for incorporation into the rules." Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, House Document No. 93-87, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 185
(1973).

498. 111 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1940).
499. The 1938 Act was to "govern proceedings so far as practicable
in cases pending when it takes effect." 52 Stat. 940 (1938).
500. In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 111 F.2d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 1940).
501. Kirby v. United States, 329 F.2d 735 (10th Cir. 1964).
502. In re Luscombe Eng'r Co., 268 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1959). In
a different transaction in the same case, another nonbankrupt party had
terminated a contract burdened with a security interest because of the
bankrupt's prebankruptcy defaults. The trustee's new contract with this
party was also held to be free of the security interest. See text at
notes 440 and 455 supra.
503. 11 U.S.C. §110(b) (1970).
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claim in quasi contract for the value of the work performed by
the bankrupt less the damages incurred by the other party as a
consequence of the rejection, but he cannot recover damages
from the other party on the basis that he was prevented from
completing performance. 50 4
B.

REHABILITATION PROCEEDINGS

Since its revision in 1935 section 77b 5° 5 has provided that
a plan of railroad reorganization may reject contracts executory in whole or in part, including unexpired leases, and that the
term "creditor" includes "the holder of a claim under a contract
executory in whole or in part including an unexpired lease."
While there is no express grant of authority to the trustee to
adopt or reject such contracts, the section also provides that
adoption by the trustee shall not preclude rejection in a reorganization plan and that if such a contract is rejected or "not ...
adopted" by the trustee, or is rejected by a reorganization plan,
any person injured "by such nonadoption or rejection" shall
be deemed a creditor for all purposes of section 77 "to the extent of the actual damage or injury determined in accordance
with principles obtaining in equity proceedings."
These provisions have received remarkably little interpretation. In a case involving the rejection of a 999-year street
railway lease by the section 77 trustee 969 years before it expiration, the Supreme Court held the language last quoted to mean
that the lessor's damage claim was confined not to the
difference between the rent reserved and the earnings of the
leased properties calculated up to the latest practicable date in
the section 77 proceeding but to the "present value of the rent
reserved less the present rental value of the remainder of the
term" to the extent that the lessor could establish those figures
"to reasonable certainty." 508 Although the lessor later tried to
establish the figures for the next 40 years following rejection,
he succeeded only as to 11 years, three in which evidence of actual post-rejection earnings was available and eight more to
which were assigned the average annual earnings of a period
running from 11 years before to three years after rejection. To
dispel the trustee's argument that earnings during the excluded
504. Rosnick v. Aetna Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 146 Conn. 565, 153
A.2d 435 (1959).
505. 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970).
506. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co. v. Palmer, 305 U.S. 493, 504,
505 (1939).
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958 years of the term might be sufficient to wipe out the damage thus projected for 11 years, the Court announced that "it is
fair to assume the parties thought the annual rent reserved and
rental value were the same" when the lease was executed and
that "until something else is shown, courts are entirely justified in assuming that for the long years ahead the rent and the
rental value are the same."50 7
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has continued to follow the uncertain course it originally charted for railroad reorganizations in equity receivership cases. 0 8 Where a section
77509 trustee rejects a lease but thereafter continues to pay rent
at the contract rate while operating the leased line at a deficit
for the account of the lessor under section 77c (6),110 the
court has held him entitled to recover from the lessor both the
rental paid and the deficit incurred. 51 ' Another court has held
that, while section 77b 5 12 provides that adoption of an executory contract by the trustee does not preclude rejection of it
in a reorganization plan, section 77o, 513 requiring Interstate
Commerce Commission approval for abandonment of a line,
would require Commission approval for a plan to reject a track14
age agreement assumed by the trustee.
When the Commission approved a plan providing for the rejection of leased lines unless the lessor consented to a reduction
of the rental, the Supreme Court in the Chicago, Milwaukee
case 51 5 held that such action was proper as an exercise of sound
"business judgment." Although the lines had been operated
at a profit in recent years, the Court reasoned that the Commission's action was proper if it was necessary to work out a
fair and equitable plan. The Court also held that the plan
could properly defer the date for computing damages in the
event of rejection to the date of rejection and that, at least
507. Palmer v. Connecticut Ry. & Lighting Co., 311 U.S. 544, 558
(1941).
508. See text accompanying notes 447-49 supra.
509. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
510. Id. § 205(c) (6). See note 409 supra.
511. Palmer v. Palmer, 104 F.2d 161 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S.
590 (1939).
512. 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970).
513. Id. § 205(o).
514. In re New York, S. & W.R.R., 160 F.2d 29 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 844 (1947). The court relied on Thompson v. Texas Mexican Ry., 328 U.S. 134 (1946), discussed in notes 395 and 411 supra.
515. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mil., St. P. & Pac.
R.R., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943), discussed in note 87, Countryman, Part
L
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where rent at the contractual rate had been paid during the
section 77 proceeding, section 77c(6)516 did not require that
operation of the lines by the trustees prior to rejection should
be for the account of the lessors so as to entitle them to the net
earnings produced by the trustees' operation. Whatever may be
the rule when a trustee rejects a lease prior to confirmation, 511
if the rejection occurs in a confirmed plan the Commission can
conclude that the lessor receives fair and equitable treatment
vis-a-vis other creditors where it receives a return of the leased
lines, the stipulated rental until rejection and a general claim
for damages for loss of future rents.
As enacted in 1934518 and until superseded by Chapter X in
1938, former section 77B contained more detailed provisions with
respect to rejection of executory contracts than does section
77. 519 Section 77B (c) (5) provided that the judge "may direct
the rejection of contracts of the debtor executory in whole or
in part" and section 77B(b) (6) provided that the reorganization plan "may reject contracts of the debtor which are execu. ,,520
tory in whole or in part, including unexpired leases ...
Section 77B (b) also defined "creditors" to include "all holders
of claims.
including claims under executory contracts, whether or not such claims would otherwise constitute provable claims
under this Act" and provided that if
an executory contract or unexpired lease of real estate shall
be rejected pursuant to direction of the judge given in a proceeding instituted under this section, or shall have been rejected
by a trustee or receiver in bankruptcy or receiver in equity,
in a proceeding pending prior to the institution of a proceeding
under this section,521 any person injured by such rejection
shall, for all purposes of this section and of the reorganization
plan, its acceptance and confirmation, be deemed to be a creditor.
Regardless of the lessor's status as a "creditor," however, his
claim "for injury resulting from the rejection of an unexpired
lease of real estate or for damages or indemnity under a covenant contained in such lease"5 2 2 was limited to an amount not
516. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (c) (6) (1970). See note 409 supra.
517. See text accompanying notes 508-11 supra.
518. 48 Stat. 912 (1934).
519. 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1970).
520. There was an exception in § 7Tb (b) (6), although none in §
77B (c) (5), for "contracts in the public authority." See note 409 supra.
521. Section 77B (a) authorized the filing of a § 77B petition in a
pending straight bankruptcy case.
522. Section 77B (b). In view of the attention that the Supreme
Court later gave to this language, it is important to note that present
§ 63a(9), 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (9) (1970), differs only in referring to claims
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to exceed the rent without acceleration reserved by the lease for
the three years next succeeding the date of surrender of the
premises to, or reentry by, the landlord plus unpaid rent accrued to that date.
The Supreme Court promptly undertook the construction of
this language as it related to the claims of landlords. Where a section 77B petition was filed in a pending straight bankruptcy case
in which the bankruptcy trustee had already rejected the lease,
the Court viewed the section as changing the prior law to give
the lessor a provable and hence a dischargeable damage claim
based solely on the rejection of the lease even though it contained no covenant for damages or indemnity. The lessor had
such a claim despite the fact that following rejection he had reentered and relet the premises under such circumstances as to
amount to a surrender of the leasehold which terminated the
tenant's liability for future rent under applicable state law.
The Court reasoned that section 77B(b) contemplated both surrender and reentry. Moreover, since the landlord's claim "necessarily is the difference between the rental value of the remainder of the term and the rent reserved, both discounted to
present worth," he must be allowed to obtain possession and
avail himself of the present rental value for which he must give
credit in computing his damages.

28

In another case where a straight bankruptcy trustee had rejected a lease before the section 77B petition was filed, the lessor had immediately reentered and terminated the leasehold unof a landlord "for damages for injury .

. . ."

(emphasis added).

Former

§ 63a(7), the predecessor of present § 63a(9), was enacted as part of
the Act containing § 77B and contained language identical to that quoted
from § 77B(b). Like present § 63a(9), however, it imposed a limit
of one year's rent as stipulated in the lease on the landlord's claim

for loss of future rents in straight bankruptcy cases. 48 Stat. 924 (1934).
523. City Bank Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433, 443 (1937).
See also Schwartz v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 456 (1937). But where
the lease itself provided that transfer by the tenant to the landlord
of the tenant's interest in the leasehold should constitute full satisfaction
of the landlord's rights, and where the landlord accepted such a transfer from the tenant and its bankruptcy trustee, the landlord had no
provable claim in the subsequent § 77B case. Meadows v. Irving Trust
Co., 299 U.S. 464 (1937).
The Court in City Bank also observed by way of dictum that §
77B had changed the usual bankruptcy rule "that the claim under an
executory contract must mature at or before the filing of the petition"
(cf. notes 46, 56 and 57, Countryman, Part I) so that "claims upon
covenants for damages or indemnity arising out of the termination of
a lease after initiation of proceedings under § 77B are provable." 299
U.S. at 440.
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der a provision of the lease which contained a covenant by the
lessee to indemnify the lessor against all loss of rent resulting
from such termination. Rejecting the lessor's argument that all
damages proved in excess of the statutoiy limitation were allowable as a claim subordinated to other creditors but with priority over stockholders under the reorganization plan, the Court
read the limitation on the lessor's claim under the covenant to
be a complete limitation on any allowance in the section 773
case. The Court held, moreover, that the limitation as so read
52
did not violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment. '

Where section 77B trustees had for nine months been operating the debtor's street railway system on 55 leased lines without assuming or rejecting the leases, the Court held that the
trustees were not required to pay the lessors' taxes, which were
part of the stipulated rentals. The remedy of the lessors was
described in language reminiscent of the equity practice:
Notwithstanding the fact that § 77B gives no specific authority to trustees in reorganization to reject burdensome leases
or contracts, it is well settled that they have that right and
are accorded a reasonable time within which to exercise it. If,
in the opinion of the [lessors], a reasonable time has expired
those companies are not without redress. They may declare
a forfeiture of the leases ...

for nonperformance on the part

of the trustees, or they may apply to the District Court to compel an election by the trustees, to affirm or disaffirm. In the
meantime, if the situation were such as to permit a proper calculation of the amount due for use and occupation, it would
be proper for the court to order the trustees to pay a reasonable
sum to be treated as a payment for use and occupation in the
event that the leases... are disaffirmed or, on account of rent,
in the event they are affirmed. But this record [due to intermingling of properties and of accounts] furnishes no basis for
such a calculation .... Moreover, since the [lessors] are simple contract creditors, an overpayment to any one of them
might work a preference as against other such creditors ....525
524. Keuhner v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 445 (1937). Where the
leased premises were all sublet and the § 77B trustee never had possession, the "surrender" which established the beginning of the three-year
period was held to occur when the landlord was notified of the rejection of the lease by the trustee. In re United Cigar Stores Co., 86 F.2d
629 (2d Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 679 (1937).
525. Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, 312 U.S. 168, 174 (1941). While
the Court cited no precedent for the "well settled" authority of § 77B
trustees to reject executory contracts and leases, lower courts had held:
(1)While a debtor in possession for 28 days must account to the lessor
for subrents collected, he had not yet had a reasonable time to elect
whether to assume or reject. Central Manhattan Properties v. D.A.
Schulte, Inc., 91 F.2d 728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 743 (1937).
(2) After a debtor in possession had continued operation of one of a chain
of restaurants on leased property for slightly over a month, the debtor,
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One court ignored this "reasonable time" standard of the
Supreme Court and held that the later enacted 60-day time limit
of section 70b

52 6

was applicable to a section 77B reorganization

so that a trustee who neither assumed nor rejected a lease within
that time was deemed to have rejected it.527 Another court,
however, dealing with an executory contract to purchase electric power with respect to which the section 77B court had
given the trustees three months to decide whether to assume
or reject, held that although the trustees had not assumed the
contract by letting that time expire it was error to reserve jurisdiction to determine the question of assumption or rejection
later in an order confirming a reorganization plan that neither
assumed nor rejected the contract. Since "a claim under an executory contract does not arise .

.

. until the contract has been

rejected," rejection should occur not later than confirmation of
the plan so that the plan might provide for the claim thus cre5 28
ated.
on the lessor's application for permission to repossess, would be ordered
within five days either to pay for use and occupation at the contract
rate or to vacate the premises and promptly bring before the court the
matter of adoption or rejection of the lease. In re Chase Commissary
Corp., 11 F. Supp. 288 (S.D.N.Y. 1935). (3) Before a reorganization
plan had been filed, the court could order the rejection of a lease on
the petition of the debtor in possession and over the objection of the
lessor. In re Cheney Bros., 12 F. Supp. 605 (D. Conn. 1935). See also
In re 211 East Del. Place Bldg. Corp., 76 F.2d 834 (7th Cir. 1935). Cf.
In re Connecticut Co., 95 F.2d 311 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U.S.
581 (1938), holding that where the debtor in possession agreed with

the lessor to rescind a lease the lessor had a first priority claim both
for the rent stipulated in the lease up to the date of rescission and
for the use and occupancy thereafter until surrender of the premises

to the lessor.
In re Chicago Rapid Transit Co., 129 F.2d 1, 4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 683 (1942), later found Philadelphia Co. v. Dipple, supra,
authority for the power of a § 77B court to "rid the trust estate of
exorbitant unjustified expenditures" and thus concluded that the court
could authorize the § 77B trustees of a street railway to reject a lease
of deficit lines and to operate them for the account of the lessor until
the lessor repossessed or state authorities approved discontinuance of
service.
While a use and occupancy allowance might also be made to a
vendor under an executory land contract, In re Charles Nelson Co., 27
F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Calif. 1939), denied such an allowance on a finding
that the § 77B trustee had not used the property during the period
fixed by the court for him to decide whether to assume or reject the
contract.
526. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
527. Wiemeyer v. Koch, 152 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1945).
528. Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co. v. United Rys. &
Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799, 804 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 663

(1937).
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Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc.52 0 directly
confronted the problem of the manner and consequences of assumption or rejection of a lease in a section 77B proceeding. There
the debtor in possession under section 77B paid the rental stipulated in the lease while the case was pending, and the confirmed
plan neither expressly assumed nor rejected the lease but
nonetheless provided that the debtor would assign it to a successor corporation. The lease was so assigned and the case was
closed. Later, the lessor moved to re-open the case and to modify the plan to require that the successor corporation assume
the debtor's obligations under the lease. The court agreed with
the lessor that the mere assignment of the lease to the successor corporation "created privity of estate between it and [the
lessor], but no privity of contract" so that the successor corporation was bound to pay the stipulated rental as long as it remained in possession "but it could move out at any time, free of
liability to the landlord."5 30 However, the court found no abuse
of discretion in the refusal of the section 77B court to reopen
the case inasmuch as the lessor had received notice of the proceeding, had entered an appearance, and had received notice of
the confirmation hearing but had entered no objection. Although in the absence of a rejection of the lease the lessor could
file no claim in the section 77B case, he was "entitled to insist
that his lease be either rejected or fully assumed under the plan
and he must appear in the reorganization court at the confirmation hearing or before, in order to assure adequate protection
531
for his interests."
Shortly after this decision the lessor's worst fears were realized. The successor corporation to which the debtor had assigned the lease paid the rent for a few months and then itself
assigned the lease and surrendered possession to another. When
the lessor sued the successor corporation in a state court for
rent accruing after the second assignment, it recovered a summary judgment which was promptly reversed on appeal The
appellate court said that the lessor at trial might invoke provisions in the lease providing that the original lessee disclose
to the lessor any proposed assignee, that the lessor would then
529. 111 F.2d 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 654 (1940),
discussed in note 252 supra.
530. Id. at 288.
531. Id. at 290. The court did not consider whether the provision
in the plan for assignment of the lease could be treated as an assumption of the lease, but resolution of that question apparently would not
affect the liability of the successor corporation.
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have had the privilege of proposing his own assignee on terms
no less favorable than those offered by the lessee's proposed
assignee and that if the lessor had thereafter accepted the
lessee's proposed assignee the assignee would assume the lease.
But here the successor corporation had not assumed the lease,
and the lessor had recognized its right to possession and had
accepted rent from it. Thus the successor corporation "has
32
cogent argument that only privity of estate arose."
Apparently the lessor was left with no recourse save against
the original debtor, a now defunct corporate shell. 533 And for
the nonbankrupt party to an executory contract other than a
lease who permitted a similar assignment of the contract, the
consequences would be even more grim. With neither "privity
of estate" nor "privity of contract," such a party has no contractual claim against the successor corporation even for benefits
received from him by that corporation. 534 Where the successor
corporation in another section 77B proceeding did assume the
obligations of an executory contract to share expenses with tenants in common under an oil lease and the contract was neither
assumed nor rejected in the section 77B proceeding, however, the
successor was held liable thereon to the cotenants. 535
532. Mohonk Realty Corp. v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 260 App. Div.
64, 77, 20 N.Y.S.2d 739, 742 (1940), appeal dismissed, 286 N.Y. 476, 36
N.E.2d 669 (1941).
533. Even the lessor's recourse against the original debtor is unclear.
Section 77B(h) provided that the "final decree shall discharge the
debtor from its debts and liabilities" except as provided in the plan.
A determination whether this discharge would cover the lessor involves
a choice between the somewhat inconsistent provisions of § 77B (b) that
the term "creditors" should include "all holders of claims . . . including
claims under executory contracts" and that it was on the rejection of
the contract that any person injured thereby is to "be deemed to be
a creditor."
534. 4 A. CoRnn, CoNTRAcns § 906 (1951). Cf. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-210. Under the law of contracts an assignee of a contract
who does not assume its obligations is not liable to the other contracting
party, but if he does assume the contract he remains liable even though
he thereafter disposes of it. Both In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 111
F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1940), discussed in text accompanying note 502 supra,
and the last sentence of § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970), (see text
accompanying note 465 supra) indicate that the trustee who "assumes"
a contract under the Bankruptcy Act incurs a lesser obligation. The
trustee incurs liability to the other contracting party by the assumption
but terminates that liability where he properly disposes of the contract.
535. Arkansas Fuel Oil Co. v. Pace, 203 Ark. 52, 155 S.W.2d 886
(1941). See also Black v. Richfield Oil Corp., 146 F.2d 801 (9th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 867 (1945), where the successor corporation
assumed all contracts which had been assumed by the trustee in the
§ 77B case. For reasons indicated in note 533 supra, it is unclear
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Chapters X, XI, XII and XI were adopted in 1938 and contain nearly identical provisions which treat executory contracts
in a manner now familiar. The Chapter X provisions may be
taken to establish the pattern. An "executory contract" is defined to include unexpired leases of real property.53 0 On the
approval of a petition, the judge may permit the rejection of any
executory contract except a contract "in the public authority"'5 7
after notice to the parties to such contracts and to such other
parties in interest as the judge may designate.5 38 The plan
may also provide for rejection of executory contracts except
contracts in the public authority.53 9 If an executory contract is
rejected by a plan or with the permission of the court in a
Chapter X case, or by a trustee or receiver in bankruptcy or a
receiver in equity in a prior pending proceeding, 540 "any person
injured by such rejection shall, for the purposes of this chapter
and of the plan, its acceptance and confirmation, be deemed a
creditor. The claim of a landlord for injury resulting from
the rejection of an unexpired lease" of realty or for damages
or indemnity under a covenant contained in the lease is provable but is limited to an amount not to exceed the rent reserved
by the lease for three years following the date of surrender to
whether the original debtor, again a defunct corporate shell, also remained liable on the contract. Perhaps a § 77B debtor contemplating
the acquisition of future assets and intending to dispose of a contract
without assuming or rejecting it as debtor in possession should seek
to effect a novation under the plan. See 4 A. Comm;, CoNmAC=S § 866
(1951).
536. Section 106(7), 11 U.S.C. § 506(7) (1970). The provisions of
the other chapters are identical. Sections 306(4), 406(4), 606(5), 11
U.S.C. §§ 706(4), 806(4), 1006(5) (1970).
537. See note 409 supra.
538. Section 116(1), 11 U.S.C. § 516(1) (1970). The provisions of
the other chapters vary inthree respects: (1)there isno concept of
approval of the petition as a prerequisite to rejection, (2) the authority
is conferred on the court (which includes the referee) rather than the
judge, and (3) there is no exception for contracts in the public authority. Sections 313(1), 413(1), 613(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 713(1), 813(1),
1013(1) (1970). The statutory provisions for notice and hearing are
perpetuated in Chapter XII Rule 13-604, which took effect October 1,
1973, and in proposed Chapter X Rule 10-606 and proposed Chapter
XI Rule 11-53, both of which have been circulated to the bench and
bar for comment but which have not yet been submitted to the Supreme
Court for approval.
539. Section 216(4), 11 U.S.C. § 616(4) (1970). The provisions of
the other chapters do not except contracts in the public authority. Sections 357(2), 461(4), 646(6), 11 U.S.C. §§ 757(2), 861(4), 1046(6) (1970).
540. Petitions initiating chapter cases may be filed in pending bankruptcy cases. Sections 127, 321, 421, 621, 11 U.S.C. §§ 527, 721, 821, 1021
(1970).
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or reentry by the landlord, plus unpaid rent accrued to such
date. 54 1 The only reference to the assumption of contracts was
added in 1967 and provides that, where the proceeding aborts
and straight bankruptcy follows, any contract "entered into or
assumed" in the chapter case "and which is executory in whole
or in part" at the time bankruptcy is ordered shall be deemed
to be rejected unless expressly assumed within 60 days of the
bankruptcy or of the qualification of the bankruptcy trustee,
whichever is later, unless the court for cause shown extends
or reduces the time.5 42 Thus far the courts have considered only

some of these provisions and, with one exception, 543 only in
cases arising under Chapters X and XI.
These provisions indicate that the court may permit the re541. Section 202, 11 U.S.C. § 602 (1970). The provisions of Chapters
XI and XII are identical. Sections 353, 458, 11 U.S.C. §§ 753, 858 (1970).
The provisions in Chapter XIII omit the reference to an earlier rejection

by an equity receiver and limit the landlord's claim for loss of future
rent to the amount of rent reserved by the lease for one year. Section
642, 11 U.S.C. § 1042 (1970).

542. Section 238b, 11 U.S.C. § 736(b) (1970).

Identical provisions

were added to Chapters XI and XII in 1967, Sections 378b, 483b, 11
U.S.C. §§ 778(b), 883(b) (1970). Bankruptcy Rule 122(10), which applies whenever a Chapter X, XI, XII or XIII case is converted to a
straight bankruptcy case, provides:
Rule 607 [see text accompanying note 483 supra] shall govern
the assumption, rejection, and assignment of contracts entered
into or assumed by a trustee, receiver, or debtor in possession
acting in the superseded chapter case which are executory in
whole or in part at the time of the entry of the order directing

the case to continue as a bankruptcy case ....

However, if a trustee had been selected and qualified in a pending
straight bankruptcy case before the abortive conversion to a chapter
case, the time limits prescribed by Rule 607 will begin to run from
the entry of the order sending the case back to straight bankruptcy.
543. In re Freeman, 49 F. Supp. 163 (S.D. Ga. 1943), reached the
unremarkable conclusion that an unexpired lease of real estate is an
executory contract as defined in § 406(4), 11 U.S.C. § 806(4) (1970),

and thus may be rejected in a Chapter XII case of the lessor. The

court held inapplicable to a Chapter XII proceeding a provision in §
70b, 11 C.S.C. § 110(b) (1970), the "unless a lease of real property
expressly otherwise provides, a rejection of the lease or of any covenant
therein by the trustee of the lessor does not deprive the lessee of his
estate." The most controversial aspect of the decision is its assumption
that the quoted provision means that the tenant may remain in possession after rejection by payment of a reasonable rental fixed by the
court. See, e.g., Creedon & Zinman, Landlord's Bankruptcy: Laissez
Les Lessees, 26 Bus. LAw. 1391, 1405 (1971). The restrictions imposed
under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 on the eviction of tenants were also held inapplicable to eviction of the tenant after rejection of the lease. Cf. Cullen v. Bowles, 148 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1945),
holding a Chapter X trustee subject to the rent ceilings imposed under
that Act. See note 401 supra.
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jection of executory contracts at any time and that the confirmed plan may also reject such contracts. As either form of
rejection requires court approval, moreover, most courts considering the matter have concluded that the 60-day time limit
of section 70b 54 4 and its provision that any contract not assumed

within that time shall be deemed rejected 5 4 5 are inapplicable
in chapter proceedings.5 46 As one court has put it, the provisions in Chapter X "clearly indicate Congress intended that before an executory contract should be rejected, a judicial hear544.

11 U.S.c. § 110 (b) (1970).

545. See text accompanying note 465 supra.
546. In re Imperial "400" Nat'l, Inc., 429 F.2d 680 (3d Cir. 1970);
Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d 582
(5th Cir. 1966); Title Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Hart, 160 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947); In re Flying W Airways, Inc., 328
F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Pa. 1971); In re M & S Amusement Enterprises,
Inc., 122 F. Supp. 364 (D. Del 1954); In re Childs Co., 64 F. Supp.
282 (S.D.N.Y. 1944). See also In re Alfar Dairy, Inc., 458 F.2d 1258
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); In re American Nat'l Trust,
426 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970). The Supreme Court decision that the
forfeiture provisions of § 70b are applicable in a Chapter X case originally contained a statement that "Congress has made § 70 applicable
to reorganization proceedings under Ch. X." By a later order (Sup.
Ct. J. 276 (Oct. Term, 1944)), the opinion was amended to read: "Congress has made the forfeiture provision of § 70 applicable to reorganization proceedings under Ch. X." Finn v. Meighan, 325 U.S. 300, 302
(1945), discussed in text accompanying note 396 supra.
One court has long assumed that the time limits of § 70b, and the
consequence of the trustee's failure to assume within that time, are applicable in chapter proceedings. Ten-Six Olive, Inc. v. Curby, 208 F.2d
117 (8th Cir. 1953), discussed in text accompanying note 477 supra. See
also Wiemeyer v. Koch, 152 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1945), discussed in text
accompanying note 527 supra. But that court has more recently noted
that it may be in error. Entin v. Stevens, 323 F.2d 894, 899 (8th Cir.
1963), discussed in text accompanying note 476 supra. See also Stauduhar v. Limbach Co., 308 F. Supp. 696 (E.D. Wis. 1970); In re Capital
Serv., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 430 (S.D. Cal. 1955); In re Schenectady Ry., 93
F. Supp. 67 (N.D.N.Y. 1950).
Bank of Am. Natl Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Smith, 336 F.2d 528
(9th Cir. 1964), held that contracts for the sale of goods had not been
assumed where the receiver in a Chapter X case manufactured goods
and filled prepetition and postpetition orders under such contracts. In
response to an argument that the receivers had not obtained court approval for rejection of the contracts as required by § 313(1), 11 U.S.C.
§ 713(1) (1970), the court noted that the Chapter XI proceeding had
aborted after two months and the debtor had been adjudicated a bankrupt. Thereafter, the proceedings were to be conducted as if the debtor
had been adjudicated a bankrupt on the date of the filing of the Chapter
XE petition so that, presumably, the time period specified in § 70b began
running with the filing of the Chapter XE petition and the contracts
were deemed rejected because not assumed within that time. See also
In re Robertson, 41 F. Supp. 665 (W.D. Ark. 1941). Cf. text accompanying note 542 supra.
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ing and inquiry, at which interested parties might be heard,
should be held, and.
an executory contract [can] be rejected
only with permission of the court ....,,547
That court also concluded that while Chapter X like the
other chapters does not expressly impose the same requirements
for assumption of executory contracts, "we think by necessary
implication it requires judicial approval for such . .. assumption" since otherwise
a trustee, without authorization by the court,
could bar the
court from exercising its statutory power to authorize the rejection ....

Assumption ... of executory contracts may have

an important bearing on the financial status of the debtor, and
should not be implied from conduct of the trustee or debtor
in possession, but should be the result only of judicial consideration.
Hence, a confirmed plan could reject an unexpired lease even
though the trustee had not complied with a court order directing him to report to the court within two months on the advisability of rejecting any executory contracts, and after expiration
of that time 548 had given written notice to the lessor that he
had "elected to ratify the lease." The lessor's remedy, the court
said, would have been to "petition the court for an order of affirmative assumption or rejection. ....,,549
547. Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d
582, 584 (5th Cir. 1966).
548. See also In re Rochester Shipbuilding Corp., 32 F. Supp. 98
(W.D.N.Y. 1940), discussed in note 50, Countryman, Part I, holding that
a Chapter X trustee did not adopt a time charter by failing to reject
it within the time fixed by the court. In re the Sire Plan, Inc., 221
F. Supp. 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), modified sub nom. Fifty-Seven Associates
v. Joseph, 322 F.2d 120 (2d Cir. 1963), was a case in which the Chapter
X court gave the trustee three and one-half months to file recommendations for assumption or rejection of executory contracts and later extended the time an additional 23 days. Almost a month after the expiration of the extended time, the chapter court ordered that the leased
premises be surrendered to the holder of a mortgage on the leasehold
by the end of the next month with permission to the lessor to terminate
the lease unless it received all arrearages of rent within a week thereafter and rent payments were kept current. The trustees, who had been
collecting subrents, were ordered to pay to the lessor an amount for
use and occupancy prior to their surrender of the premises which was
less than the stipulated rental. The trustees were also given six months
to initiate an action to challenge the validity of the leasehold mortgage
with provision that if they were successful the mortgagee would have
a lien on the leasehold for any payments it had made in excess of
subrents collected by it to avoid termination of the lease.
549. Texas Importing Co. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, 360 F.2d
582, 585 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113
F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940), discussed in text accompanying note 250 supra.
The decision in Texas Importing that court approval is required before
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Other courts, however, have found without directly addressing the question, that the trustee or debtor in possession has
assumed an executory contract in circumstances revealing no
court approval,550 or at least no approval on notice and hearing to the other party to the contract.55 1 Regardless of the problematic manner of assumption, where the chapter trustee does
assume a contract he takes it subject to the debtor's earlier assignment of a security interest in the proceeds thereof 552 and
subject to the right of the other contracting party to credit the
books of the debtor for merchandise returned and for advance
553
payments made under the contract.
Where the chapter trustee rejects a contract, the other contracting party has a claim for damages, 54 not a claim for restitution of part of the purchase price paid. 55 5 The rejection of a
a Chapter X trustee can assume an executory contract is extensively
criticized in Comment, Chapter X Trustee Adoption of Executory Contracts: The Bankruptcy Act Speaks Through Its Silence, 115 U. PA. L.
Rsv. 937 (1967).
550. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994 (3d Cir. 1951) (Chapter X trustees assumed a contract for the sale of goods by making deliveries thereunder); Di Lauro v. Electronics Wholesalers, Inc., 239 A.2d
162 (App. D.C. 1968) (Chapter X trustee assumed a contract for the
sale of goods by filling prepetition orders placed thereunder). See also
In re Public Ledger, Inc., 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947), discussed in text
accompanying note 289 supra.
551. Title Ins. & Guar. Co. v. Hart, 160 F.2d 961 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 761 (1947) (Chapter X court had approved the trustee's
assumption of a lease by directing him to exercise an option to renew
it). Cf. In Te Grayson Shops, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)
(debtor in possession had assumed a lease by assigning it pursuant to
a stipulation with the lessor which the court had approved).
552. In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994 (3d Cir. 1951). Cf.
Bank of An. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Smith, 336 F.2d 538 (9th Cir.
1964), discussed in note 546 supra, where the court's holding that the
contract had been rejected defeated the claim of a bank that its prepetition security interest in the proceeds of the contract reached the proceeds of the receiver's performance. See also text accompanying notes
440, 455 & 486, supra.
553. Di Lauro v. Electronic Wholesalers, Inc, 239 A.2d 162 (App.
D.C. 1968), discussed in note 550 supra; H.G. Pizant & Co. v. Gust M.
Newberg Const. Co., 299 N.B.2d 369 (Ill. App. 1973).
554. King v. Baer, 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
577 (1973); In Tre Anerican Nat'1 Trust, 426 F.2d 1059 (7th Cir. 1970);
Workman v. Harrison, 282 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1960).
555. King v. Baer, 482 F.2d 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct.
577 (1973). Rejection may have other consequences for the other contracting party. Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Ray, 328 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 827 (1964), affirmed a Chapter X court's approval
of the trustee's rejection of a contract under which the debtor had assigned chattel paper to a finance company. The court found that the
contract was executory because it merely made the finance company
the debtor's agent for collection of all its present and after-acquired
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lease may give the lessor a first priority claim for use and occupancy of the property, 556 but only to the extent that it was used
for the benefit of the estate.55 7 Moreover, there are statutory limits on the amount of a lessor's damage claim for loss of future
55
rent,"
and other limitations may be found. Where an ipso facto
clause provided for termination of a lease on the filing of a
Chapter XI petition and for the retention by the lessor of a
security deposit equal to three months' rent as "liquidated damages," for example, the parties were held to have limited their
damages at the amount of the deposit so that the lessor could
have no additional claim for loss of future rent.659 And a lessor
with an option to terminate on the filing of a Chapter X petition who both exercised the option and accepted a surrender
of the premises was held to have terminated all liability for
future rent and thus to have forfeited his right to retain a security
deposit. 560
chattel paper. When the trustee later sued the finance company in a
state court for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, the prior decision was held to foreclose the finance company by collateral estoppel
from again asserting that there had been a sale of the chattel paper
rather than an agency contract. Ray v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 92 N.J.
Super. 519, 224 A.2d 143 (1966).
556. In re Plywood Co., 425 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1970). In both
straight bankruptcy and rehabilitation cases there is a small complication typified by the tenant whose rent is payable in advance on the
first of each month and who, for example, defaults on April 1 and files
a petition under the Bankruptcy Act on April 11. Since the full rent
for April was payable before the bankruptcy, it arguably represents
a claim against the bankrupt (entitled to a fifth priority under § 64a (5),
11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (5) (1970), but not in Chapter X, where § 64a is
made inapplicable by § 102), with the first priority use and occupancy
claim to run from May 1. On the other hand, the claim for April could
be apportioned, one-third against the bankrupt and two-thirds against
the trustee. The prevailing but not unanimous view is that the claim
should be apportioned. See In re Fredrick Meats, Inc., CCH BANKII. L.
REP. 64,982 (9th Cir. 1973); In re Universal Medical Servs., Inc., 357
F. Supp. 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1973), and cases cited.
557. 120 Wall Associates v. Schilling, 266 F.2d 548 (2d Cir. 1959)
(although two floors leased, use and occupancy only for the one floor
used); American A. & B. Coal Corp. v. Leonardo Arrivabene, S.A., 280
F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960), discussed in note 50, Countryman, Part I (no
use and occupancy, consisting of demurrage under time charters, where
vessels not used).
558. See text accompanying note 541 supra.
559. In re Plywood Co., 425 F.2d 151 (1970). Cf. Oldden v. Tonto
Realty Corp., 143 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1944), discussed in text accompanying notes 495-96 supra.
560. Floro Realty & Inv. Co. v. Steem Elec. Corp., 128 F.2d 338 (8th
Cir. 1942). The lessor who did not exercise his right to terminate on
the filing of a straight bankruptcy petition, but who also accepted a
surrender of the premises, fared no better in Ten-Six Olive, Inc. v.
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In the absence of very careful advance planning, the latest
opportunity for assumption or rejection of an executory contract, at least in a Chapter XI case, is the time of confirmation.
In In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc.501 an executory contract to purchase stock came belatedly to light in a Chapter XI
proceeding because of the debtor's failure to include it in the
list of executory contracts required to be filed with the petition.562 The question of rejection of the contract came on for
hearing after the plan had been confirmed, and the referee
permitted the rejection because he found no time limits upon his
section 313(1)563 authorization to permit rejection of executory
contracts. The referee's allowance of the rejection was reversed
on the ground that he had lost jurisdiction. Although the referee
had purported to retain jurisdiction in the confirmation order,
no provision for such retention was contained in the plan
as required after confirmation by section 368.04 Sections 369
and 370565 provide that the court shall in any event retain jurisdiction until final allowance of and distribution to all properly
filed claims "affected by the plan," but the court held that "affected by" meant "provided for" 5 0 and found that the plan provided for distribution only to claims arising from the rejection
of executory contracts "prior to confirmation." Section 367517
Curby, 208 F.2d 117 (8th Cir. 1953), discussed in note 477 supra. But
see City Bank Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 299 U.S. 433 (1937), discussed
in text accompanying note 523 supra.
561. 227 F. Supp. 609 (S.DN.Y. 1964).
562. Section 324(1), 11 U.S.C. § 724(1) (1970). There is an identical requirement in Chapters XII and XI, but not in Chapter X. Sections 424(1), 624(1), 11 U.S.C. §§ 824(1), 1024(1) (1970). Proposed
Chapter XI Rule 11-11 (1) preserves the statutory requirement, but
Chapter XII Rule 13-402, effective October 1, 1973, relieves the debtor
of the obligation to file a list of executory contracts unless directed
by the court to do so in a particular case.
563. 11U.S.C. § 713(1) (1970).
564. Id. § 768. Where jurisdiction is so retained the court can
permit the issuance of certificates of indebtedness by § 344, 11 U.S.C.
§ 744 (1970), and can dismiss the case or adjudicate the debtor a
bankrupt for default under the plan by § 377, 11 U.S.C. § 777 (1970).
Chapter X contemplates that the court will retain jurisdiction until
consummation of the plan. Section 228, 11 U.S.C. § 628 (1970). Chapter
XII apparently contemplates that the court may retain jurisdiction without provision for retention in the plan. Section 483, 11 U.S.C. § 883
(1970). Chapter XII contemplates that the court will retain jurisdiction until consummation of the proceeding by ruling on the debtor's
discharge. Section 662, 11 U.S.C. § 1062 (1970).
565. 11U.S.C. §§ 769, 770 (1970).
566. Confirmation of a Chapter XI plan discharges all dischargeable
debts "provided for" by the plan except as provided in the plan or
in the confirmation order. Section 371, 11 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
567. 11 U.S.C. § 767 (1970).
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provides that, except as otherwise provided in sections 369 and
370,568 the case shall be dismissed on confirmation of the plan, and
section 372569 provides that on consummation of the plan the
court shall enter a final decree closing the estate. While the
latter provision indicates that some jurisdiction remains after
dismissal and until final decree, the court held that such residual
jurisdiction did not extend to postconfirmation rejection of executory contracts. The court reasoned that the other contracting
party would become a creditor too late to be provided for in the
plan and too late for other creditors to be aware of his existence
57
when voting on the plan.

0

Even where an executory contract is effectively rejected
so that the other contracting party becomes a creditor, the re5 71
jection may occur after the time for filing claims has expired.
At a time when Chapter XI required claims to be filed within
572
six months of the date first set for the first creditors' meeting,
573
In re Miracle Mart held that where the referee permitted the
568. Id. §§ 769, 770.
569.

Id. § 772.

570. The court relied on Consolidated Gas Elec. Light & Power Co.
v. United Ry. & Elec. Co., 85 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1936), cert. denied,
300 U.S. 663 (1937), discussed in text accompanying note 528 supra.
571. In Chapter X and Chapter XII cases the judge fixes, §§ 196,
451, 11 U.S.C. §§ 596, 851 (1970) and may extend, §§ 119, 413(3), 11
U.S.C. §§ 519, 813(3) (1970) the time for filing claims. Expressly inapplicable to both of these chapters is § 57n, 11 U.S.C. § 93(n) (1970),
which allows six months after the first date set for the first creditors'
meeting as the time for filing claims in straight bankruptcy. Sections
102, 402, 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 802 (1970). In Chapter XIII nothing is said
about the court's fixing a time for filing claims or about § 57n, and
its time period is therefore applied. Fausett v. Murner, 402 F.2d 961
(5th Cir. 1968); In re Willett, 265 F. Supp. 999 (S.D. Calif. 1967); In
re Heger, 180 F. Supp. 147 (D. Minn. 1959); In re Maye, 180 F. Supp.
43 (E.D. Va. 1958). Cf. Chapter XIII Rule 13-302(e), effective October
1, 1973.
Except for a provision barring claims which were barred by the
expiration of the six-month period of § 57n before a Chapter XI petition was filed in a straight bankruptcy case, Chapter XI originally was
also silent as to the time for filing claims, and claims were paid on
the basis of the debtor's schedules. In 1963, § 355, 11 U.S.C. § 755(a)
(1970), was added to make § 57n applicable. In 1967, § 355 was
amended to require filing of claims at any time before confirmation
except that (1) any claims scheduled by the debtor can be filed 30
days after notice of confirmation but cannot be allowed in an amount
in excess of the amount scheduled, and (2) a claim arising from the
rejection of an executory contract can be filed within such time as the
court may direct.
Cf. proposed Chapter X Rule 10-401, Chapter XI Rule 11-33 and
Chapter XII Rule 13-302.
572. See note 571 supra.
573. 396 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1968).
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debtor in possession under Chapter XI to reject leases after
that time had expired the referee had power to allow the lessors
10 days to file their claims. Shortly after the referee's action,
5 74
Congress amended Chapter XI to provide this power.

Because there is no provision in the chapters as there is in
straight bankruptcy that an executory contract not assumed
within a specified time shall be deemed rejected, there is a possibility as there was under former section 77B 5 7 5 that a chapter
case may be closed with some such contracts neither assumed
nor rejected.

It is clear under the chapters,5

70

moreover, that

the other contracting party is not a "creditor" until his contract
is rejected. 577' Thus where there has been no assumption or
rejection in a chapter case the claim of the other contracting
party is not discharged.578 This conclusion has been reached by
574. See note 571 supra. The court also held that claims for damages arising out of the defaults of the debtor in possession prior to
rejection of the lease were not entitled to priority as administration
expenses. Cf. In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.
1940), discussed in text accompanying note 248 supra.
575. See text accompanying notes 528-35 supra.
576. It was not clear under former § 77B. See note 533 supra.
577. If the other contracting party was a lessor with an ipso facto
clause or an option to terminate entitling him to treat the initiation
of the chapter case as a breach of a covenant for damages or indemnity,
and if he properly asserted his rights, see In re Union-Fern, Inc., 205
F. Supp. 947 (N.D.N.Y. 1962), he would have a claim as a creditor without a rejection. See note 523 supra; Kuehner v. Irving Trust Co., 299
U.S. 445 (1937), discussed in text accompanying note 524 supra. Such a
lessor would also have a claim for use and occupancy before the premises
were surrendered to him. Ghoti Estates v. Freda's Capri Restaurant,
332 Mass. 17, 123 N.E.2d 232 (1954).
578. Under Chapter X the confirmed plan is binding "upon all creditors." Section 224(1), 11 U.S.C. § 624(1) (1970). After confirmation
the property of the debtor either in its own hands or in the hands of
a successor corporation is "free and clear of the claims . . . of credi-

tors." Section 226, 11 U.S.C. § 626 (1970). The final decree discharges
the debtor except as provided in the plan or confirming order or in
the order directing transfer or retention of the property. Section 228,
11 U.S.C. § 628 (1970).
Under Chapter XI a confirmed plan is binding "upon all creditors."
Section 367(1), 11 U.S.C. § 767 (1970). Confirmation of the plan discharges the debtor from "all his unsecured debts and liabilities" except
as provided by the plan or the confirmation order. Section 371, 11
U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
Under Chapter XII the confirmed plan is binding "upon all creditors." Section 473(1), 11 U.S.C. § 873(1) (1970). The property dealt
with by the plan after confirmation, in the hands of the debtor or a
successor, is "free and clear of all debts affected by" the plan except
as provided in the plan, the confirmation order or the order directing
transfer or retention of the property. Section 474, 11 U.S.C. § 874
(1970). Confirmation of the plan discharges the debtor from all dischargeable "debts and liabilities" provided for by the plan except as

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58:479

all courts which have considered the matter.579
The courts have also concluded that where the contract is
neither assumed nor rejected the other contracting party is not
entitled to participate in the distribution under the plan.5 80
Both the decisions to this effect and the decisions dismissing
the other contracting party's contention that a contract is rejected in a chapter case if the trustee does not assume it within
the time specified in section 70b 58 suggest that the other contracting party should obtain court-approved action on his contract before confirmation of a plan. The cases holding that
nonaction means nondischargeability, moreover, suggest that the
debtor may also have an interest in obtaining such action.
There have been no chapter cases dealing with the liability
of one to whom an assumed contract is assigned. 8 2

Neither

have the courts considered whether there is any reason for not
applying in chapter cases the last sentence of section 70b, 83
which exonerates the trustee from liability where an assumed
contract is assigned to another with the approval of the court.
provided in the plan or the confirmation order.

Section 474, 11 U.S.C.

§ 874 (1970).
Under Chapter XIII the confirmed plan is binding on all "creditors."
Section 657, 11 U.S.C. § 1057 (1970). And the Chapter XIII discharge
covers all dischargeable "debts and liabilities" provided for by the plan
and all nondischargeable debts held by creditors who have accepted
the plan. Sections 660, 661, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1060, 1061 (1970).
579. In re Afar Dairy, Inc., 458 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972); United States Metal Prods. Co. v. United
States, 302 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), discussed in text accompanying note 346 supra; Columbia Prods. Corp. v. Coronation Diamonds, Inc.,
276 App. Div. 1083, 95 N.Y.S.2d 898 (1950). Cf. In re Warrack Medical
Center Hosp., 282 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Calif. 1968), where the Chapter
XI debtor, a secured creditor and an unsecured creditor entered an
agreement by which the unsecured creditor subordinated his claim to
the secured creditor. Because the agreement was not rejected in the
Chapter XI case, the court held that the secured creditor could take
the distribution to which the unsecured creditor was otherwise entitled
under the plan. It should be noted both that this contract was fully
executed by the secured creditor when it made a loan to the debtor
and that the debtor had no obligation to the unsecured creditor under
this contract. The contract was therefore not executory within the meaning of the Act so that it could not have been rejected. See note 86,
Countryman, Part I. But the case seems correctly decided quite apart
from that point.
580. In re Greenpoint Metallic Bed Co., 113 F.2d 881 (2d Cir. 1940),
discussed in text accompanying note 248 supra; In re Union-Fern, Inc.,
205 F. Supp. 947 (N.D.N.Y. 1962). But see note 577 supra.
581. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970). See note 546 supra.
582. See text accompanying notes 529-35 supra for such cases under
former § 77B.
583. 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970).
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But in approving the assignment by a debtor in possession of a
sublease to his lessor, one Chapter XI court has found it unnecessary to determine whether the lessor was assuming the debtor's covenants under the sublease. The subtenant had no complaint, the court said, because the debtor could not by the assignment relieve himself of his obligations under the sublease
and would remain liable as before if the lessor-assignee did not
perform. 584 Presumably, when the court spoke of the "debtor"
it did not refer to the debtor in possession under Chapter XI,
who has all of the title and powers of a trustee.58 5 In the absence of a novation, the debtor apparently would remain liable
on the sublease whether or not the assignee-lessor was also liable; 58 6 the subtenant was apparently not a creditor whose claim
would be discharged in the Chapter XI case. While the court
did not mention section 70b, its decision does serve to emphasize the limited protection given by the last sentence of the
section even if applied in chapter cases. By exonerating the
"trustee" from liability for postassignment breaches where an
assumed contract is assigned with approval of the court, the
section operates only to preclude a first priority claim against
the estate for such breaches and to protect the trustee (or
debtor in possession) in his capacity as such from liability for
such breaches. It does not seem to protect the debtor in chapter cases, or the bankrupt in straight bankruptcy cases, from
liability for postassignment breaches not covered by his discharge.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Except for the decisions, erroneous but of little consequence,
587
which treat conditional sale contracts as executory contracts,
the courts seem to have experienced little difficulty in fashioning a definition of executory contracts that is both workable and
consistent with the apparent policy of those provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act dealing with such contracts. There is, therefore,
no urgent need for a statutory definition.
In a few other respects, however, statutory amendments
do seem desirable. Priority treatment for unfunded pensions
of employees who have retired before the employer's bankruptcy58 8 should be expressly forbidden. The privileged treat584.
585.
586.
587.
588.

I re Grayson Shops, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 145 (SJ).N.Y. 1986).
Section 342, 11 U.S.C. § 742 (1970).
See note 535 supra.
See Countryman, Part I, at 488-91.
See text accompanying notes 260-73, 290 supra.
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ment that enables railway and airline labor forces to preserve
the status quo in section 77 and Chapter X and XI cases6SO
should be eliminated to the extent that it can be done by relieving the rehabilitation proceeding of the cumbersome procedures
of the Railway Labor Act.
Amendments would be desirable also to make clear that
the doctrine of anticipatory breach, other provisions of nonbankruptcy law and express provisions in contracts and
leases, 590 should not be available to enable the other contracting party to deprive the trustee of this option under the Bankruptcy Act to assume or reject executory contracts. The trustee
should also be given a reasonable time to cure prebankruptcy
and postbankruptcy defaults without regard to whether the
debtor had such a right under the contract or under nonbankruptcy law. 591

While the time fixed by section 70b within which the trustee is to exercise his option is not appropriate for rehabilitation
cases, 592 some adaptation of the section's further provision that
any contract not assumed within an appropriate time shall be
deemed rejected would eliminate the problems which arise
from the apparently inadvertent failure either to assume or reject executory contracts in rehabilitation cases. 9 3 A provision
that in rehabilitation cases any executory contract not assumed
with the approval of the court G94 by the time of confirmation of
a plan shall be deemed rejected and a requirement that the
plan make provision for all claims arising from executory contracts rejected or deemed rejected would eliminate such problems. The debtor or a successor could then make a deliberate
judgment whether to retain liability on the contract. If it was
concluded that liability should be retained, the confirmed plan
could assume the contract and expressly require the debtor or
a successor to assume it also. To this end the last sentence of
section 70b should be amended to require that, unless expressly
waived by the other contracting party, any person taking an
assignment of an assumed contract from the trustee in either a
589. See text accompanying notes 291-302 supra.
590. See text accompanying notes 375-445 supra.
591. See text accompanying notes 334-74 supra.
592. Most courts have recognized this. See note 546 supra and accompanying text.
593. See text accompanying notes 528-35, 561-70, 576-81 supra.
594. An amendment of § 70b, 11 U.S.C. § 110(b) (1970), to require
court approval of the assumption of an executory contract in straight
bankruptcy cases also would eliminate some uncertainties and avoid
some inadvertent assumptions.
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straight bankruptcy or a rehabilitation case must also assume
the debtor's obligations thereunder. The section should further provide that in any event the debtor's liability ends with
assignment of the contract to another.
These proposed amendments all assume no basic change in
the treatment of executory contracts under the Bankruptcy
Act, including the Act's treatment of rejection as a breach of
contract as of the date of the petition. The consequences of such
a rejection, however, are found for the most part in nonbankruptcy law, and at least two changes should be made.
One change is necessary to protect the interests of a purchaser under a land contract. Presently the trustee of the bankrupt vendor can reject such a contract and leave the purchaser
with only a general claim for damages merely because applicable nonbankruptcy law does not require the vendor to account
for payments theretofore made by the purchaser. There is no
apparent reason why the purchaser should be treated differently
from one who has given a purchase money mortgage, although
under the analysis proposed the purchase money mortgage is
not an executory contract which the trustee of the bankrupt
vendor-mortgagee can reject. The unfairness to the purchaser
under the land contract could be eliminated, as earlier suggested, 595 either by an amendment requiring recognition of the
purchaser's equity in the bankruptcy case even though it is
not recognized by nonbankruptcy law or by an amendment forbidding rejection of executory land contracts by the trustee of
the vendor where the purchaser is not in default on his pay596
ments.
The second change is necessary because the Bankruptcy
Act in its present form deals only with claims which can be converted to money. 597 While unliquidated and contingent contract
claims are provable under section 63a(4) and (8),598 they are
allowable under section 57d 59 9 only if they can be liquidated or
reasonably estimated without unduly delaying administration of
the estate. And if they are not allowed for this reason, section
63d 60° provides that they shall not be deemed provable and
595. See Countryman, Part I,at 473.
596. See Countryman, Part I,at 471.
597. I am indebted to George A. Treister, of the Los Angeles bar,
for this suggestion.
598. 11U.S.C. § 103(a) (4)& (8) (1970).
599. Id.§ 9a(d).
600. Id.§ 103(d).
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hence are not dischargeable under section 17a. 00 Under nonbankruptcy law, however, some contractual claims are provided
an equitable remedy because of the difficulties of proving monetary damages-specific performance of a land contract 0 2 and
an injunction to enforce a covenant not to compete 0 3 are ready
examples.
In the few cases where it was sought, either in receivership or under the Bankruptcy Act, the courts have refused specific performance of land contracts because to grant it would be
to prefer the nonbankrupt party over other creditors contrary
to the general policy of equal treatment for creditors in receivership and bankruptcy. 60 4 At least where individual debtors
or bankrupts are involved, it is unlikely also that the courts
would grant injunctive enforcement of a covenant not to compete. To do so would be contrary to the policy of the Bankruptcy Act to give the debtor a fresh start and to free his future earnings from prebankruptcy claims not specifically made
nondischargeable. 0 5
But these policies of the Act would be frustrated if the
courts were to decide that the difficulties of establishing monetary damages, which inspired the use of equitable remedies
apart from bankruptcy, meant that a claim for monetary damage based on breach of a land contract or a covenant not to
compete was not allowable in bankruptcy and hence not provable or dischargeable. There is no reason why the measure of
difficulty should be the same for both purposes, and section
57d 6° 6 certainly suggests a nonrigorous approach by its language
about "liquidation or reasonable estimation." Liberality might
be further encouraged, however, if section 63a 0 0 7 were amended
601. Id. § 35(a).
602. 5A A. CoRsiN, CoNTRAcTs § 1143 (1964).
603. Id. § 1210.
604. See Countryman, Part I, at 440 n.11, 465-67.
605. See Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy Cases
(Part1), 47 N.Y.U.L. REV. 407, 449-55 (1972). Heyl v. Emory & Kaufman, Ltd., 204 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1953), held that while a private sale
by an insurance agent of a list of expirations of fire and casualty policies might carry an undertaking by him to refrain from soliciting those
listed for policy renewals, a sale of the list by his bankruptcy trustee
carries no such undertaking. See also In re Meyers, 308 F. 407 (7th
Cir. 1913), which modified an order for the sale of the bankrupt's medical practice to make it clear that the sale carried no undertaking by
the bankrupt not to continue practice.
606.

11 U.S.C. § 93(d) (1970).

607. Id. § 103(a).
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to specify that unliquidated and contingent contractual claims
may be provable, even though by applicable nonbankruptcy law
an equitable remedy is provided, because of the difficulty of
establishing monetary damages with precision. 0 8

608. This problem could arise, and the proposed amendment would
be equally applicable, in cases where the contract was not executory
because fully performed by the nonbankrupt party.

